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TRANSFORMATIONS: MATERIAL TERMS FOR WRITING ON RELIGION IN 
COMPOSITION CLASSROOMS 
 
Mark Alan Williams 
 
April 10, 2013 
 
This dissertation argues for closer attention to the material conditions of student 
writing on religion. Writing scholars in recent years have called for the inclusion of 
students’ religiously inflected perspectives, values, experiences, genres, and texts in the 
classroom, but I argue insufficient attention has been paid to the broader social contexts 
in which composition students must write about religion.  
In the first chapter, I outline the basic principles of my theoretical approach and 
attempt to articulate the generalized exigency of this work in terms of our current 
political and religious climate. I contend that a clearer understanding of how changing 
conditions create and transform religions can better prepare educators to intervene in and 
alter potentially counterproductive understandings and assumptions held by students and 
instructors alike. In the second chapter, I illustrate this, demonstrating how approaches to 
religious students previously forwarded by rhetoric and composition scholars fail to 
adequately address the material conditions of the writing classroom and larger American 
religious culture in which students and teachers interact.  
The third and fourth chapters draw on scholars outside rhetoric and composition 
to offer a materialist case-study of American evangelicalism, exploring how its
 vi 
representations are distributed through various channels including institutional policies, 
celebrity representatives, research definitions, classroom interactions, and political 
platforms; and how these representations come to shape a society’s religious ideas, 
commitments and identities. I also examine the discourse of alternative forms of 
evangelicalism to demonstrate how religious formations are contested and change in 
response to changing social contexts, such as recent shifts in American attitudes towards 
homosexuality and women’s rights.  
In chapter five, I draw on translingual pedagogies emphasizing the critical use of 
students’ personal resources in the classroom to point out several ways students could 
employ their diverse religious resources in writing so as to interrogate and intervene in 
these changing religious contexts. Vital to these pedagogical recommendations is a focus 
on the role of disciplinary relationships, bodily practices, and material objects in religion, 
areas of study that have increasing value as rhetoric and composition looks to 
acknowledge these critical dimensions of learning and writing. 
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CHAPTER I  
THE WEAK MIDDLE 
 
Charles Taylor characterizes the current “Secular Age” as one in which most 
individuals can no longer naively adhere to traditions but must always choose, forced to 
recognize that their tradition is one among a range of options. Anthony Giddens similarly 
suggests that globalization has placed new demands on people: “in a cosmopolitan world, 
more people than ever before are regularly in contact with others who think differently 
from them. They are required to justify their beliefs, at least implicitly, both to 
themselves and to others.” Giddens’ description, like Taylor’s, suggests what we already 
likely know: globalization brings contact, and contact often denaturalizes habituated 
beliefs—as well as habituated assumptions, feelings and behaviors. College writing 
courses are sites where these challenges to students and their ways of being occur; not 
only because the university classroom is a site for the sort of contact that Giddens 
gestures at, but also because the rationale behind many contemporary writing courses 
emphasizes diversity, complexity, cultural critique, reflection, and choice. Our 
classrooms are inherently and intentionally sites where such encounters across difference 
will take place. Recognizing this pressure, scholars in rhetoric and composition have 
spent more than a quarter century asking how we can better facilitate (both initiate and 
address) these processes of critique, self-reflection, representation, and choice with all 
students.  
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Religious discourses are increasingly recognized by writing instructors as one of 
these sources of difference (Daniell; Goodburn; Perkins; Gere; Rand; Carter; Thomson; 
DePalma). But religious discourses—a term by which writers often designate religious 
ways of being that include religiously-inflected perspectives, values, feelings, behaviors, 
texts, genres, as well as the communities in which they circulate (Thomson 7)—are not 
always comparable to other differences that instructors work to incorporate in the 
classroom. Religious students and their religious discourses—statistics suggest 
somewhere between 70 and 80 percent of American students claim a religious 
affiliation—present a different challenge for instructors because religions have been and 
continue to be implicated in many forms of oppression and intolerance. Lizabeth Rand’s 
statement ten years ago still holds true, although it now might apply to more religious 
groups than she references: “We may feel suspicious toward religion—particularly 
Christianity—as a cultural and social force that has been used too often to oppress and 
dominate people” (351). In the United States, for example, we can cite the religious 
institutions, coalitions, and discourses currently fueling legislative and cultural efforts 
against gay marriage and contraceptive rights. Given this suspicion, it can seem that 
incorporating religious discourse as a legitimate difference in the classroom will mean 
“either working toward effecting [political] change in students, some of whom appear to 
oppose it, or reinforcing through [our] teaching practices what [we] perceive to be 
ethically noxious social relations” (Lu and Horner, “Problematic” 265).  
In this fairly common construction of the situation, we are faced with an 
ostensible choice between promoting tolerance by challenging a dominant religious 
discourse, or practicing tolerance by abstaining from forcing our critical discourse onto 
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religious students. The first to thoroughly articulate this concern was Amy Goodburn. 
Fifteen years ago, she reversed the common-sense framing of religious students as 
possessors of the dominant discourse, and instead worried that some religious students 
were actually struggling against a dominant critical discourse. As she noted, “some 
fundamentalist students’ experiences often are that of constantly defending their beliefs 
from dominant discourse, even those that invoke liberatory goals” (350). In this struggle 
she saw between critical academic discourses and Christian fundamentalist discourses, 
students were forced to “engage in counter-hegemonic practices daily in classrooms 
where the discourses through which they read the world are delegitimized or challenged” 
(350). To remedy this, Goodburn hoped to re-present fundamentalist discourse to writing 
instructors in a way that might alter what she called “oppressive classroom relations” 
(351). Following subsequent, similar critiques from Priscilla Perkins and then Rand, 
critical strategies that challenged religious discourses largely ceded the ground to 
inclusive strategies that construed religious and academic discourses as complementary 
and worked to avoid hegemonic relations between students and academic discourse.1 I 
understand this as a major shift away from trying to “fix” or “change” religious students 
and their religious discourse (promoting tolerance) and towards what Bruce Horner and 
Min Zhan Lu describe as “a commitment to honor the experiences, needs, and desires of 
students or informants” (“Problematic” 258)—what I call practicing tolerance. 
In these inclusive strategies, students’ religious commitments have come to be 
viewed increasingly as discourses or identities to be respected and incorporated as 
classroom resources that help students acquire academic discourse, while the critical idea 
                                                
1 Elizabeth Vander Lei and Lauren Fitzgerald, Shannon Carter, Heather E. Thomson, and 
Michael John DePalma have each noted this inclusive trend as well. 
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of working to change religious discourses or helping students work to change religious 
discourses has become less and less visible. This inclusive trend seems to be on the rise 
despite our persisting, if largely unvoiced, concerns that religious discourses can still 
prove hegemonic, ethically and politically suspect. I find this a less-than-satisfactory 
result. I applaud the sentiment behind this shift, but I’m concerned that in the process 
we’ve left behind the important critical aim of promoting tolerance, specifically the aim 
of helping our religious students use their writing to participate in improving their lived 
conditions. Improving those lived conditions, of course, should include helping them to 
change their religious discourse and religious discourse community. Unless we do, we 
cannot successfully answer Shari Stenberg’s call that writing be used to help religious 
students obtain new ways of examining their religion that might be “politically 
transformative” (284).  
In this dissertation, I work to locate a strategy for accomplishing inclusive goals 
while still pursuing a politically transformative agenda. I believe this begins by 
acknowledging that religious students and writing instructors are always “trying to talk to 
each other under the weight of global political, cultural, and economic forces we [can] 
only understand incompletely,” as Bronwyn Williams has written (116). Our strategies 
have not yet achieved a balance between promoting and practicing tolerance because we 
haven’t given sufficient attention to these structuring forces, what Williams also calls the 
“constraints of the structures of power” (116). My dissertation responds to this gap by 
drawing on scholarship in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and rhetoric and 
composition to posit a new contextual framework for writing on religion in light of those 
forces. Specifically, my project investigates and explicates materialist approaches to 
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religious culture, and to religious students’ writing, that can help us achieve Stenberg and 
Perkins’ politically transformative goals.  
 
The Trans-formational Approach 
In this first chapter, I outline the basic principles of my theoretical approach to 
religion, and attempt to articulate the generalized exigency of this work in terms of our 
current political and religious climate. In order to do so, we must begin from the work of 
sociologist Talal Asad, whose writings on religious studies initiated my particular line of 
approach almost thirty years ago. The crucial founding assumption in Asad’s 
“formational” approach is that religions are always in process; like genders, identities, 
and languages, religions do not have an essence or a stable core. They instead depend for 
their existence upon the forms of life that maintain and transmit them—languages, 
material objects, relationships, practices—and the social apparatuses that organize and 
authorize those forms so that particular religious practices, relations, and loyalties are 
enabled, while others are disabled. So what a religion is can only be determined 
provisionally by the practices and institutions shaping it into a temporary historical 
formation at a given moment (on this, see also Keane; Engelke; Mahmood; Robbins; and 
Chidester). Religions are always becoming.  
Asad originally asserted this perspective in a critique of anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz, who had forwarded an essential, universalizable definition of “religion” that he 
could apply to various groups and behaviors. But such universalizing definitions, Asad 
argues, “aim at identifying essences when we should be trying to explore concrete sets of 
historical relations and processes” (“Reflections” 252). Failing to explore religion in 
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terms of these concrete sets, Asad suggests, obscures the “processes of formation and 
effects of power, hovering above social reality” (251). Put another way, Asad argues that 
religious meanings and symbols simply “cannot be understood independently of . . . their 
articulation of social life in which work and power are always crucial” (250; 251). So 
Asad argues we must “begin by asking what are the historical conditions (movements, 
classes, institutions, ideologies) necessary for the existence of particular religious 
practices and discourses. In other words, let us ask: how does power create religion?” 
(252). This sets out the two related lines of religious investigation that inform Asad’s 
work as well as this dissertation—the ongoing creation of religion through processes of 
formation and through relations of power.  
 
Processes of Formation 
As indicated by the phrase “processes of formation,” Asad’s term formation here 
is not only a noun referring to a religion, but always also a verb referring to the active, 
historic process that constantly inscribes particular religious sensibilities, attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviors into individual and corporate bodies, producing religion. I prefer 
Asad’s term formation over terms like “discourse” because the crucial emphasis upon the 
contingency of particular instantiations of religion is constantly highlighted in the dual 
reference to processes of formation and products of formation. Other terms with a similar 
utility include “collective” (Latour) and “assembly” (DeLanda). Though there are 
differences, all three terms encourage users to present social groups as instable and 
constantly in process—as Bruno Latour writes, when looking at a network, we must 
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focus more on the “work” than the “net.” To put it differently, we must focus on the how 
and the why, not the what, when examining religion from a formational perspective.  
From the formational perspective, religions’ relative stability paradoxically results 
from the nearly imperceptible process of change that theorists including Pierre Bourdieu, 
Judith Butler and Alastair Pennycook have called “sedimentation.” Sedimentation occurs 
as particular practices, words, objects, and sensibilities are practiced—repeated—over 
time and in various contexts, coming to be both socially recognized and described as 
markers of particular religious formations, and so create apparently natural boundaries 
around religions through their relatively stable reproduction. Together, these apparent 
coherences and boundaries result in the sets of practices that we identify as “religions.” 
But sedimentation is an ongoing process, because material conditions continually change, 
and because all new iterations of religious actions and practices must break (however 
slightly) with the previous context in which they were performed in order to be re-
contextualized in their new context. Thus the next “stable” iteration of a religion will 
necessarily be different from the previous “stable” iteration, so that repetition 
simultaneously produces religious stability—as in duration—and assures its essential 
instability—as in change (Pennycook 34-51).  
In addition to simultaneously offering an account of the durability and instability 
of religion, the practical sedimentation process assigns religious participants an active 
role in forming and re-forming religion—after all, practitioners are the ones who bring 
religious words, forms, and behaviors into new contexts, maintaining and transforming 
religion through iterating its forms across space and time. Practitioners, then, create 
religion. Throughout the dissertation I will draw out different facets and consequences of 
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this assumption, contrasting it with the implicit assumptions in our own work. Asad’s 
formational perspective begins from the assumption that religious users do not simply 
experience or believe in a static religion—they actively perpetuate, and change, the forms 
of religion that they receive and the inflected forms of religion that they subsequently 
transmit. I will offer multiple examples of this below.  
 
Relations of Power 
But focusing on sedimentation in formational processes also introduces the 
question of power into religion, because sedimentation indicates that uses of religious 
forms are not free, but instead are constrained by the social conditions and previous 
histories of use that make them socially meaningful. As Judith Butler writes, “[T]he 
subject is neither a sovereign agent with a purely instrumental relation to language, nor a 
mere effect whose agency is pure complicity with prior operations of power. The 
vulnerability to the Other . . . is never overcome in the assumption of agency (one reason 
that ‘agency’ is not the same as ‘mastery’)” (Butler 26, qtd. in Lu and Horner, 
“Translingual Literacy” 11). This sort of tension is perhaps most visible when religious 
practitioners re-deploy religious conventions for their own purposes—like the Egyptian 
Muslim women in Sherif’s “Gender Contradictions in Families,” who don the hijab in 
order to take well-paying jobs outside the home (see discussion in chapter four). Those 
women are neither sovereign nor passive, to borrow Butler’s descriptors, but 
negotiating—deploying one religious tradition in order to transform another to their 
advantage (the Egyptian social and religious systems that encourage middle- and upper-
class married women to remain in the home).  
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As it regards religious formations, Asad addresses this “vulnerability to the 
Other” that Butler describes at least partially in terms of processes of authorization. 
Rather than asserting that there are quintessentially religious dispositions or meanings 
that we can locate in various cultural behaviors, Asad argues that for something to be 
“religious,” there must be an authorizing process, and implicitly agents, that declare it so:  
The connection between religious theory and practice is fundamentally a 
matter of power—of disciplines creating religion, interpreting true 
meanings, forbidding certain utterances and practices and authorizing 
others. Hence the questions that Geertz does not ask: how does religious 
discourse actually define religion? What are the historical conditions in 
which it can act effectively as a demand for the imitation, or the 
prohibition, or the authentication of truthful utterances and practices? How 
does power create religion? (246) 
 
That last phrase is the provocative refrain throughout Asad’s article, and the question he 
ultimately condemns Geertz for failing to address. So Asad’s formational perspective 
encourages us to focus on the creative work of power relations on several different 
levels—on one level, there are the intraformational power asymmetries between religious 
practitioners within a tradition that shape the way a religion will be practiced and talked 
about; second, there are the interformational relations and power asymmetries among 
religious (and irreligious) groups in society that shape religions by introducing new 
possibilities or restrictions into religious practices; and on a third level, there are 
interformational asymmetrical power relations between researchers and religious 
subjects, which often seem to enact the former asymmetries.  
 
Work and Power: Transformations 
In a complex move, Asad locates all of these creative and asymmetrical relations 
within Geertz’s definitional work. For Geertz, Asad argues, the heart of religion rests in 
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“religious symbols [that] formulate conceptions of a general order of existence” (qtd. in 
Asad 247); those religious conceptions are affirmed and expressed in (not shaped by) 
religious practices. On this conception of religion, Asad argues, “to achieve what is truly 
religion, ‘received practices and conventional sentiments’ must be joined to discourses 
which affirm something, which give these practices some cosmological meaning” (245). 
The essence of religion for Geertz, then, lies in a meaning behind the practices, which the 
anthropological researcher attempts to discern: “always, there must be something that 
exists beyond the observed practices, the heard utterances, the written words” (246). But 
Asad argues that this definition of religion, which still seems to hold sway in many 
rhetoric and composition texts2, gives inordinate primacy to religious thought and 
religious meanings “without regard to the processes by which meanings are constructed” 
(245). Geertz’s focus on religious meaning, Asad writes, misses “the occurrence of 
events (utterances, practices, dispositions), and the authorizing processes which give 
those events religious meaning” (245).  
For Asad, religious symbols and actions are not merely expressive of religious 
conceptual truth, but rather are constitutive of religious truth and both constrain and 
enable its experience. Asad points out that even for St. Augustine,  
[I]t is not mere religious symbols that implant true dispositions, but 
power—ranging all the way from laws (imperial and ecclesiastical) and 
other sanctions (hellfire, death, salvation, good repute, peace, etc.), to the 
disciplinary activities of social institutions (family, school, city, church, 
etc.) and of human bodies (fasting, prayer, obedience, penance, etc.). 
Augustine was quite clear that power, the effect of an entire network of 
motivated practices . . . imposed the conditions for experiencing 
[religious] truth. (242-43) 
 
                                                
2 See discussion in chapters two, three, and five 
 11 
Rather than existing out there somewhere apart from its practical realizations, for Asad 
here religious truth is immanent: implanted in bodies in the form of a “true disposition,” 
and conditionally experienced as a result of the social disciplines that produce that 
disposition.  
Asad argues that Geertz’s definition, by removing the essence of religion from 
this processual immanence, is heavily biased towards modernist, idealist, Western, and 
specifically Protestant constructions of religion. When Geertz universalizes his definition 
of religion as cosmological meaning and applies that largely Christian definition to the 
behaviors of non-Western and non-Christian religious groups, he obscures and 
perpetuates the intra- and inter-formational power relations mentioned above. First, in 
accepting the more modernist Christian construction of religion—rather than, say, 
Augustine’s—Geertz ignores the historical processes and power struggles within 
religions that shape and re-shape their practices and beliefs. He mistakes the religion he 
sees in one point in time for something transcendent. But he also mistakes the religion he 
sees in one location for something universal. In doing so, he ignores the power 
asymmetries at work between the Western researcher and his non-Western subjects, 
wherein the researcher’s discourse itself does the work of deciding what events and 
practices have true religious meaning. This research process echoes broader 
interformational power relations between Western religions like Christianity and the 
religions of the non-Western populations Geertz studies.  
To draw out these various relations, Asad has most recently focused on the 
practices and institutions of modern “secularism” that form contemporary religions. He 
sets out the following guiding questions for his study, Formations of the Secular:  
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How do attitudes to the human body (to pain, physical damage, decay, and 
death, to physical integrity, bodily growth, and sexual enjoyment) differ in 
various forms of life? What structures of the senses—hearing, seeing, 
touching—do these attitudes depend on? In what ways does the law define 
and regulate practices and doctrines on the ground that they are ‘truly 
human’? What discursive spaces does this work of definition and 
regulation open up for grammars of ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’? How 
do all these sensibilities, attitudes, assumptions and behaviors come 
together to support or undermine the doctrine of secularism? (17) 
 
He examines, as one example of these interformational relations of work and power, a 
situation in Greece where individuals were not allowed to keep their religious affiliation 
on “identity” cards despite their protests—thus enforcing a definition of religion and of 
identity. Asad explains that the Greek government refused by citing the need to protect 
their human rights; but clearly, what it means to be “human” is different for the protesters 
and the government. As Asad argues, what the protesters “regard as vital to their religious 
being,” the government judges not to “affect their freedom of religious belief”—so here 
we see different views of 1) what human rights include and 2) the nature of religion and 
religious belonging (Formations 139-140).  
In order to declare that keeping the religious affiliation would amount to the 
violation of those desirous individuals’ civil rights and removing it would not, the 
government declared religion (and identity) an individual, private matter that therefore 
cannot be violated by lack of access to particular forms of identification, including 
communal identity. Only on the assumption that human rights are “individual” and even 
that they relate to anonymity can a government refuse a minority group the right to 
identify as a group on the basis of human rights. And only on the assumption that religion 
is about internal “religious belief” can such a ruling be upheld. But these are not 
universally-agreed upon definitions of the human and of religion, but rather Western 
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ones: Asad argues that in contrast, being Muslim “is being able to live as autonomous 
individuals in a collective life that extends beyond national borders” (180). Those 
Muslims’ religious being, in other words, was violated for the sake of ostensibly 
protecting their rights as a human being. So we might fairly say that a significant social 
conflict plays out here in the production of a small material object: practical definitions of 
religion and of humanity are contested and made significant through practical 
enforcement, motivated by a question of legal practice, and decided through a structure of 
legal channels, ultimately shaping how it is possible to practice religion and to be human 
and/or religious in Greece.  
Asad’s work is often focused in this way on the complex and mutually 
constitutive relations between formations (like Western academics and non-Western 
informants). He imagines contemporary life as “complex space” in which a variety of 
forms of life operate and relate simultaneously. In defining this complex space, he cites 
John Milbank’s argument that “there is no such thing as absolute non-interference; no 
action can be perfectly self-contained, but always impinges upon other people, so that 
spaces will always in some degree ‘complexly’ overlap, jurisdictions always in some 
measure be competing, loyalties remain (perhaps benignly) divided” (Formations 178). 
Complex space speaks to the complexity of individual’s “internal” space as well: we 
should imagine society as “a multiplicity of overlapping bonds and identities. [In 
medieval Christendom and Islam] People were not always expected to subject themselves 
to one sovereign authority, nor were they themselves sovereign moral subjects” (179). In 
complex space, everyone participates in multiple formations—“the sovereign state cannot 
(never could) contain all the practices, relations, and loyalties of its citizens” (179). 
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Simply put, from a formational perspective religions do not operate in a vacuum, but 
interfere, are interfered with, and really depend upon external discourses—public 
discourses on sexuality, gender, race, politics, education, even religion—and the shared 
forms of social life—media, political systems, educational systems, economies, and the 
like—wherein those discourses can circulate. So rather than looking for a single 
hegemonic discourse or single religious powerful institution in society, Asad encourages 
the recognition of various mutually-interfering formations that operate at a variety of 
practical levels to support, change, or undermine one another.  
In order to even more firmly indicate the mobility and instability of religious 
formation in complex space, in my dissertation I will term Asad’s construction of religion 
transformational. There’s obviously some redundancy in the term, but transformation 
highlights for me the cross-formational action that accounts for much of the change and 
relations of power we want to represent. Trans-formational action takes several forms: 
First, there are the internal trans-formational relations between groups within a religious 
formation (not all Muslims would agree with Asad’s characterization of “being Muslim,” 
for instance); second, there are also external trans-formational relations wherein outside 
formations participate in and reciprocally shape a religious formation, as in the Greek 
government’s restriction on religious practice; third, and just as importantly, there are 
trans-formational relations that translate between levels, in and across formations: from 
bodily practice to religious belief, from manufacturer’s invention to religious disposition, 
from legal doctrine to religious identity. In various chapters of the dissertation I will 
focus on all three of these trans-formational relations.  
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It is my working assumption in this dissertation that education is one of the forms 
of life in which religions circulate, and that liberal academe specifically is one of the 
“competing” formations engaged in mutually interfering relations with religion—
especially, in American classrooms, with forms of Christianity like evangelicalism in 
which many of our students participate. In addition to Asad’s work on religion and 
Western thought, writers like Charles Taylor and Mark C. Taylor have traced a few 
intricate engagements between Christianity and Western academic thought far beyond 
what needs to be established to initiate this investigation (Sources of the Self; After God). 
The academy, however, is an incredibly varied institution with largely undeterminable 
relations to both religion and traditions in Western thought. It seems necessary for me, at 
least, to narrow my scope.3 I believe writing scholars’ texts on religious students offer us 
descriptions of local instances where religion and the writing classroom interfere with 
one another, and in somewhat regularized ways. That being the case, this dissertation 
attempts to answer Asad’s provocative question—How does power make religion?—with 
regards to my discipline, rhetoric and composition. In what ways, I ask throughout, do 
writing scholars, instructors, and students participate in the making of religion through 
these overlaps and interferences? What sorts of religions are we making? How might we 
participate differently in shaping the various practices of religion in America? 
                                                
3 The same logic, in part, drives my decision to focus on evangelicalism. I certainly want 
to recognize that students affiliated to other forms of religion—not only other forms of 
Christianity but other forms of religion and irreligion—are also present in the 
composition classroom. I assume here that they too may participate in and experience 
interfering relations between academic and religious formations. But given the incredibly 
diverse nature of religion it often proves necessary here to narrow my scope to just one 
set of interfering relations, drawing in other forms of life and religion wherever possible. 
I elaborate on my selection of evangelicalism, specifically, in chapter three (see pp. 86-




So why are the answers to those questions important to rhetoric and composition, 
specifically? I will argue throughout this dissertation that the consequences of current 
constructions of religion in America, perpetuated in part by interactions in the writing 
classroom, are politically and socially damaging—not only to the civic agenda of a liberal 
arts education, but also to our students whose ways of being religious or irreligious are 
constrained by these constructions. In a recent online interview, sociologist Philip Gorski 
puts the contemporary religio-political situation well:  
Our current politics is in many ways defined by the people on the edges, 
by radical secularists on the Left and religious nationalists on the Right. 
Not to say that this is all that’s going on in American politics, but if you 
take this religious slice of it, I think that’s a lot of it, with the culture wars 
and so on. The two feed off one another to a certain degree. The radical 
secularists become a stand-in for anybody who’s on the Left and anybody 
who’s not the religious nationalists, and the radical religious nationalists 
become a stand-in for everybody who’s religious. When people look at 
religious people from the Left, you get this kind of undifferentiated and 
polarizing picture, so there is this rather unfortunate synergy between the 
two positions.  
 
I argue in this dissertation that even our most generous approaches to religious students in 
the writing classroom unintentionally perpetuate this hegemonic and polarizing situation. 
This polarizing binary choice (conservative religion or liberal secularism) that 
Gorski describes has concerned many of our writers, including Michael John DePalma, 
Shannon Carter, and Elizabeth Vander Lei. We often explicitly worry that students will 
be forced to choose between the two poles (see chapter two for more on this disciplinary 
discussion). But contemporary research shows convincingly that the binary generally 
produces three categories. Sociologists Robert Putnam and David Campbell describe 
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their finding on this: “people (especially young people) have increasingly sorted 
themselves out religiously according to their moral and political views, leaving both the 
liberal, secular pole and the conservative, evangelical pole strengthened and the moderate 
religious middle seriously weakened” (American Grace 132). Some students are 
channeled towards religious conservatism, some towards secular liberalism, but the vast 
majority move towards what Putnam and Campbell have rightly described as the weak 
moderate religious middle. It’s this third option I find most significant and troubling, 
because it represents a missed opportunity for writing instructors to participate in religion 
in the politically transformative ways Stenberg imagines. I hope to show throughout this 
dissertation how our current practices risk contributing not only to religious and political 
polarization, but worse, to the expansion and weakening of the religio-political middle. 
Here, I briefly articulate those three positions. 
 
Religious Conservatism  
Students’ first potential response to current constructions of religion could be 
termed “incorporation,” in which they come to embody and identify with the 
representational norms. The primary reasons for incorporation will be discussed in depth 
below; but troublingly, research indicates that secular education can actually contribute 
to, or accelerate, this response. As Perkins notes, “conservative Christian students who 
attend public institutions tend to become more fundamentalist . . . by the time they 
graduate, whereas those who attend religious colleges emerge considerably less so” 
(594). Perkins’ brief explanation is that “students at church-related colleges are enabled 
by some combination of peer support and culturally sensitive teaching to become more 
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questioning than their relatively embattled and isolated counterparts at secular schools 
do” (595). But rhetorical theory affords us a more satisfying, if still partial, explanation of 
such responses. Within individual interactions, Elizabeth Ervin calls the reactionary 
phenomenon Perkins describes “discursive entrenchment,” the rhetorical digging-in-of-
the-heels that results from perceived risk, disrespect, or hostility in a rhetorical encounter. 
This reaction—described so well by Carolyn Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Carl Hovland’s 
Social Judgment Theory—is the motive force often attributed to larger religious 
movements as well.  
Philosopher of religion Mark C. Taylor, for example, argues that all 
fundamentalisms emerge as situated responses to perceived threats (to tradition, identity, 
values, beliefs, and so on) (13). In his Reith Lectures, Giddens similarly argues that 
fundamentalism is simply “beleaguered tradition,” and in American Grace Putnam and 
Campbell suggest that the emergence of contemporary evangelicalism in the 1970s—a 
broader cultural movement than fundamentalism, per se—could be read as a reaction 
against the liberal challenges of the sixties that continues to resonate for many. Their 
research of 2006 bears this out: “more than two thirds of evangelical Protestants in our 
Faith Matters survey said that they felt their values were ‘seriously’ or ‘moderately 
threatened in America today’” (114). All of these writers seem to suggest that the 
academic environment Heather E. Thomson describes in her dissertation on religious 
students and writing instructors, where both perceived and real antipathy seem the norm, 
may actually be triggering fundamentalism in conservative religious students while 
simultaneously silencing the majority of moderate and progressive religious students 
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whose fears of being mischaracterized—and mischaracterizing themselves—keep them 
from speaking up (Thomson 72, 96, 206).  
 
Liberal Secularism 
Christian students’ second response to the dominant religious representation is 
related. I call this the oppositional stance, visible in the exodus of American religious 
students and American young people more generally from religion. Researcher David 
Kinnaman concisely describes the shift:  
1. Teenagers are some of the most religiously active Americans.  
2. American twentysomethings are the least religiously active. (You Lost 
Me 22) 
 
Putnam and Campbell also point out that the incidence of two sets of “nones”—those 
who claim to identify with no religious group and those who did not attend church in the 
last year—has risen from about 7% of college freshmen in 1965 to about 24% in 2009. In 
fact, despite common perceptions to the contrary, there are significantly more Americans 
aged 18-29 claiming “no religious preference” than “Evangelical Protestant” (the most 
populous religious category). Putnam and Campbell explicitly attribute this desertion of 
religion to popular shifts in both popular disposition and the representation of religion:  
This group of young people came of age when ‘religion’ was 
identified publicly with the Religious Right, and exactly at the time when 
the leaders of that movement put homosexuality and gay marriage at the 
top of their agenda. And yet this is the generation in which the new 
tolerance of homosexuality has grown most rapidly. In short, just as the 
youngest cohort of Americans was zigging in one direction, many highly 
visible religious leaders zagged in the other.  
 . . . Many devout religious people would have preferred to (and did) 
sit out the culture wars, and some liberal Protestant groups have tried hard 
to keep up with the evolving views of young people on issues of sexual 
(and homosexual) morality. It is very hard, however, for a religious 
“brand” forged in the fires of the Reformation four centuries ago to 
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“rebrand” itself overnight. Moreover, this youthful generation seems 
unwilling or unable to distinguish the stance of the most visible, most 
political, and most conservative religious leaders from organized religion 
in general. (130-1) 
 
Putnam and Campbell are very clear about this: it is the articulation of Christianity with 
conservative politico-social agendas that drives many young people away from religion. 
Kinnaman also observes that most of those who leave organized Christianity “are more 
defined by and committed to their distance from Christianity than they are to their current 
spiritual perspectives” (You Lost Me 66). While “Many still have positive things to say 
about specific people (such as their parents), . . . the overall tenor of their perceptions is 
negative” (68). The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, too, notes the motivating 
force of these negative perceptions. They observe that nones tend to “think of religious 
people as hypocritical, judgmental or insincere” (qtd. in Putnam and Campbell 131). And 
so the polarizing cycle continues—negative representations of religion lead to more 
secular liberals, more religious conservatives, and a lot of religious moderates who lack 
the cohesion or representation necessary for political or even institutional mobilization. 
While we may all agree that increased alienation and fundamentalism are 
troublesome outcomes for the writing class, some of us may be tempted to feel that 
growing dissatisfaction with religion is a fine development, an even better one as it may 
be leading to the generalized decline of religion in America (I’m thinking here of 
prominent writers such as Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins). Writing scholars 
have generally argued, however, that such a shift constitutes a loss of identity (see 
discussion of Carter; Rand; Vander Lei; and DePalma in chapter two). But I would offer 
a different, perhaps more pragmatic reason for concern: Research finds that religious 
participation actually makes participants significantly better citizens and better neighbors 
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(one of the chief and oft-cited goals of our liberal educational environment) than those 
who do not participate regularly. Drawing on their own survey data as well as previous 
research, Putnam and Campbell report that “greater religiosity tends to produce increased 
giving, volunteering, and civic engagement” (462), as well as greater levels of empathy, 
altruism (464), and trust (470). This is true even when controlling simultaneously for 
“gender, education, income, race, region, homeownership, length of residence, marital 
and parental status, ideology, and age” (452). Putnam and Campbell compare this 
improvement directly to the civic benefits of education—“the civic difference between 
Americans who attend church nearly every week and those who rarely do so is roughly 
equivalent to two full years of education” (454). Education that draws students away 
from religious participation thus may be undermining some of its own civic goals, and 
should not be entered upon lightly.  
It’s very important to note that these benefits do not accrue as a result of beliefs or 
personal spirituality—quite oppositely, in every major national survey they reviewed 
Putnam and Campbell found that what they call “good neighborliness” is correlated to 
participation in a religious social network and shows no significant correlation with 
individual religious beliefs (476). They are clear on this:  
Once we know how observant a person is in terms of church attendance, 
nothing that we can discover about the content of her religious faith adds 
anything to our understanding or prediction of her good neighborliness—
nothing about her views of the Bible or life after death or evolution or 
eschatology, or her personal experience of God, or the kind of God she 
believes in, or the importance of religion in her life or in her personal or 
political decisions, or her views about morality or salvation or evolution or 




Underlining this point, they note that an atheist who get deeply involved in a religious 
social network “is much more likely to volunteer in a soup kitchen than the most fervent 
believer who prays alone” (473). Separating belief from belonging is not entirely 
possible, of course, as it may well be religious belief that spurs the push to begin 
belonging in the first place. But to the extent that belief is implicated, it is noteworthy 
that the effect of religion on citizenship is stronger for moderate and progressive religious 
participants than for conservatives. Putnam and Campbell find, “for many measures of 
civic engagement, such as club membership, organizational leadership, and . . . local 
reform activities, religiosity matters more for self-described liberals than for self-
described conservatives” (456). Thus, these benefits aren’t likely to go away if religious 
participants shift into more liberal and tolerant modes of religious belief or religious 
practice—but if the religious participation creating the benefits drops off, these benefits 
assuredly drop off as well, Putnam and Campbell find within just one year’s time.  
 
The Weak Middle 
The third, most pervasive and troubling, response to the dominant construction of 
religion in America is the relative silencing and political passivity of moderate and 
progressive religious students. When conservative representations of religion dominate 
people’s perceptions of what religion looks like, and when instructor-representatives of 
liberal academe echo and act upon these dominant representations of religion as 
reactionary, they stifle (or at least slow) the ability of young religious moderates to 
practice, represent and publicize their alternative or emergent religious practices as 
legitimate religious practices. This felt lack of agency, so often leading to moderates’ 
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silence, is cogently expressed by students in Thomson’s study. One of her informants 
writes, “As long as Christians stay, you know, as long as they don’t let their religion seep 
out and try to change other people, I think most people are fine with that” (106). Christian 
students report “avoiding topics with which their instructors may disagree; choosing not 
to disclose their religious beliefs; striving to be ‘neutral’ in their work” (206). They 
silence themselves on the assumption “that to identify as Christian is to invite doubts or 
preconceived notions about their intellectual abilities, their political views, and their 
openness to people of other faiths and worldviews” (124).  
Thomson’s religious informants, like writing instructors and writing scholars, 
seem to struggle against this dominant negative representation of religion. But they fear 
they are not capable of representing their very different religious practice adequately in 
the face of these more dominant representations. As one student explains,  
I feel a lot of times that I’m not equipped enough . . . I just have a hard 
time getting out what I mean, so when I talk to people that’s one of my big 
concerns, that I’ll say something I don’t mean, that it comes off the wrong 
way, or that I’m presenting my faith in a poor way. I just get really 
insecure about that . . . I definitely do get scared, because I don’t think I’m 
the wisest person alive. (105) 
 
Another student, Quinn, describes feeling embarrassed and angry after seeing the way a 
preacher represents Christianity on the quad. He wants to differentiate himself from “that 
guy”—but he’s not sure he can. Thomson writes that Quinn feels “he has little control 
over how others might forge connections between him and that which he rejects” (96). 
These pervasive negative representations leave students feeling “a lack of control over 
how the label ‘Christian’ (or even just ‘religious’) will be interpreted by their peers and 
instructors” (105). Thomson describes the effects of this loss of control: “The lack of 
power they have (or feel they have) over people’s perceptions of them contributes to a 
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feeling that being Christian at UM involves a certain amount of risk and requires a 
willingness to explain oneself” (97). Many students feel fearful and defensive in such 
settings. As a result, “All but two student interviewees mention fear as part of their 
experience as a Christian student”; particularly, Thomson suggests, fear at “the prospect 
of dredging up other people’s negative associations with Christianity” (104). These 
students are frustrated by popular constructions of Christianity, but experience feelings of 
inarticulacy when they wish to challenge them. In the end, they don’t feel they have a 
chance to fairly represent themselves and their religion in the face of such challenges. So 
a lack of control over their representation leads to silence, and this silence in turn 
increases the misperception of religion that leads to instructor hostility, silences moderate 
religious students, and places conservative religious students even more strongly in the 
spotlight and on the defensive. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle. 
These students, however, do not only feel this lack of agency in the academy: they 
feel silenced and out of control in churches as well. While Kinnaman argues that at least 
half of Christian young people are disaffected and feel at odds with the dominant 
religious representation and its norms, only about ten percent are actually explicitly 
engaged in trying to create change within Christianity. Some stay passively; others leave 
entirely; others wander for a few years; and that leaves only a meager ten percent who 
consistently “are trying on new ways of Christ-following that make sense to their 
communities and careers. Their rejection of some mindsets and methods common to the 
North American church stem from this desire” (You Lost Me 77). As Kinnaman explains 
this passivity, “The details differ, but the theme of disengagement pops up again and 
again, often accompanied by a sense that the decision to disconnect was out of their 
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hands” (10, emphasis mine). He goes on to quote two online comments from an article on 
Catholicism that underline this lack of agency: “I wonder what percentage of . . . ‘Lost’ 
Catholics feel like I do, that we did not leave the Church, but rather, the Church left us.” 
“I hung in for a while, thinking that fighting from within was the way to go, but I 
ultimately realized that it was damaging my relationship with God and my relationship 
with myself and I felt no choice but to leave” (10).  
Christian Smith, observing many of the same attitudes and behaviors in college-
aged Americans, classifies them as generally disengaged from religion—he says they just 
don’t care (288-89). Others have similarly noted some decline in religiosity among 
younger Americans, though they don’t draw the same strong conclusion. In fact on a 
number of scales, religious practice is up among young Americans. But it seems to me 
that Kinnaman and Thomson’s in-depth research on young Americans’ religious 
experiences demonstrates how negative engagement and blasé disengagement may be 
two sides of the same coin. Both might be interpreted as symptoms of a shared history of 
commitment and estrangement from religion, and both appear to draw upon a similarly 
liminal sensibility, or posture towards it—neither for nor against, neither in nor out. In 
either case—a generalized muting of religious feeling or a shared exilic posture—we can 
say with some certainty that there is an emergent religious formation in which many 
young Americans participate, and while it is decidedly not aligned with dominant 
constructions of religion, it is also not yet aligned with any other easily articulable, 
definite position. It is, then, mostly potential. 
The most prescient takeaway from these findings for writing teachers is not 
merely that so many young Americans who grow up as Christians are unhappy with 
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Christianity, or different from the dominant representation of religion—although whether 
they stay, hang around on the fringes, or leave entirely, this appears to be true. The most 
prescient takeaway is that most young Americans don’t believe they can change 
Christianity, or practice Christianity in the moderate or progressive ways they’d like to 
within institutional Christianity, or represent their Christianity in ways that differ from 
popular perceptions; worse, only a small percentage of them are even really trying. All 
three responses—incorporation, opposition, silence—seem practically to assume that 
religion is what it is—that the current manifestations of religion and secularism in 
America are real, essential, universal. When combined with the currently prominent 
forms of religion, this assumption, so counter to Asad’s vision of religion, is successfully 
muting the political, social, and even theological potential of young Americans. By 
investigating the transformational processes responsible for creating this version of 
religion and pointing out how we participate in those processes, I hope to identify 
strategies for creating religion differently through our classroom practices.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
In Chapter Two, I argue that approaches to religious students previously 
forwarded by rhetoric and composition scholars fail to adequately address the material 
conditions of the writing classroom and larger American religious culture in which 
students and teachers interact. I ground this argument in published accounts of instructor 
interactions with religious students, finding that while scholars often recommend 
encouraging students to bring religiously-inflected resources into their academic writing, 
their approaches and representations of such interactions tend to homogenize religions 
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and their practitioners, treat such acts of representation as transparent, overlook ongoing 
asymmetrical power relations, and construct religious experience as self-evident. I argue 
that students are denied the opportunity to deliberate and act on their religious resources 
when instead of investigating the heterogeneity within their religious communities and 
exploring its sources and consequences, they are encouraged to represent those practices 
or attitudes in generalizing terms. I explore how failing to help a student highlight the 
losses, contradictions, and transformations created by translating her religious resources 
into new language falsely separates writing from thinking and living. I suggest that an 
opportunity for re-negotiating the asymmetrical power relations between academic and 
religious discourses is lost when instead of deliberating on, manipulating, or challenging 
the conventions of academic discourse, a student is simply encouraged to revise his 
religiously-inflected text to be more audience-effective. I point out that when a student’s 
religious experiences are reported on as self-evident rather than interrogated as sites of 
cultural shaping, that student is denied the opportunity to intervene in the cultural forces 
shaping those experiences.  
In Chapters Three and Four, I use American evangelicalism as a test case for the 
relevance of my “transformational” approach to religion. These chapters are aimed, first, 
at accounting more fully for the material conditions that affect our classroom interactions 
with religious students; second, at constructing religions as sites of heterogeneity and 
conflict continually shaped by the ways individuals represent religious organizations, 
experiences, and identities in writing and speaking. To accomplish these aims, I analyze 
representations of American evangelicalism in a wide array of genres and media 
produced by lay practitioners and leading voices, including institutional policy 
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handbooks, denominational belief statements, organizational websites, blog entries, open 
letters, media networks, pop culture celebrities, sociological survey data, and previously 
published student and instructor interviews. These texts highlight the power struggles and 
transformations enacted through intra- and inter-formational debates as American 
evangelical practitioners work to shape evangelicalism’s membership, public discourse 
on Christianity, and religion more generally. The transformational approach aligns with 
the work of Raymond Williams and Judith Butler to argue that all such hegemonic 
formations are also continually transformed by a multitude of external forces. I 
demonstrate this by analyzing evangelical texts and movements inflected by progressive 
strains of religion, generational differences, feminism, and gay rights discourses; but I 
also point out how the discourse of such alternative and emergent formations remains 
largely tethered to the hegemonic account as they continually define themselves with and 
against its stereotypes, terms and logics.   
  In Chapter Five, I explore the relevance of a transformational approach to religion 
for our everyday classroom practices. More specifically, I explore its alignment with 
translingual approaches which aim to use writing to not only respect and include 
students’ multiple personal discursive resources traditionally undervalued in the 
classroom, but to recognize and develop students’ capacities for actively shaping and 
reshaping the very languages, identities, and social relations playing a key role in their 
writing and learning. To accomplish this, translingual scholars suggest helping students 
deliberate on the traffic between those different resources and draw on them to participate 
in matters of concern extending beyond the writing classroom. I turn to student writing 
featured in previous scholarship in rhetoric and composition to examine how instead of 
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merely allowing students to bring religiously-inflected resources into the writing 
classroom, a transformational approach might help students attend to how and why they 
are interested in employing such resources, and how and why they might best go about 
re-creating and transforming their religious experiences, identities, and communities in 
the process of writing about them. Instead of encouraging a student to provide or defend a 
single definition of religion, a transformational approach would help the student to 
deliberate on the sources of her definition, the context of asymmetrical power relations in 
which her definition participates, and alternative definitions she might choose to forward. 
Instead of encouraging another student to find genres for expressing his frustration when 
a romantic break-up interferes in his relationship with God, asking that student to explore 
the socially-orchestrated nature of supernatural experiences might allow him to 
interrogate his experiential struggle, deliberate on its external sources, and make plans for 
intervention.  
The increasingly rapid global flows of people, objects, signs, monies, ideas, and 
emotions across borders, which our discipline recognizes as a positive development in so 
many ways, also transmits religious conflicts—not to mention religious militancies—
around the globe. That is my starting point in this dissertation: there is necessarily 
religion and religious conflict flowing into our classroom spaces (whether we recognize 
it, or not). Religion flows across the thresholds of our classrooms through the bodies of 
our students, through objects we or they bring to class, through texts we read or they 
carry in their e-readers, through ideas churned up in class discussion or the arguments of 
a paper, through the emotional responses that arise in our classes. Last year one of my 
students, Ambreen Paracha, composed a wrenchingly beautiful essay for my class 
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describing the murder of her family members at a mosque in Karachi during a religious 
holiday. Her creative non-fiction piece, which was supposed to be contained to eight to 
ten pages, sprawled to almost twenty—there was no stopping the flow of story and details 
once begun. The sectarian violence of Pakistan had materially entered Ambreen’s life, 
and through her, our classroom. In such ways, religion continually flows through our 
classrooms, and we must not shirk the responsibility this brings. Classroom strategies for 
approaching religion in respectful, yet transformative ways are all the more necessary in 
such a world. A transformational approach to matters of religion, informed by a 
translingual approach to writing and teaching, can better address the needs and interests 
of students across races, ethnicities, classes, and genders by assisting them in making 
critical use of their own religious practices and alignments when writing and learning. 








 CAUGHT IN BETWEEN 
 
This second chapter takes a transformational approach to religion in the writing 
classroom. Believing that intersections between religion and the writing classroom 
represent one particular site of transformational action by which religion is continually 
re-formed, I attempt to identify some specific formational processes and relations of 
power by which writing scholars have constructed the forms of religion visible in our 
classrooms and scholarship over the past twenty years. I begin by sketching an image of 
our current classroom situation as it is described in writing scholarship. Following this, I 
briefly trace the development of the assumptions and logics framing our current approach 
to religious students, which I term “inclusive.” I then spend the majority of the chapter 
identifying and re-evaluating four moves characteristic of this inclusive approach—re-
presenting religion, teaching translation, downplaying conflict, and resourcing religious 
experience.  
I argue that our representations of religion and religious students, constructed as 
they are through these four pedagogical strategies, are more likely to draw out stability 
and homogeneity in religion than they are to construct religions as the fluid, participatory, 
contested formations that Asad has suggested. Because of this, students are unlikely to 
see any more clearly their own active role in maintaining and potentially transforming 
their religions. I conclude that such constructions of religion, for all the good that they 
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may do, offer our students—most of whom fall within that “weak middle” I describe in 
chapter one—little or no new means of agential intervention in the polarizing religio-
political climate of our time, and thus either fail to address, or actually run counter to, our 
stated desire for politically transformative pedagogies. While I largely examine extant 
strategies here in chapter two, I do offer the beginnings of alternative approaches at 
several points. I devote considerable time to developing those new transformational 
strategies in my final, fifth chapter. 
 
The Current Context 
Thomson’s 2009 dissertation, When God’s Word Isn’t Good Enough, presents the 
best snapshot to date of the relationships between Christian students, their instructors, and 
issues of religious representation in college writing classrooms. Thomson finds that 
writing instructors tend to see Christian students as “cling[ing] to the idea of universal 
truth” (74) and “unable or unwilling to think critically” (80). While instructors try to 
“make distinctions between Christian students whom they see as radical, evangelical, 
conservative, and judgmental and those who appear to blend more seamlessly into the 
academic environment” (68), the radical, evangelical, conservative, judgmental Christian 
student seems to drive generalized instructor perceptions of “Christians.” Moreover, 
Thomson’s findings indicate there is a markedly high degree of similarity between 
writing instructors’ perceptions of Christians and writing scholars’ published 
representations of religious students. These published representations have come under 
strong critique from Thomson, DePalma, and Rand. Rand notes that Christian discourses 
in the writing classroom are associated in our texts with a number of negative terms: 
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“quaint naïveté,” “dualistic thought,” “lack of reasoning ability,” “immature thought” 
(357), “simplicity,” “superficiality,” “foolishness,” and lack of awareness (358). Further, 
the representatives themselves are rendered as “dogmatic” (357), “narrow,” rigid, 
“obedient,” and lacking “independent and critical thought” (362). She rightly worries that 
these negative and inaccurate representations can produce damaging interactions with 
religious students in the classroom.  
In many rhetoric and composition articles, religious representatives are depicted 
in this anti-intellectual way, embodying the twin academic heresies of unquestionable 
truth and unquestioning obedience. But crucially, the religious representative also usually 
displays some form of political, social, and theological conservatism. Religious students 
are often seen in the literature opining politically and socially conservative positions on 
topics like evolution, abortion, women’s rights, and homosexuality (for instances of 
students writing on these topics, see Goodburn; Shafer; Dively; and Downs). 
Theologically conservative religious students are also usually selected as religious 
representatives in our articles, indicated either by labels or by reported practices. Chris 
Anderson describes the “’sweet,’ ‘foolish’ discourse” of a “born-again paper” (Rand 358; 
Anderson 12); Janet Neuleib describes disgusted instructor responses to a written 
“testimonial about the saving power of Jesus Christ” (Rand 357); Goodburn focuses on a 
Christian fundamentalist who dominated her classroom, and connects his conservative 
religious beliefs with the political action of the Religious Right (333, 335); Ervin 
connects the rhetoric of Christian fundamentalists with the rhetoric of Creationists (454); 
Perkins’ students are described as fundamentalist evangelicals whose religious beliefs 
cause their economic subjugation (588); Carter’s students and their “inappropriate” and 
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“unacceptable” academic behavior are explained in terms of “evangelicalism” (578, 581); 
Douglas Downs’s “true believer” student, who predicts that gay adoption will lead to 
mass pedophilia and increased teen suicide, espouses “orthodox LDS doctrine, 
assumptions, and language” (40); Williams’s student, though Muslim rather than 
Christian, espouses conservative Muslim ideological positions and protests Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses without having read it (109); Juanita M. Smart describes the 
discourse of a student who compares Frankenstein’s monster to Jesus Christ as 
“evangelical discourse” (20) and connects it with politically charged issues such as 
abortion and gay rights; and Gregory Shafer’s student, whose arguments for traditional 
family values and gender roles are mocked as anti-intellectual by her classmates, is 
identified as a Christian fundamentalist.  
The combined result is a collective literature on religious students focused largely 
on representatives whom Mark C. Taylor would call either contemporary 
foundationalists—those who stubbornly privilege “simplicity, security, and certainty over 
complexity, insecurity, and uncertainty” (4), religious reactionaries—religious and 
political conservatives characterized by tendencies to “absolutize faith in unquestionable 
foundational principles” and exercise “total obedience to authoritative figures” (23), or 
(usually) both. In contrast, studies highlighting students’ subscription to moderate or 
progressive theological, political, or social viewpoints have only appeared in Thomson’s 
unpublished dissertation and to some extent Rebecca Schoenike-Nowacek’s essay. This 
disparity in representation exists despite the demographic reality that most American 
religious students hold religiously, politically, and socially moderate to liberal views 
(Pew; Kinnaman; Putnam and Campbell). Those religious students simply don’t get a 
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chance to “represent themselves” in the literature. To look at our articles on religious 
students, it would appear that we teach a lot of religious reactionaries whose religious, 
intellectual, social, and political habits are deeply and negatively implicated in one 
another. This perception leads to what Laura May, in one of the only comprehensive 
histories of writing on religious students within rhetoric and composition, calls the 
“original or core problem: the problem of ideological and pedagogical friction between 
more liberal secular teachers and more conservative religious students” (9).  
In articles that advocate a critical pedagogical approach to religious students, 
these tensions rise immediately to the surface. Vander Lei and Lauren Fitzgerald sum up 
the common sentiment driving such critical approaches: “Given our allegiance to critical 
thought, most of us can identify with the frustration that results from students (and 
instructors) who hobble scholarly inquiry with unexamined belief” (188). That vividly 
described stock character—the deluded, trapped, hobbling, unreflective student—
represents the antithesis of critical ideals. Where we perceive these students in our 
classrooms, it is understandable that our instinctive response has, as DePalma notes, often 
been an attempt to change their relationship to their religious discourse. We do this by 
either directly “challenging students’ religious viewpoints or teaching the language and 
posture of critique” (223), the latter often intended as an indirect way of mounting the 
same challenge. Anderson, whose three page “The Description of an Embarrassment: 
When Students Write about Religion” initiated this line of scholarship, exemplifies this 
critical mindset. He suggests the following tack in working with “born-again” religious 
students: “if we change the way students write, change their language, we also change 
what they think, what it is possible for them to think” (362). Rand explains the mentality 
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she sees underlying this attempt at change: “For composition studies, evil results from a 
lack of critical consciousness”; so “we want students to get saved and to resist subject 
positions that discourage critical awareness” (360, 364). This emphasis on the 
responsibility to create “change” is central to the critical approach, and features strongly 
in articles by Ronda Leathers Dively, Perkins, Downs, and Shafer.  
It is important to note, though, that while writing instructors and scholars may 
have these tendencies to perceive and describe religion negatively, they are also often 
visibly struggling against these tendencies, not attempting to perpetuate them. 
Instructors, for instance, are quick to indicate that they’re aware and concerned about the 
effects of this negative account. As Thomson wrote, instructors try to “make distinctions 
between Christian students whom they see as radical, evangelical, conservative, and 
judgmental and those who appear to blend more seamlessly into the academic 
environment” (68). The instructor responses Thomson highlights in her study 
demonstrate this struggle with the negative stereotype as they simultaneously forward it 
and counter it. When asked, “What characteristics come to mind when you think of a 
Christian student?” one instructor writes, “I feel like I should say either ‘conscientious 
and kind’ or ‘radical and evangelical’ but Christian students, like others, seem to be 
individuals” (65). Another writes, “There are radical Christian students and normative 
Christian students” (67). A third actually responds, “I see this trap and will try to avoid 
it” (66).  
This “trap” is evidently felt by our published writers as well: most of the same 
writers who depict conservative representatives actually provide caveats or try to mount 
challenges to this hegemonic account of religion, consistently affirming that they are as 
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concerned to respect religious students as they are to change them. Every prominent 
critical approach to religious students (beginning with Anderson, and moving through 
Goodburn, Perkins, Downs, on down through Shafer) offers self-reflexive critiques of its 
own critical approach, worrying that these produce a hegemonic situation in which 
academic discourses threaten and disrespect religious students’ identities and discourses. 
While she doesn’t cite them, Rand similarly positions evangelical students’ experiences 
of the academy as a matter of resistance to a dominant culture. Specifically referencing 
Anderson’s seminal article on Christian students, Rand critiques popular disciplinary 
representations of Christians as “condescending” (358), challenges the assumption that 
we can and should improve students’ faith as “lacking in respect” (362), and criticizes 
attempts to change resistant religious students and their discourse “into a respectable 
academic form” (362). Rand argues that students’ religious discourses and experiences 
should be respectfully included in the writing classroom, rather than challenged.  
The central trope justifying such calls to respect is identity. Rand writes, “spiritual 
identity may be the primary kind of selfhood more than a few of [our students] draw upon 
in making meaning of their lives and the world around them” (350). (She seems to use 
spiritual and religious interchangeably.) This means for Rand, “religion should be 
considered a difference along with identity markers such as race and sexual orientation” 
(350). She notes, crucially, that it is religious discourse that forms this religious 
subjectivity—as she writes, instructors need to recognize how “faith is ‘enacted’ in 
discourse and sustained through particular kinds of textual and interpretive practice” 
(350). This, in turn, leads to her argument against attempts like Anderson’s to alter 
students’ religious discursive practices. She describes these as “lacking in respect for the 
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deeply intimate and profoundly personal ways that human beings come to make meaning 
of what is sacred” (362).  
In the ten years since its publication, Rand’s focus on identity as discursive 
subjectivity has become the touchstone quotation for scholarship on Christian students, 
directly cited multiple times within the texts of Carter, Nowacek, and DePalma. DePalma 
notes that if we accept Rand’s identity claim a critical or challenging “posture toward 
students’ religious discourses becomes pedagogically ineffective and ethically 
questionable” (223), again linking religious identities with religious discourses and 
making both relatively un-challengeable. Vander Lei and Fitzgerald observe how “much 
of the scholarship on religious belief in composition studies extends research on cultural 
and social identity, an extension that can make talking about religion seem like 
trespassing” (190). Through its continual citation, Rand’s identity claim establishes and 
re-establishes an intimate connection between religious identity and religious discourse as 
well as the tension between respect and change that drive our efforts at respecting 
religious discourse in the classroom.4  
These same claims about discursive subjectivity also undergird the push for the 
inclusion of religious discourses in the writing classroom. Vander Lei, for example, 
argues that asking students to keep religion out of the composition classroom “suggests to 
students that to succeed in our composition courses they must deny who they are” (4). In 
classrooms where it goes undiscussed, Vander Lei argues, religious faith is comparable to 
a missing gun in an empty holster—the absence of the gun is still recognizable and 
                                                
4 I find that writers evince little need to explicate why these descriptors demand respect—
apparently, writers feel they can rely on generalized assent that discourses and identities 
should be respected. 
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significant. DePalma, too, worries that students will feel that they must compartmentalize 
or relinquish their religious identities if their religious discourses are not included and 
treated with respect in the classroom. To help students avoid this self-alienation, scholars 
often recommend that instructors “embrace the ideals of pluralism and inclusiveness” by 
accommodating students’ religious discourse (perspectives, valued texts, experiences) in 
the classroom (Carter 572-73; DePalma 220). Carter’s logic is paradigmatic; students for 
whom the Bible constitutes a “primary sense of selfhood” must not be made to feel that 
discourse centered on the Bible is inadequate or that it must be replaced (586), so she sets 
about utilizing religious discourse to help students see the plurality of discourses and help 
students acquire academic discourse as one more discourse. She hopes this will allow 
students to become better academic writers without losing their highly valued religious 
discourse.  
These attempts at achieving respect and inclusion for religious discourses and 
identities generally rely on four overlapping moves that I believe are at once useful, and 
yet ultimately undermine these goals—producing new representations, teaching academic 
discourse, downplaying conflict, and privileging personal experience. Because religious 
discourse is generally approached as a source of difference in the writing classroom, both 
analogues and critiques of these strategies can be located in other areas of writing 
scholarship, like basic and second-language writing. This particular correspondence 
might best be explained by the ascription of “irrationality” to students of all three 
categories (see Stenberg 276-77; Thomson 28). One could compare the litany of negative 
representations of religious students, above, to similar litanies describing basic writers in 
Lu’s “Conflict and Struggle” (891) and Glynda Hull, Mike Rose, Kay Losey Fraser, and 
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Marisa Castellano’s “Remediation” (311-312); the level of vitriol is certainly quite 
different, but the attitude and implications are quite similar.  
 
Move One: Homogenize Religion and Its Practitioners 
The first move we make in trying to improve relations between instructors and 
religious students is to re-present religious students and their discourse in more favorable 
ways. This is done to increase instructor respect, or at least understanding, of religious 
students and their religious discourses. Rand, for instance, wonders, “Perhaps if we tried 
to collapse the binary between ‘rebelliousness’ and ‘religiosity’ (even evangelical 
religiosity), we would find new ways of talking about faith. This vocabulary might in turn 
be useful in our classrooms as we respond to students whose views diverge from our 
own” (356). So she collapses the “binary” by offering an alternative representation of 
Christianity drawn from alternative Christian representatives like Paulo Freire and 
Stephen Carter. Perkins, too, makes this attempt, drawing upon liberal theologians like 
Leslie Newbigin and relative progressives like Arthur Holmes to locate religious 
alternatives that are not only unobjectionable, but might actually inform instructors’ 
rhetorical practice. 
Carter, following a similar logic, points out several parallels between religious 
communities of practice and academic communities of practice in order to establish that 
religious communities of practice are not (any more) anti-intellectual (than academic 
ones): she directly points to the academic merits of “faith” (585) and “orthodoxy” (586), 
two of the most seemingly anti-intellectual components of religion. DePalma too focuses 
on faith parallels, and adds experience—he argues that these dimensions of knowing, so 
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crucial to religious discourses, are highly valued within pragmatist accounts of 
knowledge and crucial to academic knowing as well. DePalma seems to hope this might 
lead to a re-valuation of religious knowing. Rand makes a similar argument in describing 
the conversion focus of critical pedagogues—as she writes, “Composition studies itself 
preaches a kind of born-again faith; we want students to get saved and to resist subject 
positions that discourage critical awareness” (364). Given this emphasis on conversion, 
she doubts the “dichotomous relationship we maintain between the ‘evangelical’ and the 
work we ourselves do in composition studies” (356). The implication of this set of 
arguments is, if admittedly only in part, a fascinating sort of backhanded compliment: 
“Perhaps we aren’t really any better than them, since our discourses and theirs do many 
of the same things: for this reason, we should re-consider our dismissive stances towards 
them.”  
Though he is making a slightly different point than I am here, I believe DePalma 
presciently diagnoses the problematic tendency towards homogenization underlying all 
these efforts at more positive representations. DePalma argues that in constructing their 
representations of religious students, writers in our field have tended to over-emphasize 
official, homogeneous accounts of religion while under-emphasizing individual religious 
practice: 
Narratives of this kind tend to start with a description of how religious 
students think about language and texts, based on definitions generated in 
religious studies or elsewhere, and move on to an illustration of student 
texts that fit those definitions. Such research, in my view, is limited, 
because it works from generalizations that do not account for the complex 
notions about texts and language that many religious students have. (239) 
 
DePalma largely limits his critique to the way we represent religious “notions about texts 
and language,” but I think it could be argued that we often do this more broadly by 
 42 
providing definitions of religions that highlight official or at least dominant descriptions 
and perspectives, and the practices that neatly enact these doctrines. Specific religions 
and religious groups are defined in our literature essentially, homogeneously, and often 
ideologically; then these definitions are taken to directly inform individual student 
practices. While the homogeneous representations we offer are pressed into the service of 
creating greater respect or understanding for religious students, Raymond Williams 
points out the significant cost attached to such generalizations: “The relatively mixed, 
confused, incomplete, or inarticulate consciousness of actual men in that period and 
society is thus overridden in the name of this decisive generalized system” (109). In other 
words, our habit of moving directly from dominant accounts to exemplary practices 
leaves too little room for the heterogeneity, change, conflict, and creativity in students’ 
lived religious practice.  
Goodburn’s article offers one version of this tendency to explain individual 
behavior through a dominant account of religious ideology: 
In defining Christian fundamentalist discourse within this essay, then, I am 
not referring to a description of practices or institutional affiliations, but 
rather to a set of guiding assumptions . . . “a tendency, a habit of mind, 
rather than a discrete movement or phenomenon, . . . a body of discourse 
arising from belief in the sole authority of an inerrant Bible.” (Kintz 10, 
qtd. in Goodburn 336, emphasis mine) 
 
The textual behaviors of the student Goodburn writes about, Luke, are then explained 
through this universal description of fundamentalists (which corresponds directly to the 
dominant representation and its norms discussed in chapter two). But Goodburn’s 
explanations depend upon her own characterization of Luke and other students as 
fundamentalists, not on their own profession of fundamentalism or of any specific 
religious doctrine (336). She writes, for instance, “Luke’s resistance to a revisionist 
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reading of this biblical story is understandable given how he views the authority of 
biblical text as the literal and unmediated word of God” (339). Just a paragraph later, 
Goodburn writes, “Given Luke’s perspective on the authority of meaning within biblical 
texts it’s not surprising that he does not mention the other two articles that were 
assigned…” (339). She explains, “for him, the Bible is the sole source of authority for 
interpreting all other texts” (339). This explanation again derives from a homogenizing 
and unilinear causal relation Goodburn appears to be assuming between official doctrine 
and individual practice: “fundamentalists do not view texts as offering multiple readings” 
(339). This representation implies that Luke is entirely defined by the official religious 
discourse—and while this isn’t a denial of “agency” because Luke is still acting with his 
discourse and maintaining his discourse through performing it, it certainly is a 
representation that fails to highlight all of the potential differences between official 
religious discourse and Luke’s performance of it. 
A second manifestation of this move encourages our students to act as official 
representatives, often when we imagine that they and we are involved in cross-cultural 
negotiations. I see this particularly in Carter’s text where students are asked to explain 
evangelicalism to her, and in Bronwyn Williams’s negotiations with Mohammed. In 
Williams’s text, Mohammed is positioned (or positions himself) as a sort of spokesperson 
for Muslims, and Williams positions himself as a spokesperson for liberal, Western 
values. As spokespersons, the two engage in a negotiation process intended to create 
better understanding across “cross-cultural conflict,” here represented by a discussion of 
divergent Western and Muslim reactions to Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (117). 
Given both Williams’ and Mohammed’s background and stated positions on issues, this 
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seems fairly reasonable, all the more so in that each individual appears comfortable 
speaking as such within the conversations. But in the process, both Williams and 
Mohammed also frequently display a tendency to present a singular, unified conception 
of the positions they represent that stems in part from this spokesperson status and in part 
from the Western form of argument they enact.  
In order to talk cross-culturally in this manner, both reduce their traditions 
selectively without much acknowledgement of these selections. Here, for example, is 
Mohammed: “The entire Islamic system consists of the so-called ‘Hodud’ or limits 
beyond which one should simply not venture. Islam does not recognize unlimited 
freedom of expression. Call them taboos, if you like, but Islam considers a wide variety 
of topics as permanently closed” (109). Interestingly here, Mohammed confidently 
attributes positions and assumptions to “Islam,” but seems to recognize practical variation 
in the very next line, writing, “Most Muslims are prepared to be broad-minded about 
most things” (109). In the same way, when Williams describes his position he does so in 
fairly singular terms: “Quakers search for truth in contemplation and consensus” (107); 
“As a Quaker I had been raised” (110); “Quakerism also privileges human discussion and 
consensus” (111). While I am certainly not in a position to deny the general accuracy of 
any of these statements, I think it is notable that in such phrasings particular positions are 
reified and homogenized—rendered official. At one point Williams insightfully 
acknowledges the differential role of class in Muslim’s experience of religion; at another 
Mohammed points to the role of education and poverty in Muslim responses to the West. 
But these sources of intradiscursive difference don’t receive the attention that 
interdiscursive differences do, and I wonder whether that is a result of the construction of 
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the rhetorical situation as a “cross-cultural negotiation” between representatives. When 
we construct ourselves and students as representatives in this way, we may actually 
perpetuate hegemonic logics of homogeneity and generalization, even if in the short term 
we do not perpetuate specific hegemonic relations.  
Third, I think that this tendency to privilege the official and under-emphasize 
intradiscursive difference is further exacerbated by emphasizing religious “identity” as a 
rationale for respecting religious discourses. This, too, can easily lead to downplaying the 
critical differences between students with religious identities. If we say an “evangelical 
subjectivity” is many of our students’ “primary kind of selfhood,” as Rand would have it 
(350), this can easily become a way of understanding our evangelical students primarily 
in terms of official ideology or dominant representations, as well as a way of 
homogenizing heterogeneous experiences of evangelical discourse. Goodburn and 
Perkins both note this complication in their footnotes, though they elect not to discuss it 
within the text of their articles. Goodburn explains, “I realize that reading a student’s 
responses or actions as shaped by one overriding discourse is problematic because such a 
reading seems to decontextualize this discourse from its relationship to others, like race 
and class,” yet she chooses to do so because “naming the discourses that shape student 
response helps teachers examine how their own discourses shape their practices” (352). 
Perkins similarly notes, “Though the majority of evangelical Christian students aspire to 
a seamless reading of Scripture, their interpretations are overdetermined by aspects of 
their identities—senses of their own whiteness or blackness, cultural ideologies of family 
or political power—that most of them cannot change (not that they would)” (609). 
Unfortunately, Perkins like Goodburn relegates this important caveat to a footnote. 
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Undeniably, these writers make understandable choices given their own purposes; 
however if our goal is to counter a dominant representation that seems to effect religious 
students by negating their differences from the dominant representation, I think relegating 
such qualifications about students’ multiply-constituted discursive identities to a footnote 
is a mistake. Perkins’s and Goodburn’s choice to de-emphasize students’ multiple 
identities in favor of their religious identity has seemingly contributed to later scholars’ 
elision of these complexities. Carter and DePalma, writing after Perkins and Goodburn, 
don’t even provide a footnote explicitly noting how other traditional sources of difference 
impact religious identity. Religious students and even a church service Carter attends, for 
example, are described using a number of racial markers that might suggest the church 
and some of the students are black, yet Carter never explicitly acknowledges that both her 
race and that of the congregants are inflecting the way evangelicalism is being enacted 
and experienced in the service or in the classroom. (If it is even evangelicalism—most 
sociologists do not classify African American churches as evangelical, despite quite a 
few similarities.)  
This erasure of other components of student identity, like all the others, keeps us 
from seeing differences in students’ religious experiences; for example, an evangelical 
woman may sharply feel the differences in evangelical identity between herself and 
evangelical men; men can take on a much larger range of leadership roles in most 
conservative evangelical churches, yet surprisingly women are more active in both 
leadership and recruiting in these churches (Woodberry and Smith). Evangelical men 
may not even be aware of the difference between these evangelical subjectivities. 
Pointing to another source of such difference, a student named Lauren Lewis in one of 
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my classes once wrote an autoethnographic essay on the historical relationship between 
black women and Christian churches in America. She used sociological research to 
develop several lines of thought reflecting on the church’s relation to the legacy of 
slavery as well as shifting gender roles. But she also used interviews with family 
members and video footage of her deceased grandmother, a pastor, leading worship. 
Together, these resources allowed her to deliberate on not just religious experience or 
black women’s religious experience, but on the religious experience of black women in 
her family across three generations. She reminded me that in Christ, as Galatians 3:28 
says, there may be “neither Jew nor Greek, . . . neither slave nor free, . . . no male and 
female”—but in the church and at school, all of these categories still exist, and so do 
many more.  
So if we say that students participate in some form of evangelical discourse that 
constructs their sense of self, we must not fail to note that students participate in that 
particular evangelical discourse in different ways relating to other discourses and subject 
positions they embody: one individual might participate in evangelicalism as an 
evangelical man, as a (rare) black evangelical, as a homosexual evangelical, as an 
(increasingly common) upper-class evangelical, as an (also increasingly-common) 
college-educated evangelical, as a gamer who is evangelical, as a Southern evangelical, 
as a scientist evangelical, as a liberal evangelical, and as a young evangelical. This 
conception of a plural evangelical identity introduces sources of difference—first, a 
dissonance experienced by the individual who moves within these various discourses and 
communities; second, dissonances experienced between individuals’ experiences of 
evangelicalism. Both create the deliberative space in which change, re-organizations of 
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the relations among discourses and individuals, can occur. Representations that elide such 
heterogeneity are (or can quickly become) tools of the dominant order—no matter their 
intended use. So in such attempts to represent religion respectfully and protect students 
from academic hegemony, we merely substitute one essential definition for another, and 
thus contribute to a homogenizing and essentialist construction of students’ religion. 
 
Move Two: Translate Religious Discourse Transparently 
The second move we’ve made in response to conflicted relations between 
academia and religion is to encourage students to transparently “translate” their religious 
discourse into academic discourse for us. Because our goal is often improved relations 
between religious and academic discourses and improved relations between religious 
students and their academic instructors, we tend to help religious students take up 
specifically academic ways of representing their religious discourse that might make 
religious discourse more palatable and even respectable to instructors whom we assume 
are generally suspicious of religion and religious students. In this model, respect is 
directed towards the religious discourse while change is directed instead largely towards 
the ways that students practice discourse in the classroom.  
Rand’s argument sets this up, too: in her conclusion, she quotes Thomas Newkirk: 
“It is one thing to demonstrate an alternative—to extend a repertoire; it is another to try to 
eradicate a ‘lower’ form of consciousness” (102, qtd. in Rand 364). As Vander Lei re-
frames the essential conflict of the writing classroom, the question is really, “How do we 
respect the writer’s rhetorical commitments (both cultural and religious) while 
simultaneously preparing her to meet the expectations of an academic audience?” (103) 
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Downs offers our paradigmatic answer: translation. “As with any other home Discourse, 
we would not necessarily wish students to leave Affirmation behind. If our project is 
teaching Discourses of inquiry, then, our task is to help translate” (50, emphasis mine). 
Downs elaborates on this process of translation:  
A “translator” response from me would have been to explain to Keith 
more about the audience he faced and what sorts of support for his case 
they would value. I could have shown him how “real scholars” probably 
wouldn’t accept a “the Bible tells me so” argument on its face but might 
accept similar arguments framed in cultural terms, or how to reframe his 
question more usefully for them, or how “real scholars” who are unable to 
accept a “true believer’s” received knowledge of spiritual experience 
might be more sympathetic to “felt sense” (Perl and Egendorf 1986). (50) 
 
Teaching students to translate their religious discourse—a term that seems variously to 
refer to religiously inflected perspectives, experiences, values, feelings, behaviors, texts, 
genres, as well as the communities in which they circulate (Thomson 7)—into academic 
discourse (again, defined variously) will respect students’ religious discourses and 
identities while changing their academic discursive habits.  
This logic of translation informs even casual approaches to religious students. In a 
recent article, Nancy Sommers and Laura Saltz discuss religious students in the context 
of a larger project, and so discuss such students’ writing without subjecting their 
discussion of religion to careful reflection and elaboration. This provides us with a better 
view of the disciplinary doxa on religious students than do articles focused on them. 
Discussing Jeremy, a “deeply religious” student at Harvard, Sommers and Saltz 
negatively evaluate what they call Jeremy’s early proclivity for “personal writing”: “If 
students are only writing to understand their personal experiences, if their expertise 
comes only from their personal connection with the material, or if they see the personal 
and academic as opposites, their writing remains a form of self-expression” (146). But 
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Jeremy eventually arrives at “argument,” where he “learns to locate his questions within a 
wider circle of readers, seeing himself as part of an ongoing critical discussion about 
what compels people to accept or reject their faiths, a discussion that is legitimate in 
itself, not just a topic that tells him more about himself” (145). The implicit goal of 
college writing courses, for Sommers and Saltz, is to see students move “from personal 
writing to argument” (145)—so the “personal” must be translated (here, we can think of 
translation in the religious sense of being raised to a higher state) into academic 
discourse, that which is legitimate in itself, they say, because it is suitable for this 
particular public’s consumption and is potentially of interest to that readership. Academic 
discourse on religious topics in this sense means progressively creating distance from 
personal experience, choosing proper methods, evidence, and authors for citation, and 
employing explanatory (analytic) modes of thinking and writing. Other explicit examples 
of pedagogy-as-translation, all of which also offer us an implicit definition of academic 
discourse, appear in attempts to arrive at mutual understanding through rational discourse 
(Williams; Goodburn; Smart) attempts to help students achieve critical consciousness 
(Perkins), to help them make persuasive arguments defending religious viewpoints 
(Downs; Shafer), and to effectively convey religious experiences for academic audiences 
(DePalma).  
Frequently, the claim that such translations will not damage students’ religious 
commitments seems to rely upon the assumption that religion can be separated from the 
ways in which it is discussed. This in turn often depends on constructing religion as, 
essentially, beliefs. We see these dual assumptions repeatedly: Mark Montesano and 
Duane Roen argue that the challenge for the writing teacher is to “provide opportunities 
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for students to actively engage their belief systems in writing classrooms . . . without 
diluting one’s own beliefs” (85). Perkins explains that a student named Clifford’s 
religious faithfulness has been salvaged though he acquired some level of critical 
consciousness because he learned to read and write academically “Without . . . 
abandoning the beliefs that shaped his personal relationships and that gave meaning to his 
existence” (605). And we see this definition early on in Goodburn, who argues that 
instead of attempting to change core religious beliefs and assumptions in students who 
are satisfied with them—this would be “a bit arrogant”—students should be encouraged 
to articulate these fundamentalist assumptions and their consequences for the purpose of 
better mutual understanding (350-351). Elizabeth Vander Lei sets her goals for religious 
students similarly: “not that they alter what they believe”—that is, the apparent essentials 
of their religion—but their expressions and their thinking: she hopes to see them “bring 
their religious faith to their writing,” “respond effectively to the religious faith they 
encounter in the public square,” and “use tension between faith . . . and academic inquiry 
as a way of learning more and learning better” (8).5  
Outside rhetoric and composition, Giddens best articulates the divide between 
belief and discourse—between religious content and religious language—that this view 
constructs. Giddens argues that a fundamentalist is not a fundamentalist because of her 
tradition, but because of the way she justifies her tradition. So there is religion on the one 
                                                
5 This representation of religion as primarily a matter of belief is also strongly if subtly 
reinforced by our generalized use of “believer” to designate religious adherents. This 
construction is specious at best, depending upon a definition of religion as centrally or at 
least essentially a matter of beliefs, similar to Geertz’s definition. Since Asad’s article 
almost thirty years ago, such views have largely fallen out of favor in scholarship on 
religion. See chapters one, three, and five on this point. 
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hand, and then there are the ways people talk about religion in public on the other. 
Fundamentalism, according to Giddens, 
is tradition defended in the traditional way—by reference to ritual truth—
in a globalizing world that asks for reasons. Fundamentalism, therefore, 
has nothing to do with the context of beliefs, religious or otherwise. What 
matters is how the truth of beliefs is defended or asserted. Fundamentalism 
isn’t about what people believe but, like tradition more generally, about 
why they believe it and how they justify it.  
 
We in rhetoric and composition seem to agree with Giddens. So long as students are 
willing to fully adhere to conventional forms of academic discourse when speaking and 
writing in academic spaces, our rhetoric runs, students may believe (and often argue for) 
whatever they want.  
Carter offers us perhaps the most overt and fully elaborated version of this logic 
and pedagogy for religious students. She explains here her basic understanding of the 
classroom context: 
I argue that inasmuch as these believers “live in a world always already 
biblically written” (Kintz) and large segments of the academy are likely to 
remain hostile to faith-based ways of knowing, we would do better to help 
students speak to and across difference by employing what I have called a 
pedagogy of rhetorical dexterity, an approach that trains writers to 
effectively read, understand, manipulate, and negotiate the cultural and 
linguistic codes of a new community of practice (Lave and Wenger) based 
on a relatively accurate assessment of another, more familiar one. (574) 
 
We might paraphrase Carter to be saying that the tensions between conservative religious 
students (and religious discourses) and academics (and academic discourses) are not 
changing. By implication, neither are the discourses—conflict is inevitable. Because of 
this conflict, becoming a part of the academic discourse community risks loosening 
students’ bonds to their religious discourse community. So religious students need to 
protect themselves from that by getting better at learning new discourses. Specifically, 
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they need to acquire the discourses of power—as she puts it, “those the academy expects 
them to exhibit” (574). This will allow them to keep their religious identities intact, 
Carter says.  
But writing scholars have begun intimating a growing concern that religious 
identities aren’t being protected as much as we think in such acts of “translation,” 
because language can’t really be separated from thinking and living. bonnie lenore 
kyburz explains:  
We struggle to attend to context [elsewhere she calls it an oversimplified 
audience concept] in ways that we imagine as helpful, and we believe that 
we are making various “transitions” easier for students to experience (I 
dare say that we imagine the transitions as unproblematically necessary, 
which should be alarming). Rarely do we consider our work on/in 
audience as harmful; more often we think of it in terms of “rites of 
passage” (139) 
 
This concern finds fuller elaboration in Smart’s essay, which quite typically begins by 
arguing that “Faith embarrasses our attempts to articulate it because it is otherworldly and 
thus other-word-ly: Faith asks us to explain the unexplainable” (14). Early on, she seems 
sure that when instructors recognize this difficulty and “help faith-oriented students move 
from ‘embarrassment’ to engagement by asking students to examine their religious 
assumptions and the language they use to articulate those assumptions” (14)—helping 
them get better at meeting audience expectations for explanation and articulation, in other 
words (20)—they can help to “legitimize the faith-centered voices of our students” (14). 
She enacts this herself by asking a religious student writer to revise his paper and 
“consider his rhetorical situation and the need to address his purpose and audience 
appropriately by composing a paper for a literature class, not a sermon for church” (20). 
Smart intends for these strategies to help her student think critically about his faith while 
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they also “recommend him to, rather than alienating him from, an eclectic audience of 
academic mentors and peers” (20). So the student responds to Smart’s request by 
scrubbing out the overtly religious forms of evidence and re-writing the paper with an 
academic audience’s rhetorical conventions in mind (20-21). This seems to be a perfect 
example of the translation Downs calls for. Smart recognizes, however, that her student’s 
success may have come at a cost—she ends up asking the crucial question: “what costs 
do such acts of re-vision exact on the privately-intuited, epistemological registries of the 
student?” (21)  
I think we can best answer Smart’s question—what are the actual costs of 
translation?—by borrowing a critique from scholarship on language difference. 
Pedagogies that encourage students to translate their religious discourse into academic 
discourse might be said to take something of an accommodationist approach to religious 
difference. Such approaches are purportedly more progressive than earlier pedagogies in 
that they don’t want to eradicate differences—instead, they acknowledge them, codify 
them, and grant individuals a right to them. They do this by teaching students contextual 
appropriateness—learning to use the right discourse in the right “specific, discrete, 
assigned social sphere” (Horner, Lu, Royster, and Trimbur 306). In “Conflict and 
Struggle,” Lu argues, however, that these accommodationist approaches are troubled 
from the start because they problematically depend upon Giddens’ separation between 
content and form to justify their audience-focused strategies. Speaking of a similar 
separation in Mina Shaugnessy’s approach to basic writers, she notes it is only “because 
of her essentialist assumption that words can express but will not change the essence of 
one's thoughts, [that] her pedagogy promises to help students master academic discourse 
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without forcing them to reposition themselves—i.e., to re-form their relation—towards 
conflicting cultural beliefs” (906).  
In other words, it is only when languages are separated from thinking and 
living—from other aspects of culture—that they can be reduced to codifiable sets, and 
distinguished from the forms of life and thought they merely “describe.” In this 
accommodationist conception of language’s relation to thinking and living, language 
does not shape thinking and living, but is simply asked to represent them accurately, the 
way that a French translation is separate from (has no impact on) the English book it 
translates. The concerns for a translator, in that case, are basically limited to accuracy to 
the original on the one hand, and audience-effectiveness on the other. We risk enacting 
both accommodationist assumptions in transparent translation approaches to religious 
students: On the one hand, if we act as though students’ religion can be spoken about in 
new, academically appropriate ways without altering its essential qualities or their 
essential religious commitment, we risk forgetting the intricate relation between thinking, 
living and language. Forgetting this allows us to believe students who translate their 
religious discourse into academic discourse must only concern themselves with an 
accurate and/or appropriate representation of their religion. On the other hand, if we 
acknowledge that religious discourse is, in fact, a discourse connecting speaking, writing, 
thinking and living, then religion cannot be thought about in just any way, any more than 
it can be spoken of in just any way, without producing alterations and new relations to the 
discourse. The specific ways of thinking about religion are themselves a part of the 
religion, so introducing new ways of thinking about religion can alter an “essential” 
aspect of students’ religion, too.  
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If language is understood as wrapped up in thinking and living, then switching the 
language you use to describe something is more than just exchanging one word for 
another. The same is true of approaching religion from a new perspective—these 
exchanges will actually change meanings, as well as users’ relations to their original 
discourses; transformations become inevitable in the process of opaque translation. As 
Mary Soliday explains in “Translating Self and Difference through Literacy Narratives,” 
parts of the original self, discourse, community, or experience may be left behind, or 
contradicted, by translation into a new discourse: “the translation of self, cultural 
categories, and felt experience can be incomplete” (515). This incomplete or 
contradictory translation is literally felt by those who learn new discourses. Lu discusses 
this throughout “Conflict and Struggle” and exemplifies it in “From Silence to Words,” 
as she recounts both the contradiction and compartmentalization she experienced in 
shifting between different languages. She attributes these experiences of loss and 
contradiction to the ways of thinking and living that attach themselves to ways of 
speaking—Standard Chinese at school and English at home were not simply linguistic 
codes, but entire conflicting cultural ways of being that immersed Lu in dramatic internal 
conflict (443). From this perspective, we can see that translation is neither solely a 
question of accuracy—no discourse, identity, experience, or community can be fully 
transferred into another—nor of audience-effectiveness—speaking or writing in new 
ways affects not only the audience but also rebounds upon the speaker or writer and upon 
the discourses, identities, experiences, and communities spoken. A whole system of 
meanings and ways of seeing and feelings are attached to words, and these new meanings 
and ways of being may well contradict with other ways of being. New sets of relations 
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are established. Thus translation is always a process of creating losses, contradictions, 
and choices.   
We can see something of the actual opacity of translation between religious and 
academic communities in Carter’s interactions with Keneshia. In keeping with an 
accommodationist perspective, the codification of discrete communities’ features 
prominently in Carter’s pedagogy and Keneshia’s translation. Carter poses her questions 
for students more generally this way:  
What are the “territorial imperatives” within this community of practice? 
That is, what are the “rules” that govern what one should or should not 
say, think, or feel in this context, as well as how one must behave, dress, 
and carry oneself in order to be considered a “churchly child” rather than 
merely “a child that goes to church”? How is membership in this context 
expressed? What strategies must one use to be “heard, understood, taken 
seriously” within this community of practice? In other words, what 
strategies or ways of being mark some children as “churchly” and others 
as children who just “go to church”? . . . What kinds of things did you 
have to do before you could consider yourself Christian-literate? . . . What 
might you have to learn, recognize, and embody in the academy before 
you may be able to feel literate as a writer and reader in various school-
based contexts, too? (587, emphasis mine) 
 
Students like Keneshia are said to have succeeded in Carter’s class if they have 
“developed ways . . . to make sense of her own Christian literacies in terms legible and 
accessible to those much less literate in Christianity” (591). But as we can see, in order to 
accomplish this legibility and accessibility, Carter encourages students to speak in rules 
and imperatives and universals—a representational strategy that produces both 
homogeneous and static representations. Nor is there any space for discursive change in 
Carter’s text: note that her questions are largely synchronic. Thus, a heterogeneous and 
changing discourse, translated into an academic assignment, can become static and 
homogeneous.  
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Carter also encourages Keneshia to translate her religious discourse into the 
textually-driven form of evangelicalism that Carter—and Goodburn, Perkins, Rand, and 
many others—have deployed in their texts (noted above). This representation can be 
traced to Goodburn and Dively’s early disciplinary articles on conservative Christian 
students. Here’s Dively, quoted in Rand:  
Many [Christians] who have been fed [a] narrow view of subjectivity may 
perceive themselves as rigidly defined by belief in the tenets of holy 
scripture and of faith in the existence and saving power of Jesus Christ. A 
'literal' interpretation of scripture becomes their rule book for living a 
'pure' and productive life, and God becomes the center of their universe, 
the ideal against which all thoughts, behaviors and actions should be 
judged. (94, qtd. in Rand 362)  
 
In keeping with this cited and sedimented disciplinary conception of conservative 
Christianity as text-centered, Carter—not Keneshia—initially constructs evangelical 
Christianity as a text-centered community of practice at the beginning of her article. Like 
Goodburn, Carter quotes Linda Kintz: “all ‘legitimate participants . . . live . . . inside a 
world of textual quotations and references to biblical passages, interpretations, and 
reinterpretations” (578). She draws from this the inference that “many of my students 
‘live inside the Book’” (578) and that for evangelical Christian students “the Bible 
represents their ‘primary sense of selfhood’” (581). This last is a significantly appended 
version of Rand’s words: “spiritual identity may be the primary kind of selfhood more 
than a few of [our students] draw upon in making meaning of their lives and the world 
around them” (350). The upshot is that Carter draws a direct line from Bible to religious 
discourse, from religious discourse to spiritual identity, and from spiritual identity to 
primary selfhood.  
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So working from within this academic understanding of evangelical discourse as 
text-centered and codifiable, Carter wants Keneshia to better articulate and codify the 
connections between the Bible and her church’s community of practice. She writes to 
Keneshia, “In revision, I’d like . . . [for you to] show us how these ‘rules’ as outlined in 
Exodus might play themselves out in your church” (590, ellipses original). Keneshia, 
who had apparently originally cited a passage from Exodus with only oblique 
connections to the practices she was describing in her church, responds by quoting a new 
scripture, this time from Psalms, and explaining line by line how her church’s worship 
service fulfills the lines of the Psalm (591). Carter writes that in Keneshia’s revision “we 
can begin to understand how the shape and function of the church might be informed by, 
among other things, this passage from the Book that makes up the core guidance in this 
community of practice” (591). Carter also suggests this representation is evidence that 
Keneshia is “developing a deeper awareness of the various ways in which the Bible itself 
informs Christian literacy” (592). This certainly may be true—a Psalm describing 
worship practices does seem likely to more directly inform Keneshia’s worship practices 
than the Ten Commandments, which are focused ostensibly on moral strictures. But 
Keneshia’s revised account also seems simply more in line with writing scholarship’s 
academic discourse about evangelical Christianity. First, it presents a stable and 
homogeneous codification of her religious community by sketching a direct, linear 
relationship between an official document and everyday practices; second, it places the 
Bible at the rule-giving center of religious practices. Keneshia’s religious discourse has to 
some extent been assumed by academic discourse through her own assumption of 
academic discourse.  
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It is, admittedly, impossible for me to tell what effect this emphasis on 
codification and textuality actually had on Keneshia’s relationship to Christianity and the 
Bible, or to predict what effect similar codifying strategies could have on other students. 
Acknowledging this limitation in my work, I nevertheless want to highlight the potential 
risks and affordances of this encounter that scholars have generally failed to acknowledge 
or work to address in their recommendations.6 In my view, this translation may cause 
Keneshia to re-construct and re-conceptualize her religion to fit academic 
conceptualizations—making it potentially not “true” to the original religious discourse 
community she’s describing—and it may also change the way that Keneshia relates to her 
religious discourse (and confirm for us our existing relation to it). For example, contrast 
the potential effects of encouraging Keneshia to connect her contemporary religious 
practices to a three thousand year-old poem (and turning the poem into a set of explicit 
instructions) against encouraging Keneshia to connect her contemporary religious 
practices with ever-shifting historical, cultural, racial, geographic, or class trends. Or, 
alternatively, contrast Carter’s codifying strategy against encouraging Keneshia to 
identify variations and changes in how religious practitioners enact these instructions 
from the Psalms, either over the years or within her congregation, and to contemplate the 
role of culture and context in creating those shifts. I believe the former strategy seems 
more likely to encourage Keneshia to understand these everyday practices as ageless or 
static, while the latter strategies seem more likely to encourage Keneshia to think through 
what causes her community’s religious practices to change, and what might cause them 
to change again. In highlighting the relations between the Bible and Keneshia’s religious 
                                                
6 I face similar limitations in my re-readings of published accounts throughout the rest of 
this chapter, and in chapter five.  
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practices rather than the relations between, say, social trends, the Bible, and Keneshia’s 
religious practices,7 an opportunity for promoting more flexible, politically efficacious 
representations of religious discourses is missed. Keneshia is not encouraged to see her 
own agency in producing her religious discourse, nor how the situation is actually 
involved in shaping her community’s situated practice, nor her potential role in changing 
that situation. (Nor is she encouraged to consider how her academic situation is 
impacting her discursive practice.) Though again this cannot be said with any degree of 
certainty, it seems that translation into this particular form of academic discourse might 
actually keep Keneshia from seeing the agency, change, and heterogeneity in her 
religious discourse, and so prove not only ineffective but counterproductive.  
An instructor’s responsibility here is not to eradicate such risks in translation—
that would be impossible—but to acknowledge the possibilities so that students can be 
vigilant and actively making decisions on whether and how they want to change. This is 
why in translingual pedagogies the act of translation itself comes under investigation 
even as a translation is produced. When students are asked to translate from one 
discourse or language into another, they are confronted with the opacity of words and the 
constraints of any one discourse’s representation of “reality” and “experience.” As they 
translate, they are forced to select new words from among a set of partially adequate 
choices, leaving some meanings and subtle nuances out of the new translation while 
drawing in new ones. Further, these translations must be made to highlight the unequal 
power relations between discourses in that particular setting: these selections are made 
because someone has asked for the translation; because some privilege or reward or 
                                                
7 For example, Perkins would encourage consideration of the relations between social 
trends and possible interpretations of that text, that in turn affect religious practices. 
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punishment will be attached to its performance or failure. And while a pragmatist or 
accommodationist approach might emphasize the utility and benefits of producing the 
finished translation, a truly translingual approach will ask students to contemplate the 
remainders, we might say—the losses, inefficiencies, and injustices also produced by the 
process. Ideally, by focusing student attention on the process and its by-products (and not 
only the document that results) students see how each of these discourses or languages 
bring limitations and new meaning potentials not available in the other, but also how 
power works through such processes. Translation is never a matter of neat, algebraic 
substitution, and language use is never simply a matter of information transfer. 
 
Move Three: Resource Religion as Compl(i)mentary 
Our third move, resourcing religious discourse, retains some of the assumptions 
of transparent translation while explicitly attempting to move beyond accommodationist 
pedagogies. Like other inclusive methodologies, this move emphasizes respect for 
religious students and their discourses by looking to locate ways in which academic 
discourse can accommodate religious discourse. But resourcing explicitly goes beyond 
accommodation because it looks for ways “students’ religious discourses might 
contribute to discourses of the academy,” as DePalma puts it (224). He emphasizes this 
shift: “religious students’ discourses are seen not as barriers to critical inquiry but as 
resources that have the potential to contribute to the enterprise of knowledge making” 
(225). DePalma’s approach would appear, at first glance, to be in keeping with Horner et 
al.’s translingual approach to language difference, which “insists on viewing language 
differences and fluidities as resources to be preserved, developed, and utilized. Rather 
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than respond to language differences only in terms of rights, it sees them as resources” 
(304). But I will attempt to demonstrate that there remains a crucial difference between 
translingual resourcing and religious resourcing. Because DePalma’s application of 
resourcing fails to help students deliberately attend to the power relations involved in this 
merger between religious and academic discourses, it remains largely accommodationist 
in spite of itself.  
Like many others have, notably Goodburn, Nowacek, Perkins, Rand, Smart, 
Stenberg, Vander Lei, DePalma emphasizes the complementarity of religious and 
academic discourses as a response to assumptions of mutual exclusivity by scholars who, 
like Carter and Downs, imply at times that the gap between religious and academic 
discourses may be irreconcilable (574). He rightly points out that highlighting 
incommensurability mistakenly shores up the porous boundaries between discourses, 
reifying differences and power relations. Rehearsing the by-now familiar disciplinary 
religion-academe conflict narrative, DePalma notes that it forces an undesirable binary 
choice upon instructors and students (223). He wants to avoid this compartmentalization 
and its binary choice, so his goal is to help students find ways to “merge” religious and 
academic discourses by allowing students to utilize both. In DePalma’s presentation of an 
evangelical student named Thomas’s writing, merging manifests as analyzing religious 
vocabulary and key words (237-38), incorporating religious texts like the Bible (229), 
reporting on religious experiences like feeling the presence of the Holy Spirit (231), and 
utilizing religious discursive forms like an epistolary generic form that Thomas borrows 
from C.S. Lewis (234). In these ways, religious discourse can merge with academic 
discourse in one text, rather than having to be translated first.  
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To justify this inclusion DePalma, like many others, emphasizes how academic 
and religious discourses are actually “overlapping or complimentary [sic]” (223). He 
offers a rather strong version of the anti-foundationalist position that recognizes all 
discourses and discursive subjectivities as situated, and all truths as partial. DePalma 
argues that since all discourses are provisional and transitory attempts “to convey the 
ever-shifting stream of human experiences” (224), any discourse that helps make 
meaning out of experience can have value. From such a position, users of academic 
discourses must try not to invalidate other discourses and instead respect and include 
diverse perspectives, acknowledging that no discourse can claim transcendent knowledge 
and all discourses could have something to teach us. Religious discourses, too, might help 
to convey or work through experiences. “From this vantage point,” DePalma writes, “we 
are no longer forced to choose between discourses. Instead, it becomes possible to see 
how students’ religious discourses might contribute to discourses of the academy” (224). 
But in the process of creating epistemological equality between the discourses, he seems 
to lose sight of the still-extant structural inequities between discourses that his 
epistemological stance wants to rectify.  
We can literally watch this erasure of conflict occur in DePalma’s text. He 
specifically locates his argument for complementarity in the context of translingualism 
and resource-based approaches to discursive difference drawn from Horner, Lu, A. 
Suresh Canagarajah, and Joseph Harris. Here, he cites Horner and Lu: 
By treating these [academic and religious] discourses as “fixed varieties 
into and out of which writers can ‘translate’ their ideas without altering 
what is imagined to be the discrete nature of each,” rather than as 
overlapping or complimentary [sic], students are given the impression that 
they must become different ‘selves’ in each context they enter (9, qtd. in 
DePalma 223).  
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Through the quotation, DePalma concisely brings out the risks of translation that arise 
when we consider relations between discourses: first, the mistake of treating various 
discourses as fixed and discrete; second, the mistake of assuming that discourses can be 
translated transparently into one another without altering the discourses themselves; third, 
the mistake of compartmentalizing students’ mixed and plural discursive identities. 
But when looked at more closely, DePalma’s gloss on Horner and Lu’s words actually 
appears to shift away from the originating text’s concerns about translation and relations 
between discourses. In fact, DePalma’s rosy characterization of those relations, 
“overlapping or complimentary,” proves to itself be a silent translation of Joseph Harris’s 
characterization of discourses as “overlapping and contradictory,” a phrase DePalma 
quotes later in the article. This elision of conflict becomes especially clear in DePalma’s 
revision suggestions for Thomas—evident in both what he doesn’t ask Thomas for (any 
discussion of the conflicts or struggles between discourses, communities, or identities) 
and what he does (academic forms of discourse). 
On a fully translingual model of translation or “merging,” accomplishing a merger 
between discourses as powerful as Christianity and academic discourse should result in 
losses, contradictions, transformations, and remainders; and students should be 
encouraged to focus on those ruptures. But this is not the case in DePalma’s model, 
because transdiscursive conflict is de-emphasized in favor of complementarity. At times, 
we do see the struggles of merging in DePalma’s interactions with Thomas. He certainly 
has a number of revision suggestions for Thomas’s next draft. These revision suggestions 
might be interpreted as symptoms of just such a struggle between discourses (232-33, 
236-38), particularly because DePalma focuses so strongly on critiques he thinks 
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“academic readers” might offer when reading Thomas’s writing (232). DePalma worries 
at that point that “some readers” will be concerned by Thomas’s use of biblical and 
religious terminology without providing definitions or qualifications; his appropriation of 
religious clichés to express personal sentiments; and the balance of metaphor and 
concrete description in his narration of religious experience (232-33). DePalma notes that 
these criticisms might miss the positive work of self-exploration, reflection, and 
invention that Thomas is doing, but he studiously avoids rejecting the criticisms 
themselves (which he himself constructed). And when he later posits his own suggestions 
for revision—analytical exploration of religious key words, greater concreteness of 
description, imitation of academic models of religious discourse (237-38)—these 
suggestions also press Thomas towards academic modes of discourse. The religio-
academic merger is beginning to look more like a take-over. For me, they index the 
competition involved in such a complex web of “competing belief systems” (perhaps he 
means different discourses?) and lived experiences.  
But for DePalma, these simply index the struggle for adequate expression and 
understanding—finding words adequate to Thomas’s experience (a crucial objective), 
and finding words adequate for Thomas’s audience. We can see how DePalma 
conceptualizes both expression and audience in the following phrases: he wants to help 
Thomas  
1) “relate these experiences to readers more effectively” 
2) “[communicate] the magnificence of these experiences to his audience” 
3) “convey the shift in his interior condition to his audience” 
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4) “more vividly represent the fluctuation among the various forms of belief he is 
attempting to articulate in his essay” (all on 236)  
5) “ground his experiences in a way that is accessible to readers” (237) 
6) “more effectively articulate [his] beliefs, commitments, and experiences” (237) 
7) “gain a serious hearing with diverse audiences” (237) 
8) “explore [his] deeply held values and beliefs in light of his experiences in an 
effort to make them available to others” (238) 
9) “mine [his] ‘God-terms’ and reflect on defining events in [his life] in order to 
communicate them to an audience in writing . . . in a way that is meaningful to 
diverse audiences” (238, all emphases mine) 
DePalma seems unaware of the uneven power relations he is perpetuating by continually 
casting modes of academic discourse (indicated by his specific revision suggestions 
above) as ways for students to write effectively for a broad, “some readers” type of 
audience (indicated by the phrasing of these goals for Thomas’s writing). So academic 
discourse retains its hierarchical place; first, because Thomas’s religious discourse 
remains ultimately answerable to academic norms; second, because those academic 
norms themselves become transparent and naturalized into general requirements for 
successful communication. 
As DePalma seems to construct the issue, now that religious discourses and 
experiences have been deemed academically appropriate and complementary (through his 
theoretical framework), the struggle of writing comes down to a struggle for audience-
appropriate self-expression (transparent translation). Or, as Carter put it using a similar 
line of reasoning, the struggles between religious and academic discourses in the 
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academy can be “understood as a dispute over appropriateness, rather than as a question 
of whether [students] suffer from ‘false consciousness’ or, as I’m (unfortunately and 
often) quick to see it, outright ‘ignorance’” (580). This does not acknowledge that a 
dispute over appropriateness is indeed a dispute in which various parties exercise power 
over others (who decides what is appropriate?). The political agenda behind critical calls 
for merging discourses and incorporating experience—challenging hegemonic positions, 
politicizing experience together (see, for instance, Anzaldua; Pratt; Soliday)—dissipates 
in the face of these emphases on appropriateness or successful communication, as do the 
structural pressures and constructed borders between academic and religious discourses. 
There is no longer a conflict to acknowledge between powerful and competing 
discourses, because they are epistemological equals working together in a bigger struggle 
to make language align with and communicate experience. Because of this, like Carter 
and the accommodationists before him, DePalma can’t seem to see that he, too, is asking 
for a particular type of discourse that will only be effective for certain audiences. These 
approaches promise to reduce conflict, and do—by simply requiring students to surrender 
for their own good.  
Mary Soliday asserts that writing classes should help students actively participate 
and deliberate on conflicts—not avoid them. In contrast to pedagogies that treat the 
collision of discourses as a problem to be resolved through adequate expression and 
audience awareness, and the classroom as a space where harmonious and complementary 
mergers are privileged, Soliday’s vision is of texts and classrooms as contact zones: 
“social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in the 
contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power” (Pratt 34, qtd. in Soliday 512). It is 
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only through deliberately writing in these contact zones and through deliberating on 
those forms of contact that students will be enabled to more critically participate in and 
shape the cultural forces shaping them. Within the discipline of that time, Soliday saw 
“considerable debate . . . on whether writing teachers and their students should assimilate, 
critique, or reject dominant discourses,” but she notes that instructors seemed to be 
arrogating students’ rights to make their own decisions. Soliday suggests that students 
have significant contributions to make in those debates and decisions; ironically, she 
argues that they might think through cultural conflicts by focusing precisely on the sorts 
of processes of translation and merging that DePalma and Carter recommend as a means 
of avoiding conflict.  
Soliday imagines a pedagogy that might help students “to ponder the conflicts 
attendant upon crossing language worlds and to reflect upon the choices that speakers of 
minority dialects and languages must make” (512). By deliberating on translations, 
students may be enabled to contend 
with complicated affective and social issues of translation that the 
scholarship boy could not resolve without losing a sense of self: how to be 
independent from teachers, yet also how to accept direction from them; 
how to switch codes according to context without being an opportunistic 
rhetor; how to enter one discourse world without losing the words and 
values of another. How, in short, to translate self and difference between 
language worlds without becoming “a stranger to yourself.” (519) 
 
In other words, Soliday argues it is only through deliberating on acts of merging and 
translation that students can truly contend with questions of social power and cultural 
conflict that arise in the multicultural classroom—not merely by performing the mergers 
and producing the translations. I will return to this argument for deliberation below.  
 
 70 
Move Four: Report Religious Experience as Self-Evident 
A fourth move we have made in our efforts to counter hegemonic classroom 
relations is the incorporation of religious experience in academic writing. We are now 
encouraging students to write richer, closer reports of their own lived religious practice 
(Rand; Carter; DePalma) just as we work on developing our own richer, closer 
examinations of religious practices (Moss; Crowley; Thomson). This critical 
autoethnographic approach to religious experience can be traced back to Daniell’s 1994 
essay, “Composing (As) Power.” Daniell asks informants to report on their religious 
discourse—and often personal experience—in order to help us reflect on our work. Rand 
similarly proposes that instructors ask students to represent their religious experience to 
us in order to complicate our misconceptions of religious students and their religious 
discourses. She recommends instructors ask the following questions: 
We should ask students to explain how their resistance to mainstream 
values and culture has shaped their lives and how those outside their 
immediate faith communities respond to them. (Have they faced rejection 
from family members, friends, coworkers, classmates, etc.? How do those 
in the secular world react to their religious identity?) Christians are 
admonished to be "in" the world but not "of" it (John 17:15-16): how is 
this detachment from the secular world lived out on a daily basis, and do 
the effects of sin make this kind of separation a struggle? (363) 
 
We should note that Rand’s questions here are focused on the conflicts students 
experience between religious and academic ways of being. She suggests that representing 
personal experience in these ways—in terms of inter-discursive conflict and for instructor 
viewing—might help instructors overcome crippling misconceptions of religious students 
while also engaging “students in further conversation about the complex negotiations of 
selfhood they undergo” (363). In other words, representing personal religious experience 
is seen as a strategy for countering popular, hegemonic accounts of religion and for 
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coming to greater understanding; this is certainly in keeping with Soliday’s vision of 
autoethnographic writing.  
Such uses of personal religious experience present a significant positive 
development in our approaches to religious students. But as with other moves we’ve 
made, the turn to the personal retains a troubling tendency to elide the conflicting and 
contingent social forces structuring both religious experience and its representation. I 
argue in what follows that including religiously-inflected experience in student writing is 
not inherently critical work; to be fully critical—a goal espoused by nearly all of the 
writing scholars who write on religious students—experience must be written on in ways 
that interrogate and respond to the complex cultural forces and conflicts that shape that 
experience.8 Lu and Horner offer three questions for instructors and students to consider 
when incorporating personal experience in their academic writing: “how to represent the 
experience of an other,” “how to represent experience to an other,” and “how to politicize 
experience with the aid of others” (“Problematic” 262). I argue that we have neglected to 
fully answer the third question. In order to write on experience in a way that would 
politicize it, experience would have to become a medium for deliberation on and 
intervention in power relations, rather than simply a resource for learning a new discourse 
or reporting on a history, as in our heretofore approaches to religious experience. I 
designate this here as the critical difference between interrogating experience and merely 
                                                
8 Stenberg has rightly noted that this, too, is a sort of required translation, and I agree: my 
position is that any writing we ask students to do on their religious experience will be a 
translation—the question is what sort. I justify this particular form of translation on the 
basis of the logic outlined in my first chapter: research suggests religious students would 
like to practice religion differently, but feel “out of control” and unable to change 
religion—so I take up a critical approach to help students achieve a sense of the 
instability of religion and their own ability to effect desired change within religion. This, 
to me, constitutes a politically transformative pedagogy.      
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reporting on experience. For example, we might note in the above text that Rand begins 
from a particular understanding of Christianity (“Christians are admonished to be ‘in’ the 
world but not ‘of’ it”), then asks students to illustrate that understanding by reporting on 
their own experiences (“how is this detachment lived out”?). This is, so far, a reportorial 
use of experience. But as she goes on to ask if living that out is a “struggle,” we move to 
what is potentially an interrogative treatment of experience, particularly depending on 
how sin gets defined. If students are to write on religiously inflected experiences in 
politically transformative ways, I argue here that our use of this interrogative mode must 
be expanded.  
In the most recent iteration of this move to incorporate religious experience, 
DePalma emphasizes experience and encourages students to report on those experiences 
in academic writing. He argues that instructors must “account for the intersections 
between and constant change within every ‘discourse community’” (223). DePalma 
explains the source of this constant change: “discourse that seeks to convey the ever-
shifting stream of human experience is never going to be static or stable but will always 
be in process, because its value is measured by its ability to adapt to the un-reproducible 
experiences of language-users” (224). Language, for DePalma, not only “conveys” and 
“adapts to” experience (224) and “describes” experiences (233); he also sees Thomas 
using writing for “negotiating the contradictions, complexities, and mysteries of his 
experiences” and “grappling with his experiences through the language of [Biblical] 
texts” in a “cycle of action, reflection, and invention” (234). In keeping with this 
conception of language, DePalma’s students are encouraged to “identify a moment of 
significance in their lives and compose an essay that conveyed the importance of that 
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experience to readers” (229). Writing this essay will allow students like Thomas, 
DePalma suggests, to make connections between texts and experience and better 
understand their identity in relation to their discourses and experiences (235). As 
DePalma notes, this focus on experience affords students the opportunity to discursively 
re-construct those experiences and shape their senses of self, using the discursive 
resources we can add to their repertoire “to better understand [their] own identity in 
relation to [their] faith tradition” (235) and to develop “rhetorical resources that might 
allow them to shape themselves as they desire” (238). So DePalma importantly evokes 
the dynamic nature of discourses and the intersections between identity, discourse, and 
experience. DePalma’s purposes are clearly and admirably political: as with Rand, his 
focus on religious experience is intended as a counter to hegemonic accounts that 
inaccurately depict religion and religious students and as a means of helping students 
negotiate an identity at the intersection of academic and religious discourses.  
But because DePalma is concerned with the discipline’s homogenizing tendency 
described in Move One, he tends to focus his discussion on the religious experience of 
the individual. In several different ways throughout the article, DePalma privileges the 
individuality of religious beliefs over against the “’official’ beliefs of religious 
institutions” (239), and suggests ways for highlighting individual religiosity in scholarly 
writing practices, instructor reading practices, and student writing assignments. First, of 
our representations of religious students, DePalma complains, “much of what has been 
written in this area of inquiry has relied on preconceived ideas about how ‘fundamentalist 
Christians’ view the Bible, truth, and so on. This literature has not, however, seriously 
investigated individual students’ perceptions on these matters” (239). Second, he 
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proposes a new method of reading religious students’ texts, so that “we might seek to 
understand how they as individuals conceive of their relationship to the sacred” (239). 
And third, he recommends writing assignments for students to help them acquire 
“rhetorical resources that might allow them to construct themselves as they desire” (238). 
So DePalma counters hegemonic accounts of religion and dominant discourses with 
individuality and individual experience, suggesting that this will give students the tools to 
construct themselves autonomously. By thus challenging the effects of the dominant 
account of religion on multiple levels, DePalma’s focus on heterogeneity and experience 
appears to be a promising strategy for helping instructors and religious students improve 
classroom relations.  
When we arrive at DePalma’s hypothetical revision questions for Thomas, 
however, we see that this individual conception of experience also places significant 
limitations on the critical or interrogative potential of writing about religious experience. 
He wants Thomas to elaborate on a particular religious experience by answering the 
following questions:  
What senses were activated in the Spirit’s presence? What did you see, 
hear, smell, taste, or feel? What happens to your body in moments like 
those described here? Have you experienced similar sensations in other 
contexts? What are the experiences you describe here analogous to? How 
do you discriminate the Spirit’s presence? Have you had other experiences 
of this kind? If so, what were they like? How have such experiences 
impacted your beliefs in the past? What allows you to know when the 
Spirit is present? How do these experiences compare with or differ from 
the religious experiences of others you have talked with or read about? 
(236) 
 
On many levels, these questions are excellent. They emphasize embodiment; they 
emphasize change; they emphasize heterogeneity; and they likely will produce the vivid 
descriptions that allow readers to imagine the experience. And these are, after all, goals 
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DePalma espouses (see Move Three, above). But there are things these questions don’t 
do. Namely, they fail to address the deeply social—that is, structured and contingent—
components of Thomas’s religious experience. I can demonstrate how crucial these 
failings are for a critical agenda through a pair of brief examples.  
On the one hand, we can see the dangers of constructing religious experience as 
stable and given by looking back at Rand. Despite her emphasis on cultural conflict, 
Rand, like DePalma, fails to emphasize the contingency and change inherent in religious 
experience. Ironically, this is in part because she constructs the experience of cultural 
conflict as an essential component of religion, declaring, “Religion, rightly understood, is 
a subversive force” (361). Here, she is reifying both religion and cultural conflict, and de-
historicizing both. In saying “rightly understood,” Rand is asserting that there is an ideal, 
true, originary religion that makes cultural conflict inevitable, rather than dependent upon 
the cultures in any specific conflict. We see this dehistoricization and its consequences 
even more strongly when she writes, “Christian spirituality (aside from the way human 
beings have often corrupted it) seeks to take attention off of one’s own self in order to 
exalt the name of Jesus” (363). This static definition of Christianity allows Rand to argue 
that “a declaration of faith in Jesus is far from being pious cliché or a sign of dull 
conformity” because true Christian discourse already represents a critical challenge to 
secular discourse (363). On the basis of this construction of religion, Rand can 
recommend that instructors ask students to report on their community’s (and their own) 
ongoing critical relation to secular discourse, rather than demanding that students 
critically interrogate their religious discourse. Rand’s choice here is characteristic of the 
inclusive turn: writing scholars have focused nearly all of our attention on interdiscursive 
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conflict between religion and academe while neglecting entirely to attend to the 
intradiscursive conflict and change within religion that produces change and variation in 
religio-academic relations. The result is the implicit stabilization of the religious status 
quo.  
In a sense, Rand calls for students to provide their personal experience in writing 
classes as proof of this religious constant, which will challenge secular and uncharitable 
constructions of religion and religious discourse. Carter similarly uses student reports on 
religious experience to assert/confirm stable truths about evangelical literacy that point 
out conflicts between religious and academic discourses related to faith and the Bible’s 
centrality (576). By working from this definition of religion and describing religious 
experience in the terms Rand’s questions suggest (see above), students certainly should 
become more aware of religious experiences of cultural conflict, as should instructors. 
Self-understanding and outside sympathy may increase. But if religion exists “aside from 
the way human beings have often corrupted it” then this ultimately renders all changes 
and differences in people’s religious experiences ephemeral rather than material. People’s 
behaviors are merely corruptions and superstructural variations—religion itself is not 
changed by people’s performances of religion. This may explain why Rand’s 
recommended questions for helping students investigate their own religious subculture 
ultimately emphasize commonalities rather than differences—despite a recommendation 
that students gather individual stories, she focuses on helping students create generalizing 
descriptions that highlight neither change nor heterogeneity—and why her questions 
about differences in religious practice frame those differences in terms of sin and the 
human condition, rather than as matters of social context or contingency (363-4). 
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Whatever the intended goal, this has the effect of insulating religion, particularly 
Christianity, from historical change and human participation. Un-qualified by an 
ongoing, changing history and independent of practical manifestations, religion must 
continue to exist in the same set of relations. Such representations of religious experience 
and conflict will ironically only reify religious experience into an essentially 
homogeneous, stable entity. Worse, for the purposes of educators and religious reformers 
alike, such reports will make students’ religions into homogeneous, stable entities 
immune to human intervention. Like Carter’s interaction with Keneshia, Rand’s 
stabilizing questions could potentially reduce students’ ability to see themselves as agents 
of change in their religious communities. Representing experience is reduced to reporting 
on experience, not changing it.  
On the other hand, we should also beware the danger of constructing religious 
experience as completely individual and spontaneously achieved. Looking back at 
DePalma’s questions for Thomas (above), supernatural experience appears to 
spontaneously happen. The experience’s socially- and individually-orchestrated aspects 
are not discussed. This is first because DePalma’s questions evoke no exploration of the 
ways that Thomas’s encounters with the Holy Spirit involve Thomas as an active agent. 
He asks, what happens to your body? rather than, what do you do with—and to—your 
body? What role did you play in producing this experience? How could we readers have 
an experience like this? Nor, second, does DePalma ask Thomas about the social aspects 
of the experience, outside of the Spirit and one comparative question that seems more 
likely to encourage closer description than to highlight the role of culture in producing 
the experience. Asking how Thomas’s experience compares or contrasts with other 
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accounts of supernatural experiences does not suggest social influence—whereas asking 
how other accounts of supernatural experiences might have shaped Thomas’s experience, 
or at least his ability to recognize the supernatural character of his experience, would 
have. Moreover, as I will discuss in detail in chapter five, Thomas’s account of the 
supernatural experience appears as the climax of a long, detailed narrative of Thomas’s 
spiritual journey, one kicked off by a break-up with his girlfriend and ending by the lake 
of a religious camp where Thomas interacts with the Spirit. Happily for Thomas, his 
spiritual crisis ends just days before he is set to attend a secular college. This is notable 
because the camp as described appears to be a sort of boot camp for getting Christian 
students ready for the spiritual challenges of the college year. It is disappointing that 
these contextual factors—relationships, chronologies, and spatial locations—are treated 
as unrelated to Thomas’s spiritual experience.  
In contrast, anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann has found that achieving the 
supernatural sensational experiences that Thomas describes, and the personal relationship 
with God they index, are difficult for most religious adherents to achieve, and require 
significant social production. As she explains, writing with Howard Nusbaum and Ronad 
Thisted, 
it takes effort to accept that a particular interpretation of the supernatural is 
correct, and it takes effort to live in accordance with that interpretation—
to live as if they really do believe that their understanding is accurate. It 
requires learning, and the learning can be a slow process, like learning to 
speak a foreign language in an unfamiliar country, with new and different 
social cues. That learning is often stumbling and gradual for those who 
convert, take on new roles, or go through an initiation process. People 
must come to see differently, to think differently, and above all to feel 
differently, because to believe in a particular form of the supernatural as if 
the supernatural is truly present is, for most believers, to experience the 
world differently than if that form of the supernatural were not real. (67) 
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Maintaining this experiential relationship through seeing, thinking, and feeling differently 
is difficult, contingent on a process, and must be acquired and worked at by religious 
practitioners. The relationship and the sensations are thus the products of a continual 
learning process. Elsewhere, Luhrmann argues there are three different types of learning 
involved in contemporary U.S. evangelical Christian practice: cognitive/linguistic, 
metakinetic, and relational. “Together,” she writes, “they enable new believers to do 
something quite remarkable—to construct, out of everyday psychological experience, the 
profound sense that they have a really real relationship with a being that cannot be seen, 
heard, or touched” (“Metakinesis” 519).  
This social learning process lends religious experience a sense of situated 
contingency and agency that can be contrasted with the spontaneous and a-social 
construction of religious experience assumed by Rand’s reifying questions and 
DePalma’s individualizing questions. Within such constructions of religious experience, 
students may be aided in sharing their experiences, reflecting upon them, and retro-
actively shaping their meaning for themselves or others—seemingly DePalma’s and 
Rand’s chief goals—but not in accounting for, transmitting, or intervening in the cultural 
forces shaping those experiences. Religious experiences as reported in both cases, then, 
are not practiced and formed, but undergone and then re-formed afterwards. But as 
previous sections have made clear, a politically challenging use of personal experience 
must do more than that. Writing on personal experience must be an opportunity for 
students to actively deliberate on the cultural forces shaping their experience and an 
opportunity for them to use accounts of those experiences to respond to those cultural 
forces—both of which forms of agential action are denied or partially denied to students 
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when some of those cultural forces are treated as static or spontaneous. But there is 
another requirement for a critical use of personal experience: it must present students 
with an opportunity to intervene and re-think the way cultural forces will shape their 
future experiences. While the first two requirements have been dealt with extensively 
above, the final, future orientation is at once the most critical and the least discussed. I 
will elaborate briefly here, but will offer a far more thorough articulation of how this use 
of experience might be accomplished in chapter five.   
Lu and Horner suggest in “The Problematic of Experience” that we must 
recognize discourse as always “an act of shaping—giving form to—experiences” (262), 
rather than expressing or transparently reporting them. This phrase has a sort of double 
meaning that is easy to miss: if discourse “gives form to experiences,” this doesn’t 
necessarily mean the forming occurs only after-the-fact. Lu and Horner are suggesting 
that discourse does not merely re-shape past experiences, ordering them or making sense 
of experience in some cognitive sense, as DePalma tends to imply; nor is discourse 
merely shaped (determined) by the past. Acts of representation and experiencing shape 
the way we will perceive and relate to ongoing and still-to-come phenomena, engaging in 
and altering reality and future experience. They go before us, in a sense, even as they are 
themselves already structured by lived conditions. When we acknowledge that discourse 
and experience are mutually informing in this way, then students must be encouraged to 
pay far more attention to the choices they make in reporting on their experiences for us—
they can no longer simply focus on conveying those experiences effectively, because their 
instructor’s understanding is not the only thing being affected by what they write. Their 
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future reality and their future experiences, too, are shaping and being shaped through acts 
of representation.  
This is why representing experience is potentially an effective political act: 
Resources and experiences, critical ethnographic approaches would emphasize, are not 
static but instead formed by the ways in which we use and represent them: “the relation 
between experience and discourse is not polar and hierarchical but dialectical” (Lu and 
Horner, “Problematic” 259). If we acknowledge this, that discourse on experience is 
always already culturally informed, “an act of re-forming experience” in culturally 
structured directions, this gives discourse significant sway, though not full determination. 
Because discourse and experience are inextricably related but not identical, reporting on 
an experience in a new way is potentially a means for challenging the dominant 
discourses on that experience; but discoursing differently is also a potential means to 
changing our experiences (262). So a truly critical use of personal experience will focus 
more attention on how writing about religion is a political and constructive act—on the 
ways in which religious students don’t merely report on their faith experiences, critique 
their faith experiences, reveal what lies beneath their faith experiences, but instead how 
religious students form and re-form their religious experiences through the 
representations they create when they write in our classroom. This sort of writing extends 
beyond the constructing or expressing of the self (DePalma’s chief concerns) to 
participate in cultural definition and cultural representation through the de-naturalization 
of experiences and in turn cultural forces. Discourse only truly becomes the means for 
critical self-shaping that DePalma imagines if students deliberate on the choices they are 
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Schoenike Nowacek’s ethnographic work corroborates the perspective I’ve been 
suggesting here: she finds that when religious students write they are often negotiating 
with religion and academia in far more complex ways than we may realize. In their 
papers as well as interviews, it becomes clear that her student informants’ religious 
discourses reciprocally exert their own force on (and through) academic discourse, on 
(and through) the body and experience of the students, and on (and through) the writing 
they do. Each of the students in Nowacek’s study experiences writing assignments 
differently depending upon the relationship they have with organized religion—one sees 
himself as a strong Catholic, and so feels comfortable questioning aspects of his faith in 
writing assignments at his Catholic university, whereas another, a Quaker, sees herself as 
“an uncertain outsider” at that same university and so experiences the same writing 
assignments as narrowly-designed and coercive. The third student enters college already 
questioning the reality of religious claims, and in her papers Nowacek perceives evidence 
of two different struggles: “Underneath the surface of this paper, . . . are Tigra’s religious 
experiences and concerns as well as her efforts to write about them in ways that would be 
satisfactory in an academic context” (164). The relations move in multiple directions—at 
times, religious and academic forces work together harmoniously, as in the first student’s 
case; at times, as for the Quaker student, they seem to directly conflict; and at other 
times, students know they are negotiating and struggling with both simultaneously.  
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All of this occurs, Nowacek writes, within “a subtle and shifting nexus of 
individual beliefs, classroom contexts, and institutional culture” (162) in which students’ 
religious identities “are not separable from institutional religious culture” (155). While 
Nowacek intends the religious culture of the university institution where the classroom 
experience takes place—and so remains focused on academic institutional forms of 
hegemony—I believe we need to recognize, actually, that religious students always 
operate in relation to a larger academic culture and a larger religious culture; that both 
discourses structure students’ experience of writing in the academy, in concert with their 
many other social locations; and that all those discourses enter into conflict through the 
bodies and texts of students. Religious students’ relations to religion are not uniform; 
neither, then, are religious students’ relations to academia. Conflicts traverse all of these 
relations. Our pedagogies must begin from this acknowledgement: that religious and 
academic discourses, identities, experiences, and communities are neither entirely at 
odds, nor entirely complementary, but instead reciprocally shaping one another at all 
points through conflictual, complementary, and mostly uncategorizable relations. 
So it is true, as Goodburn writes, that academic discourses and religious 
discourses “are engaged in constant struggle” (351). But in the course of this struggle, the 
lines around “religious” and “academic” are constantly changed. Moreover, we (students 
and instructors) constantly participate in these struggles as representatives and makers of 
those discourses. In our calls for respectful “merging,” dexterous switching, better 
articulation, and greater understanding, the critical focus on multi-directional change (that 
is, the reciprocal relations between “realities,” discourses, translations, and 
representations), so central to a truly critical approach, has disappeared. This causes us to 
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pay only lackluster attention to the relations between discourses that occur at the border 
formed by our translations. In light of these constant movements and struggles, our 
approaches to religious formations have to be flexible enough to incorporate the 
heterogeneity of personal religious experience while also keeping track of the power 
relations and multiple cultural discourses that inform those experiences in shared ways. 
In the next three chapters, I will examine means by which we might retrieve a fuller sense 








ACCOUNTING FOR RELIGIOUS POWER 
 
In chapter two, I describe the disciplinary turn towards incorporating religious 
discourse in the writing classroom. We have used such writing to accomplish important 
goals: chiefly, to help students combat a dominant negative representation of religious 
students held by outsiders and to help students succeed in college writing contexts. But I 
argue there that we haven’t achieved our dual goals of practicing and promoting tolerance 
with religious students for four chief reasons: a homogenization of religion, a transparent 
conception of translation, an incomplete acknowledgement of the conflictual and 
mutually shaping relations between discourses, and a spontaneous and individual 
conception of religious experience. Put otherwise, we haven’t placed sufficient emphasis 
upon the inter- and intra-formational sources of change, contradiction, and conflict in 
religious discourses. If we are to include religiously-inflected perspectives, values, terms, 
texts, genres, and experiences in the writing classroom, chapters one and two suggest that 
we must better attend to the heterogeneity, change, and conflict of living those out—and 
how the writing classroom participates in producing those differences, changes, and 
conflicts. This chapter sets out to produce one such account of religion, in the process 
suggesting terms and concepts to help us produce more such accounts.  
As I discuss in the opening, Asad argues that we should investigate the mutually 
shaping relations between forms of religion, social disciplines, and material conditions 
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that cause religions to take particular forms, and then cause those same religions to take 
new forms. So in these next three chapters I attempt to apply Asad’s perspective on 
religion to American evangelical Christianity, producing a new account of it that 
emphasizes its forces, heterogeneity, changes, contradictions, and conflicts. I demonstrate 
in this chapter that evangelicalism depends for its existence on a number of social forces 
and institutions that in effect create and maintain evangelicalism by disseminating a 
hegemonic account of it. I call this account, its proponents, and its institutions “official 
evangelicalism.” Official evangelicalism maintains itself by setting pressures and limits 
on the religious experiences, practices, and representations of religious practitioners, to 
the point that I believe most religious Americans must experience, practice, and represent 
their religion in relation to that official account. I connect this account of official 
evangelicalism back to the writing classroom throughout the second half of this chapter, 
arguing that writing scholars, instructors, and students are actually complicit in the 
reproduction of official evangelicalism. 
As I argued in chapter one and two and continue to demonstrate here in chapter 
three, scholars, instructors and students alike continue to struggle against a homogenizing 
and reifying account of contemporary American Christianity that is often explicitly 
connected to evangelicalism. This account obscures the ability of both parties to view the 
actual practices of religious adherents, and it obscures the actual hegemonic relations 
between religious adherents and official evangelicalism. In the face of the hegemonic 
account presented to them in the larger culture and at school, neither students nor 
instructors possess the language and concepts necessary to articulate the varieties of 
actual religious practice in America, nor to envision the means for changing existing 
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relations among students, religion, and academia. I choose to focus on evangelicalism, in 
other words, not only because it is a powerful force in American religion, but even more 
so because evangelicalism affects the rest of us, too.  
But this power of official evangelicalism is not total or without interruption, 
precisely because it depends upon so many institutions and participants for its continuing 
power. So I will argue in chapter four that in contrast to the homogeneity of this 
hegemonic account, official evangelicalism’s definitions are heavily contested and its 
norms practically contradicted. In contrast to the hegemonic account’s stable and given 
constructions of evangelicalism, I will demonstrate that evangelicalism, like all religions, 
is constantly forming and transforming, and describe several more of the unstable 
mechanisms that religions like evangelicalism depend upon for their transmission. 
Chapter five will discuss ways in which these mechanisms could be highlighted through 
our students’ writing. If we want to respect the place of religion in students’ lives and 
with them re-negotiate its place in our classrooms and our shared spaces, we must first 
locate its actual place(s) in their lives and our classrooms, as well as the forces that render 
those places various and contingent. 
 
I. Defining Evangelicalism 
After surveying a set of popular tropes for conceptualizing the essence of 
religion—baseball (ritual institution), Coca-Cola (fetish), rock ‘n’ roll (potlatch)—David 
Chidester concludes that each is both useful and limited in its ability to convey religion’s 
essence. Through people’s use of such tropes, he writes, “religion is revealed, once again, 
not only as a cluster concept or a fuzzy set but also as a figure of speech that is subject to 
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journalistic license, rhetorical excess, and intellectual sleight of hand” (758). Such 
definitional possibilities and difficulties, Chidester suggests, “signify both the problem of 
defining religion and the complex presence of religion in American popular culture” 
(761). I want to argue that the same might be said of the term evangelicalism—the word 
designates a cluster concept, a fuzzy set, a figure of speech. In writing scholarship, we 
know this. Running up against the need to define evangelicalism for her readers, Carter 
provides the following caveat first: “Even the most influential leaders of this movement 
are unable to reach a consensus about what it means to be an evangelical Christian” 
(581). The reason for Carter’s difficulty—and these influential leaders’ difficulties—is 
that the evangelical “movement,” as Carter calls it, does not strictly exist. Whereas the 
Catholic Church might, from one perspective, be said to exist in an ordinary sense—there 
is a monolithic institutional hierarchy with the broadly recognized (if challenged) power 
to include and exclude others from the Catholic formation—this cannot be said of 
evangelicalism. Evangelicalism is only a cluster concept; a fuzzy set; a figure of speech. 
As such, the definitions of “evangelical” and “evangelicalism” are also sites of conflict.  
The Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals, an organization associated 
with institutionally-evangelical Wheaton College, explains the difficulty of defining 
evangelicalism on its website: “The term ‘Evangelicalism’ is a wide-reaching definitional 
‘canopy’ that covers a diverse number of Protestant traditions, denominations, 
organizations, and churches” (Eskridge, “Defining Evangelicalism”). There are 
evangelical churches, denominations, schools, seminaries, associations, and political 
organizations, each with some degree of coercive power over their individual members, 
or at least member churches or groups—but there is no one Evangelical (capital E) 
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institution with coercive power over all these smaller evangelical assemblages. And yet 
despite this lack of a coherent coercive apparatus for regulating membership equivalent to 
that of the Catholic or Mormon church, and despite the apparent diversity among 
members, Luhrmann notes “About 40 percent of Americans describe themselves as born 
again or evangelical” (When God Talks Back 13). Actually, Gallup indicates that as 
recently as 2005 a stunning 47% of surveyed Americans answered yes when asked if they 
would describe themselves in this way (“Another Look”). Such an astounding number 
suggests that evangelicalism has some sort of significant presence in American society—
but it doesn’t yet tell us what that presence is.  
In trying to define and explain this evangelical presence (and the power of this 
term as an identity-marker and widely-used descriptor) in the absence of Evangelicalism, 
scholars (and others) define the terms “evangelical” and “evangelicalism” in a variety of 
ways, and to a variety of ends. The Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals 
offers three of the most common referents for the term (all text comes directly from their 
webpage):  
The first is to view as “evangelical” all Christians who affirm a few 
key doctrines and practical emphases. British historian David Bebbington 
approaches evangelicalism from this direction and notes four specific 
hallmarks of evangelical religion: conversionism, the belief that lives need 
to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a 
particular regard for the Bible; and “crucicentrism,” a stress on the 
sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Bebbington’s definition has become a 
standard baseline for most scholars. . . . 
A second sense of the term is to look at evangelicalism as an organic 
group of movements and religious tradition. Within this context 
“evangelical” denotes a style as much as a set of beliefs, and an attitude 
which insiders “know” and “feel” when they encounter it. As a result, 
groups as disparate as black Baptists and Dutch Reformed Churches, 
Mennonites and Pentecostals, Catholic charismatics and Southern Baptists 
can all come under the evangelical umbrella—demonstrating just how 
diverse the movement really is. . . . 
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A third sense of the term is as the self-ascribed label for a largely 
Midwest-based coalition that arose during the Second World War. 
Importantly, its core personalities (like Carl F.H. Henry, Harold John 
Ockenga and Billy Graham), institutions (for instance, Moody Bible 
Institute, Wheaton College, and Fuller Theological Seminary), and 
organizations (such as the National Association of Evangelicals and Youth 
for Christ) have played a pivotal role in giving the wider movement a 
sense of cohesion that extends beyond these “card-carrying” evangelicals. 
(Eskridge, “Defining the Term”) 
 
We might say that the Institute identifies an evangelical ideology consisting of articulable 
ideas; an evangelical style marked by less-articulable but still-recognizable behaviors, 
knowledges, and feelings; and an evangelical institution of leaders, coalitions, and 
organizations connected by a shared label and a shared history. All three are critical to 
any account of evangelicalism, but alone none of these definitions can fully account for 
its cultural force. The point Larry Eskridge and the Institute make so well here is that one 
cannot pin down a single, coherent “Evangelicalism,” but there are plenty of things that 
are “evangelical.”  
Such a motley definition is unwieldy at best when academics try to speak 
authoritatively and definitively about evangelicals. So most writing scholars, and many 
scholars outside writing studies, have tried to positively define evangelicalism and 
identify evangelicals by privileging one definition or another. Sociologist Sarah 
Diamond, for example, describes evangelicals in terms that are quite typical of definitions 
offered across academia (including in writing scholarship):  
In general, evangelicals are Christians, Catholic as well as Protestant, who 
have had a born-again experience [“a conversion experience in which they 
made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ”]. They believe the Bible is 
the accurate, inspired word of God, and they also believe that the only way 
to salvation is through belief in Christ’s divinity and resurrection. 
Evangelicals believe they are required to share their faith with 
nonbelievers in an effort to win new converts to Christ. (9) 
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This is a largely ideological definition—note the five explicit references to belief.  
Putnam and Campbell, in contrast to such ideological definitions, define evangelicalism 
as a loose category for grouping together a wide band of largely unaffiliated, independent 
Christian churches. “Evangelicals” are then those individuals who identify themselves 
with one of those denominations or churches—a somewhat “institutional” definition, 
although not an institutional definition that necessarily refers back to the midwestern 
coalition the Institute describes (14, 602). Both of these definitions work to include and 
exclude different people—Putnam and Campbell’s definition would exclude those who 
affirm evangelical ideology but don’t identify with an evangelical church; Diamond’s 
definition would exclude those who attend an evangelical institution but don’t affirm 
evangelical ideology; and neither gives much weight to actual behavior or evangelical 
style.  
The point, then, is not to find the right definition: the point is to find a definition 
that might highlight the conflictual uses and definitions of its own term. For my purposes, 
I follow Chidester and Asad’s transformational approach. First, I take “evangelical” to be 
an adjective, applied and defined variously, which nevertheless generally designates very 
real “evangelicalisms”: sets of ideas, ways of being, populations, and organizations. 
Second, it follows that these definitions and applications of the adjective are situated and 
partial; all uses of “evangelical” are necessarily selective, carrying along sources, 
motivations, and consequences. Third, I understand these definitions to participate in 
social conflict and power relations. Various groups and individuals within and outside of 
evangelicalism attempt to gain some measure of social power through gaining control 
over the term—by asserting the right to define its essential doctrines, or its behavioral 
 92 
norms, or its membership criteria, or its institutional hierarchies; and in turn using these 
to shape ideas, behaviors, people, and organizations. Academics in writing scholarship, 
for example, utilize definitions of evangelicals that allow us to explain, understand, 
sympathize, resource, and improve religious students and their relations within our 
classroom—though those students’ actual relations to our idea of evangelicalism are not 
entirely certain or even entirely positive. So all uses of this evangelical label, and any –
isms those uses collect and define, should be understood as contested, the locus of power 
relations. Below, I attempt to elaborate on how what I call official evangelicalism is 
“winning” the struggle to define and control “evangelicalisms.” Following that, I will 
highlight the heterogeneities and fluidities obscured by official evangelicalism’s 
hegemonic account. 
 
II. Terms for Analysis 
In order to describe this struggle over evangelicalism and explain the social 
processes that produce evangelicalism’s profound cultural force, I utilize organizing 
concepts and vocabulary drawn from critical theory: namely, Louis Althusser’s concept 
of the ideological apparatus and Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus. While Bourdieu and 
Althusser’s approaches to culture focused on accounting for the production and re-
production of asymmetrical economic and class structures, their concepts have been 
successfully applied by subsequent scholars to account for certain other aspects of 
culture—we are likely most familiar with Butler’s performative approach to gender and, 
more recently, with Pennycook’s practical re-conception of language (Gender Trouble; 
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Language as a Local Practice). Asad’s work suggests that the same conceptual approach 
can be applied to understanding religion. 
In attempting to account for the operation of hegemony in “Ideology and State 
Ideological Apparatuses,” Althusser points the finger at cultural institutions, 
acknowledging that the coercive power of the state cannot by itself explain the 
effectiveness of “ideology”—that is, why people actually seem to enjoy their subjection 
and to believe in the metanarratives that maintain existing power relations, for instance, 
when they can’t be made to believe them. He distinguishes between these cultural 
institutions, which he calls Ideological State Apparatuses, and Repressive State 
Apparatuses like the police. The difference for Althusser is in the proportions of coercion 
and ideology used by the apparatus to achieve conformity: whereas Althusser imagined 
that repressive apparatuses rely heavily on violence and coercion, “the Ideological State 
Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology,” although he concedes, 
“they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this 
is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. (There is no such thing as a purely 
ideological apparatus.)” (145). Althusser identifies several of these apparatuses: the 
religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the 
trade union ISA, the communications ISA, and the culture ISA. 
 Importantly, these ideological apparatuses simultaneously achieve two functions. 
First, as Raymond Williams notes, they have a practical effect: they “teach, confirm, and 
in most cases finally enforce selected meanings, values, and activities” by “exerting 
powerful and immediate pressures on the conditions of living and of making a living” 
(118). On the other hand, they also offer an account of those practices that makes them 
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seem not only normal, but right and natural. Althusser divides these operations into 
“know-how” and “ideology.” Take school, for instance: Althusser says the education 
system  
takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the 
years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the 
Family State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into 
them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of ‘know-
how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, 
the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state 
(ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). (155) 
 
He goes on to explain the economic function both serve: education reproduces the 
necessary relations of production (the “know-how” that will enable jobs to be performed 
successfully) even as it inculcates the ideology that makes people want those jobs, feel 
good about that work, and believe that getting the job and the pension is the only way to 
be a responsible, respectable citizen.  
This ideology, at least for Althusser, is obfuscatory: it obscures the asymmetrical 
power relations those know-hows will serve and maintain (the “real” purposes and 
mechanisms of the school) by making them seem natural. “The mechanisms which 
produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed 
by a universally reigning ideology of the School, universally reigning because it is one of 
the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology: an ideology which represents the 
School as a neutral environment purged of ideology” (Althusser 157). Althusser cogently 
points out that the maintenance of the status quo, hegemony, depends upon making 
contingent social structures seem natural and given and making culturally-specific logics 
feel like “common sense.” Elsewhere, Althusser describes this ideological function as 
instilling a sense of “obviousness” in social constructs:  
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It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to 
do so, since these are “obviousnesses”) obviousnesses as obviousnesses, 
which we cannot fail to recognize and before which we have the inevitable 
and natural reaction of crying out (aloud or in the “still, small voice of 
conscience”): “That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!” (Althusser 172) 
 
So for Althusser, an ideological apparatus functions practically by reproducing the social 
bodies necessary to the maintenance of existing power relations, and ideologically by 
reproducing a hegemonic account of that formation that naturalizes the power relations 
and social conditions it maintains, making them feel obvious, right, and true. 
Scholars have since worked to move beyond Althusser’s treatment of ideology, 
however, by more intricately connecting practical “know-how” with “ideology.” 
Religion, gender, as well as economic and class structures all depend on ideas, of 
course—definitions, discursive spaces, and assumptions (which themselves operate in the 
material world). But scholarship throughout the disciplines has increasingly granted a 
more central place for the practical in ideology, producing a subtle reversal of Althusser’s 
logic. As Terry Eagleton remarks, “It is no good reminding myself that I am opposed to 
racism as I sit down on a park bench marked ‘Whites Only’; by the [act] of sitting on it, I 
have supported and perpetuated racist ideology. The ideology, so to speak, is in the 
bench, not in my head” (40, qtd in Rickert 117). Latour would point out, as Eagleton’s 
own phrasing implies, that the ideology is not simply in the bench, but actualized in the 
active relation between Eagleton and the bench: ideology is materialized by Eagleton’s 
sitting. This, of course, is a different meaning of ideology than that being used in 
Althusser’s quotes, above. Eagleton’s broader understanding of ideology here might best 
be distinguished, as Bonnie Brennen suggests, by using a different term like “hegemony” 
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(8). Hegemony, Raymond Williams explains, incorporates both know-how and ideology; 
it 
is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: 
our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of 
ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values—
constitutive and constituting—which as they are experienced as practices 
appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for 
most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality 
beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, 
in most areas of their lives. (110) 
 
Articulating this intertwining of ideology and know-how within rhetoric and 
composition, Thomas Rickert quotes Slavoj Zizek to underline practices’ roles in 
hegemony: “belief, ‘far from being an ‘intimate’, purely mental state, is always 
materialized in our effective social activity’” (117).  
Bourdieu advanced his notion of the habitus to account for this hegemonic 
relation between practice and ideology, specifically focusing on the transmission of 
culture and social structures through the body. As Bourdieu saw it, “Practical belief is not 
a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and 
doctrines (beliefs), but rather a state of the body” (68, qtd in Lee 159). The habitus refers 
simultaneously to a social context—as in the ideological apparatuses I mention above—
and to individuals’ incorporation and participation in those apparatuses through those 
bodily states that he references. According to Bourdieu, this incorporation is achieved 
through the enculturation Althusser aptly describes above as “drumming in”: the life-long 
experiential process of prolonged exposure to meanings, values, norms, practices, and 
ideological accounts of those that causes those ways of being to become a part of our 
living. Bourdieu speaks of this incorporation process in terms of “internalized, embodied 
schemes” (Distinction 467), and “social necessity made second nature, turned into 
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muscular patterns and bodily automatisms” (474) through constant repetition and 
discipline. Experiences in our social and physical milieus actually change the structures 
of our body, and thus the way we will experience and interact with (perceive, respond, 
and thus change and be changed by) all future environments. This sort of incorporation in 
Bourdieu’s descriptions may seem like a metaphor describing a social process—but it has 
an analogue in a material, neurological reality. Philosopher Evan Thompson sums up the 
considerable body of neuroscience supporting Bourdieu’s finding: “one’s lived body is a 
developmental being thick with its own history and sedimented ways of feeling, 
perceiving, acting and imagining” (33). So we might say that our experiences within 
ideological apparatuses really do shape the bodily structures and practices of perception, 
feeling, action, expression and imagination that structure our responses to new 
surroundings, literally naturalizing culture. Bourdieu’s concept of bodily incorporation 
helps us to better understand some of the ways in which Althusser’s ideological 
apparatuses work to create the obvious, right, and true, but Bourdieu’s concept allows us 
to do so without resorting to false consciousness and a separation between know-how and 
ideology.  
Marcel Mauss spoke of this enculturation process almost a century ago, 
introducing the concept of the habitus in relatively innocuous terms by pointing out how 
very different ways of swimming, sleeping, and even having sex can seem like the natural 
way to various populations. But writers like Bourdieu, Williams, and Butler charged 
Mauss’s idea with its full political weight by applying it to the notion of hegemony and 
power relations. Prolonged exposure (and systems of attached rewards and punishments) 
created by practices themselves—quite apart from any explicit or implicit ideology—can 
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cause cultural practices to seem right and good. As perceptions and feelings are brought 
into alignment with culture and behavior, people come to expect to see what they 
generally see, and to act in accordance with their expectations (thus often bringing those 
expectations about). Together, these actions and perceptions act as a sort of mirror-
structure, as Althusser himself says. The resonances between what we are taught to 
perceive in the world and what we therefore experience (and cause to be) in the world are 
mutually confirming, constituting and affirming the reality of cultural stories about the 
world—and maintaining existing social conditions.   
This is, roughly, how Butler accounts for the cultural production of gender. She 
uses Althusser’s mirror-structure and Williams’ “reciprocally confirming” practices and 
perceptions to explain how gender operates as a credible cultural fiction:  
Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit 
collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar 
genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those 
productions—and the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in 
them; the construction that “compels” our belief in its necessity and 
naturalness. (Gender Trouble 140) 
 
If our society is part of our bodily structure, shaping the way we relate to the world, the 
way that we feel in response to it, what appeals as common sense or natural to us, and the 
choices that we see there, we cannot ever just “get outside” and reject the social structure 
entirely. One’s gender, like Bourdieu’s classed subject and Althusser’s interpellated 
subject, feels and therefore is entirely too real. Given these intertwinings between society, 
our bodies, and the way that we experience reality, Butler argues in Gender Trouble that 
“power can be neither withdrawn nor refused, but only redeployed” (124). These crucial 
redeployments will be the focus of chapter four and five.  
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These concepts of the ideological apparatus and the habitus, with a concomitant 
focus on linking institutions, accounts, practices, and dispositions, drive my 
transformational analysis of evangelicalism. I argue that we should understand the 
religion that appears in our rhetoric and composition classrooms and texts in hegemonic 
and transformational, rather than essential, terms: particular individuals and institutions 
work with and through ideological apparatuses to persistently disseminate, confirm, and 
enforce selected doctrines, meanings, values, and activities of religion, namely 
evangelicalism, as religious. Those evangelical forms of religiosity are rendered natural 
and normal through their repetition, which sediments them into the (habitual) practices 
and perceptions of individuals, as well as through hegemonic accounts of those religious 
practices and representatives as natural and normal (what Althusser would call ideology). 
Through their continual presence, these representations and norms come to be construed 
as really religious; thus creating a hegemonic religion to which individuals are forced to 
act in response. So here I examine some of the ideological apparatuses that do this work 
of realizing a particular, hegemonic brand of religion that I call “official 
evangelicalism”—namely the media, the political system, arts and entertainment, and 
education (including rhetoric and composition).  
 
III. Evangelicalism and Ideological Apparatuses 
The deployment of ideological apparatuses to promote evangelicalism has been a 
calculated choice made by the evangelical establishment. We might look, for an early 
indicator of this calculation, to Carl Henry’s The Uneasy Conscience of Fundamentalism. 
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This book, written in 1947 by the first editor of Christianity Today, represents one early 
and consequential manifestation of the Christian Right’s institutional logic. Henry writes,  
 . . . the church’s prime task is to challenge men and women individually 
in such numbers that the manifesto is global. As the world felt Hitler’s 
threats at the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland and England, and 
Mussolini’s at the border of Greece, so too must it feel the promise of 
deliverance by Jesus at the fringe of our civilization, calling men to 
spiritual decision. The Christian life must be lived out, among the 
regenerate, in every area of activity, until even the unregenerative are 
moved by Christian standards, acknowledging their force. (71)  
 
Elsewhere in the text, Henry calls this imperialistic practice—comparing Christians to 
Nazis only two years after the atrocities of World War II—“salting.” The reference to 
Hitler and Mussolini is at best remarkably tone-deaf, and at worst quite frightening. But 
clearly, Henry doesn’t intend that this Christian “force” will be literally coercive. Instead, 
he believes that Christian force must be exerted ideologically as Christianity is lived out 
in public. He argues that to attain such a global force Christians must first build up 
ideological apparatuses that instill an evangelical disposition in their own population. 
From there, Christianity can then be practically represented in public—“lived out, among 
the regenerate, in every area of activity.” Henry’s plan at once indicates the importance of 
explicitly evangelical ideological apparatuses in raising up representatives, and at the 
same time indicates Henry’s intention to subsequently place those representatives within 
secular ideological apparatuses: Henry’s representative not only is shaped by Christian 
social institutions, but in turn exerts normative pressure on people through his practical 
activities in non-Christian social institutions—challenging them, making them feel, 
calling them to decide, moving them by his standards or living out.  
 
Evangelicalism and Education 
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The first ideological apparatus I want to examine is the religious educational 
apparatus. Not only does this accord with Carl Henry’s manifesto, but describing the 
religious educational apparatus also allows me to set out some of the basic and most 
readily recognizable characteristics of official evangelicalism—beliefs and behaviors, 
specifically—to which I can attach less obviously evangelical beliefs, attitudes, 
behaviors, representatives, and groups in my descriptions of subsequent ideological 
apparatuses. Evangelicalisms, we must remember, constitute fuzzy sets: loose 
conglomerations of individuals, ideas, and organizations associated (or not) in various 
ways—by shared beliefs, shared representatives, shared commitments, shared 
dispositions, etc. The religious educational apparatus and the representation of official 
evangelicalism I draw from it, then, simply represent nodes in that network on which I 
can proceed to articulate a series of connected apparatuses and representations. 
Because representatives must be raised up before they can act as evangelical 
representatives in public, Henry calls for an evangelical education system that can effect 
his incarnated evangelical “manifesto”: he writes,  
Perhaps the answer is the building of evangelical educational plants, with 
attractive auditoriums that will serve for worship purposes, providing a 
week-round program that out-educates the secular educators. . . . Beyond 
doubt the time is here for an all-out evangelical education movement, and 
alert churches will think through the wise investment of their funds. The 
maintenance of evangelical grade and high schools, and of evangelical 
colleges and universities, with the highest academic standards, promises 
most quickly to concentrate the thinking of youth upon the Christian 
world-life view as the only adequate spiritual ground for a surviving 
culture. (71) 
 
Lest we fail to take seriously how Henry’s vision of evangelical education as a social 
force may have influenced the Christian Right, consider that evangelical educational 
institutions have exploded in the decades following Henry’s call: according to the 
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National Center for Education Statistics, over four million children in America today 
attend private religious schools (United States, “Private School Universe Survey”). 
Moreover, 9 out of 10 conservative Christian religious schools (the second largest 
category of private school) began after 1960 (United States, “Other Religious 
Conservative Christian Schools”). The reasons for this are manifold—desegregation 
might explain some of the rise in private schools, for instance—but the desire to inculcate 
a Christian disposition through children’s education must not be discounted. We can 
examine two specific ways in which evangelicals utilize educational apparatuses to 
enforce a particular brand of evangelicalism within their own populations, an 
evangelicalism then reproduced in culture at large through secular ideological 
apparatuses. Because of the structure of education, this is one of the more coercive forms 
of reproduction available to evangelical leaders while all others that I describe make 
more use of ideological pressure. This distinction comes in part of necessity: whereas 
students can be coerced into conformity, they are intended to become witnesses to those 
“unregenerative” who cannot generally be forced to conform to evangelical norms of 
belief or practice unless through governmental policy.  
At times, evangelical education can focus on shaping evangelical students’ 
external behaviors. At Appalachian Bible College in West Virginia, a highly conservative 
evangelical college, the rules of conduct for students are published in the Servant’s Staff.  
Rules range from dress code for specific occasions—men’s hairstyles, class apparel, 
Sunday apparel, casual apparel, and recreational apparel require almost three full pages 
(11-13)—to hosting—“Single student commuters who are not living with parents must 
notify the Student Deans before hosting mixed groups or any members of the opposite 
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sex in their home” (10)—to sexual behavior—“fornication, adultery, incest, sexual abuse 
of a minor, homosexuality, indecent exposure, sexual harassment, and other such 
activities are forbidden” (8)—to hygiene—“Personal cleanliness and neatness are vital to 
one’s personal testimony. Clothing and shoes should be clean and neat at all times” 
(21)—to quotidian religious observance—“Everyone is expected to have a personal time 
of prayer and Bible study” (31). Religious doctrine, too, is dictated at colleges like 
Appalachian Bible College, and conformity to these and other norms are self-evaluated, 
measured, recorded by institutional agents, used to assess eligibility for continued 
enrollment, and even evaluated one last time to determine a student’s right to graduate 
(37-38). I think ABC’s Servant’s Staff outlines a form of evangelicalism most often 
associated with fundamentalism—a reactionary religious stereotype extensively 
represented/lampooned in media representations of religion from Footloose to Saved. It’s 
certainly not the norm, and I don’t present it as such: instead, I want it to stand in for one 
extreme of institutional evangelicalism. Its rules represent here a highly invasive attempt 
at enforcing a particular version of Christianity, as homogeneously as possible. Lest we 
forget the purpose of such standards, note the reason those shoes must stay clean, because 
“Personal cleanliness and neatness are vital to one’s personal testimony” (21). The goal is 
to inculcate an evangelical disposition, and in turn the reproduction of a proper 
evangelical representative, who can exert force on his neighbors by living out his 
evangelicalism well, in public.   
In addition to shaping students’ dispositions, however, the evangelical educational 
apparatus exerts considerable coercive force in an attempt at managing evangelicals’ 
beliefs. These evangelical beliefs, like the behaviors described above, should be familiar 
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to most American readers. In order to secure and maintain employment at Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, for instance, all professors must sign and believe (see 
discussion below) both the “Abstract of Principles” (Manly) and “The Baptist Faith and 
Message.” These documents, available online, together seem to represent one explicit 
account of what I will here call “official evangelicalism.” What I mean by this should 
become clearer below, but I generally mean to indicate a simultaneously powerful and 
popular account of evangelicalism that most Americans will recognize in some way, 
regardless of how they feel about it.  
Official evangelicalism, at least in this particular Baptist instantiation, is 
designated by orthodox stances on a number of beliefs and practices including the 
following: the Bible (“It has God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth, without 
any mixture of error, for its matter”); gender (“the gift of gender is thus part of the 
goodness of God’s creation,” so “the office of pastor is limited to men as qualified by 
Scripture”); salvation (exclusive to Christians, through faith, from a literal Hell); 
witnessing (“seek constantly to win the lost to Christ by verbal witness undergirded by a 
Christian lifestyle”); society (“seek to make the will of Christ supreme in our own lives 
and in human society” by speaking against “racism . . . greed, selfishness, and vice . . . 
adultery, homosexuality, pornography . . . speak on behalf of the unborn . . . ”); 
government (“The church should not resort to the civil power to carry on its work. The 
gospel of Christ contemplates spiritual means alone for the pursuit of its ends.”9); and 
family (“God has ordained the family as the foundational institution of human society . . . 
                                                
9 Many who follow contemporary politics may be surprised by this position, but it is 
actually a traditional Baptist stance. How it is interpreted and enacted, clearly, is a matter 
for debate.  
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Marriage is the uniting of one man and one woman in covenant commitment for a 
lifetime . . . A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her 
husband even as the church willingly submits to the headship of Christ”) (“The Baptist 
Faith and Message”). Each of these positions in the “Faith and Message” is followed in 
the document by citation strings similar to those found in academic texts—the only 
difference is that these citations reference particular Bible verses. We can see that these 
beliefs are tied not only to theology, but also to practices and attitudes on cultural hot 
button issues. Staff at SBTS are required to adhere to particular definitions of the family, 
gender, religion, sexuality, and government, among others. These definitions translate 
into conservative political and social stances to which staff and faculty must adhere—
signing, believing, and we must assume practicing in other senses as well.   
I say sign and believe because as Southern’s president Albert Mohler writes, 
professors at SBTS must sign these documents “without hesitation or mental reservation” 
(“Southern Baptist Theological Seminary’s Response”). In demanding that the staff’s 
signature be written in an ideal complete sincerity, Mohler and his evangelical institution 
exert both ideological and coercive force on those individuals. This is somewhat ironic, 
in that the Faith and Message’s Preamble affirms the following:  
Confessions are only guides in interpretation, having no authority over the 
conscience . . . they are statements of religious convictions, drawn from 
the Scriptures, and are not to be used to hamper freedom of thought or 
investigation in other realms of life . . . Baptists . . . deny the right of any 
secular or religious authority to impose a confession of faith upon a church 
or body of churches. 
 
Regardless of such claims, the signature requirement directly impacts the consciences of 
hundreds of Southern Baptist Seminary employees who are required to subscribe to and 
espouse this ideology; it both directly and indirectly impacts the Seminary’s thousands of 
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students who are educated into it, not including the families they bring to campus who 
also participate in the Seminary’s culture; and through those thousands of seminary 
students and their families this particular religious educational apparatus indirectly 
impacts millions of Southern Baptist congregants and missionary targets. Southern 
Baptist Seminary utilizes coercive institutional contexts to deploy an “official” 
evangelical ideology through a whole chain of organized sponsors. Without such 
systems, SBTS’s definitions are no more significant than anyone else’s. And conversely, 
those who wish to differently represent evangelicalism must make use of their own 
mediated networks—or perhaps the same networks—to make their representations 
similarly influential. Such efforts are described below. 
But the larger reality is that it is more than possible, in spite of these examples, to 
participate in many evangelical organizations for years without ever becoming subject to 
such disciplinary procedures or codified doctrinal demands. Most evangelicals, however 
defined, would refuse to subscribe to the code of conduct put forward by Appalachian 
Bible College (sociological data cited below strongly supports this supposition) and 
would likely quibble with one or several of the doctrinal points asserted by “The Baptist 
Faith and Message.” In point of fact, most evangelicals report that they behave and 
believe generally like the rest of the American population—as has been pointed out by 
the Pew Forum, the Barna Group, Kinnaman, Smith, and Putnam and Campbell, among 
others—and most evangelicals do not ever belong to institutions with this sort of 
significant coercive power to shape their behavior. And yet “evangelicalism,” and usually 
at least some aspects of ABC and SBTS’s versions of evangelicalism, have significant 
influence on popular identifications, perceptions and representations of evangelicalism. 
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As Henry predicted, evangelicalism’s power derives not from pervasive coercion, but 
from its pervasive, hegemonic presence in American culture—highly visible on the one 
hand, deeply sedimented in people’s minds and bodies on the other. So we should instead 
consider the effectiveness of Henry’s plan as he detailed it—by examining the sorts of 
public representatives that evangelicalism produces, how they maintain their presence in 
culture, and the types of pressures and constraints (forces) the prominence of these 
representations actually place on individuals.  
 
Evangelicalism and the Media 
The representatives of official evangelicalism, and particularly the loose coalition 
of conservative politico-religious organizations often (self-) labeled evangelical, 
participate in a vast media network that has been described in detail by Diamond. These 
religious organizations often publicize their own religious stances, but also rely on non-
religious media hubs to more widely distribute those. Both religious and secular media 
benefit in page views, ads, ratings, and sales from this arrangement. This is not 
necessarily a partisan issue: the New York Times and Daily Beast stand to benefit just as 
much from running stories on religious conservatives as do Fox News and Breitbart, even 
if viewer interest may stem from different motivations. Because of the tendency towards 
sensationalism in news, these portrayals often select highly visible official “personalities” 
like Billy Graham, or highly quotable and inflammatory personalities like Pat Robertson, 
to act as representatives. Most of us will likely remember, to name two widely-reported 
instances, Robertson’s suggestions that 9/11 was a punishment for American 
homosexuality, and that Haiti’s earthquake was the result of a long-ago deal with the 
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Devil. To take an even more extreme example of religion’s presence in the media, as I 
write this there are reports in the American media that over 160 schoolgirls and their 
teachers in northern Afghanistan have been poisoned because a sectarian group finds the 
idea of educated women intolerable—likely reinforcing secular suspicions (and resulting 
from sectarian suspicions) that education and conservative religion are incommensurable.  
Such strongly negative representations notwithstanding, the media does enable 
evangelical leaders to disseminate a visible and broadly recognizable evangelicalism to 
groups well beyond their own followers. To offer one quick example, we can look again 
to Mohler. He is not merely the President of Southern Baptist Seminary: he is also on the 
board of Focus on the Family and The Council for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, 
both heavily politicized and publicized conservative religious organizations. Most 
importantly, Mohler is the de facto voice of the Southern Baptist Convention—which has 
a membership of over 16 million members and sponsors “more than 5,000 missionaries in 
153 nations” (“About Us”). Through religious media networks (which include his blog, 
podcasts, radio show, and books) Mohler disseminates official constructions of 
Christianity; multiplying the effect, a Google search immediately turns up at least twenty 
re-postings, re-publications, and twitter links to the full text of most of his articles or blog 
entries. But secular media plays a significant role in amplifying Mohler’s representations: 
he has appeared on NPR’s Fresh Air and Larry King Live, blogged for the Washington 
Post’s On Faith religion column, and serves as a representative voice for evangelicalism 
in multiple national publications. As Molly Worthen notes in a cover story on Mohler in 
Christianity Today, “Time magazine has turned to Mohler for the conservative 
evangelical perspective on issues ranging from evolution to Christian missions in Iraq, 
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calling him the ‘reigning intellectual of the evangelical movement in the U.S.’.” 
Together, these mediated platforms, including Worthen’s article—described by 
conservative evangelicals as a condescending hack job—continually cement Mohler’s 
station as a highly visible representative of evangelicalism (for an example, see Justin 
Taylor’s blog Between Two Worlds). Mohler’s official representation of evangelicalism, 
deriving from a centralized location in evangelical networks, is disseminated through a 
large number of local, traceable channels, creating something of a “global” effect. 
Through these media apparatuses, leaders like Mohler not only implicitly 
represent, but also explicitly define, evangelicalism. In a pamphlet on Southern Baptist 
Seminary’s website, for instance, Mohler sets out the doctrines that are “fundamental and 
essential to the Christian faith.” He asserts, “Where such doctrines are compromised, the 
Christian faith falls” (“The Pastor as Theologian” 8). Mohler accordingly excludes those 
who don’t believe the essential doctrines from the religious formation—and heaven—as 
“unbelievers” (8), and argues that any church that doesn’t hold to these central doctrines 
is similarly outside the religious formation. This is enacted in a piece Mohler wrote about 
Dutch heretics, where he makes clear there that any Christianity, church, or individual 
failing to subscribe to his essential doctrines “is not a new form of Christianity. It is a 
new religion meeting in historic Christian church structures” (“A Laboratory for 
Christianity’s Destruction”). Those heretics, for Mohler, are not explicitly excluded from 
Christianity by any evangelical institution, although he thinks they should be—but 
nevertheless they are definitionally outside of Christianity, and Mohler is merely 
reporting this reality. This definition, disseminated through contemporary media forms, 
directly impacts thousands of Mohler’s blog readers; it indirectly impacts many 
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thousands more who read bloggers sponsoring Mohler’s ideology and distributing it 
through links and postings as well as indirect citations. 
The book publishing industry contributes to disseminating official evangelicalism 
as well, of course: Diamond and Sharon Crowley have both noted (and in doing so 
illustrated) the massive publishing success and cultural force of the apocalyptic Christian 
fiction series, Left Behind. In that sixteen book series, co-authors Tim LaHaye and Jerry 
B. Jenkins fictionalize a particularly violent, literalist, Manichean interpretation of the 
Bible’s last chapter, Revelation. A more recent example might be Heaven is for Real, 
advertised on its website as “the true story of a four-year old son of a small town 
Nebraska pastor who experienced heaven during emergency surgery.” The book, released 
in November 2010, had sold over 6 million copies by February of 2012, managing to 
hold the top spot on the New York Times Paperback Nonfiction list for 53 weeks 
(www.christianretailing.com). Heaven is for Real has what might be recognized as a 
characteristically evangelical message; like Mohler’s discussion above, it blends a certain 
religious optimism about the reality of God and an afterlife with something far less so, 
something closer to Left Behind, actually: as the book’s online press declares, “the 
disarmingly simple message is that heaven is a real place, Jesus really loves children, and 
to be ready . . . there is a coming last battle.”  
But Mohler’s exclusionary focus upon right belief, to offer an example somewhat 
closer to home, also gets regularly disseminated through representations of 
evangelicalism in academic texts. I previously described this phenomenon in reference to 
rhetoric and composition’s published representations in chapter two, but we can also see 
an example of this by looking again at the work of Kinnaman, head of the well-respected 
 111 
religious research firm Barna Group. In a pair of extensive book-length studies on the 
attitudes of young Americans towards religion, Kinnaman attempts to differentiate 
between the attitudes of various religious groups, including evangelicals. For Kinnaman 
and co-author Gabe Lyons, “Being classified as an evangelical is not dependent on 
church attendance or the denominational affiliation of the church attended” (249-50). 
Instead, Kinnaman and Lyons—themselves evangelicals—define an evangelical largely 
in terms of belief. To be defined as an evangelical for Kinnaman and Lyons, respondents 
must be “Born-again Christians”: “people who said they have made a personal 
commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important in their life today, and who also 
indicated they believe when they die they will go to heaven because they have confessed 
their sins and have accepted Jesus Christ as their Savior” (249). Respondents must also 
meet seven other conditions: “1) saying their faith is very important in their life today; 2) 
believing they have a personal responsibility to share their religious beliefs about Christ 
with non-Christians; 3) believing that Satan exists; 4) believing that eternal salvation is 
possible only through grace, not works; 5) believing that Jesus Christ lived a sinless life 
on earth; 6) asserting that the Bible is accurate in all that it teaches; 7) describing God as 
the all-knowing, all-powerful, perfect deity who created the universe and still rules it 
today” (249). So in a book not ostensibly intended to define evangelicalism, Kinnaman 
and Lyons’s definition nevertheless serves to perpetuate belief-centered definitions of 
evangelical formations that are also being perpetuated by the official evangelical 
establishment.  
Moreover, their narrow definition reciprocally shapes their demographic 
information on “evangelicals.” The exclusionary work here is that other sorts of 
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evangelicals (say, those who don’t believe in Hell) will be excluded from statements such 
as, “evangelicals tend to…” throughout the book. In this way, evangelicalism becomes 
incrementally more homogeneous (evangelicals believe all of the same things, and 
perhaps evangelicals act in more of the same ways). Thus, when Kinnaman and Lyons 
reject behavioral or institutional definitions of evangelicalism in favor of cognitive 
definitions, they are not merely setting research parameters: they are broadcasting 
ostensibly “official” definitions of evangelicalism that are forcefully and explicitly 
exclusionary. That representation got picked up, notably, by other media outlets who 
reported on Kinnaman and Lyons’s findings: articles from Time, USA Today, Publisher’s 
Weekly, and The Atlantic are all linked on UnChristian’s website. In this way, Kinnaman 
and Lyons’s scientific definition perpetuates the hegemonic strategies that work to 
present a particular version of evangelicalism as the evangelical formation, and their 
influence is amplified by their representation’s dissemination throughout the secular 
media apparatus. 
 
Evangelicalism and Political Systems 
As is probably apparent to the reader, however, the evangelicals who attain the 
heaviest publicity and public influence are often not pastors but politicians or those 
explicitly connected to politics. The political system is perhaps the ideological apparatus 
where we see most clearly the power of official evangelicalism. Goodburn rightly 
connects evangelicalism’s highly visible presence in American culture to the political and 
cultural relevance of the Christian Right, a political group with strong, redundant ties to 
some elements of evangelical Christianity (the Christian Right as a whole has been 
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characterized by Diamond as “a political movement rooted in a rich evangelical 
subculture” [1]). While the names and organizations change, the Christian Right has been 
front and center in American political and religious consciousness for at least thirty years, 
embodied most recently in George W. Bush’s proclaimed evangelical Christianity, Sarah 
Palin’s vice presidential nomination, and Rick Santorum’s primary campaign for the 
2012 Republican presidential nomination. Evangelicals like Santorum, Palin, and Bush 
may well represent religion for this generation the way that Falwell and Robertson did 
for other generations—after all, Thomson’s student informant Quinn does complain, 
“they think that we’re all like George Bush” (Thomson 90).  
Leading historians of evangelicalism including George Marsden, Randall Balmer, 
and Mark Noll offer a narrative that traces the articulation of American evangelicalism 
with conservative social and political policy all the way back to the Puritans (Noll 40). 
Following these sources in a recent dissertation on evangelical rhetoric, Amy King traces 
the increasing prominence of evangelicalism in the religious and political imagination 
through American history—through the Puritans, the Great Awakening, the Second Great 
Awakening, abolition, the Social Gospel, Prohibition, the Scopes trial, communism, Roe 
v. Wade, the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, the Carter, Reagan, and Bush 
presidencies. Such events and movements served to not only tie together religion and 
politics, but also “solidified the position of evangelicalism at the center of American 
religious life” (Prothero 221, qtd. in King 38). That is, media attention and politics 
together solidified evangelicalism’s central place within American religion. So long 
before we arrive at the Moral Majority of the 1980s and the Tea Party of the 2000s, 
King’s sweeping narrative of America, politics, and evangelicalism draws together many 
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familiar names: George Whitehead, Jonathan Edwards (35); Charles Finney (39); Dwight 
L. Moody (42); William Jennings Bryan (45); and Graham (49). By the time we arrive at 
Billy Graham’s representation of evangelicalism in the second half of the 20th century, 
evangelicalism has firmly established itself as the chief representative of American 
Protestant Christianity. As King notes, quoting Prothero, eventually “‘Evangelical’ 
became the usual term to refer not only to the more moderate heirs to the broader 
fundamentalist coalition, but also to conversionist Protestants of any heritage” (234, qtd. 
in King 50). This evangelical prominence within hegemonic accounts of American 
Christianity was only cemented and extended in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
Evangelicalism’s more recent political power is just as familiar a narrative: in the 
70s, 80s, and 90s, evangelical leaders fronted the famed Christian Right that drew 
together conservative politics and evangelical religion through organizations and media 
outlets like the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, and the 700 
Club. Much has been written about the media and organizational strategies of leaders like 
Jerry Falwell, Robertson, Oral Roberts, Charles Colson, James Dobson and the rest. 
During their decades in the spotlight, each of those men carried on dual agendas as both 
spiritual and political leaders. Diamond paints a vivid picture of a politico-religious 
media conglomerate that used all available forms of media to motivate religious 
individuals to political action: “the evangelical subculture . . . thrives through an array of 
institutions that may not, on the surface, seem political. These include Christian 
broadcasting, literature and music, Promise Keepers rallies, and the practice of 
homeschooling” (11). These evangelical leaders both represented and shaped the 
evangelical populations they reached through their media organizations. With the 
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influence these leaders acquired by ostensibly representing millions of evangelical 
voters, well-placed Christian Right leaders of the 90s were even more importantly, 
perhaps, able to shape Republican Party platforms, pressing what should still be a 
familiar set of social issues. The platform remained conservative on issues of “abortion, 
gay rights, and sex education in the public schools,” Diamond explains, “because these 
[were] the concerns raised by the religious milieu of evangelicalism” (11).   
While in 2009 King hopefully hypothesized that the influence of the evangelical-
conservative coalition was in decline after the Obama election, in hindsight we can see 
that this was not entirely the case (196-214). We must now add the Tea Party to the list of 
political movements with strong ties to evangelicalism. As Putnam and Campbell found, 
the Tea Party draws much of its constituency from conservative religious sources.  
Next to being a Republican, the strongest predictor of being a Tea 
Party supporter today was a desire, back in 2006, to see religion play a 
prominent role in politics. And Tea Partiers continue to hold these views: 
they seek “deeply religious” elected officials, approve of religious leaders’ 
engaging in politics and want religion brought into political debates. The 
Tea Party’s generals may say their overriding concern is a smaller 
government, but not their rank and file, who are more concerned about 
putting God in government. 
This inclination among the Tea Party faithful to mix religion and 
politics explains their support for Representative Michele Bachmann of 
Minnesota and Gov. Rick Perry of Texas. Their appeal to Tea Partiers lies 
less in what they say about the budget or taxes, and more in their overt use 
of religious language and imagery, including Mrs. Bachmann’s lengthy 
prayers at campaign stops and Mr. Perry’s prayer rally in Houston. 
(“Crashing the Tea Party”) 
 
All of this is increasingly relevant to us as I write this chapter and the second straight 
Republican Vice Presidential candidate is a vocally conservative Christian and staunch 
political conservative—this time, Catholic budget hawk Paul Ryan.  
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This articulation of political, social, and religious conservatism in the public 
imagination is compounded by published agendas from Christian Right organizations like 
the Christian Coalition. Their 2013 agenda includes the following items: “Defunding and 
Rolling Back Obamacare”; “Stand with Israel”; “Reducing Government Spending and 
Debt”; “Defending Our Second Amendment Rights”; “Stop Public Funding of 
Abortion—And End Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research”; “Defending Traditional 
Marriage”; “Energy Independence and Reform”; “Ending Religious Discrimination 
against Christians in the Military”; “Opposing Liberal Judicial Nominees”; and 
“Opposing any Re-introduction of the ‘Fairness Doctrine’.” Incredibly, the Christian 
Coalition manages to embody almost all of Americans’ preconceptions about religion in 
one brief agenda. They espouse a politically conservative ideology—that somehow 
extends to a religious stance on fiscal policy and guns—while arguing against scientific 
research, abortion, homosexuality, social welfare, and liberal ideals of critical thought 
and conversation (the Fairness doctrine). Perhaps most remarkably, they perform 
hypocrisy and intolerance by evincing concern over religious discrimination in the 
military while at the same time eliding the more pressing issue of pervasive 
discrimination against homosexuals in the military, and looking to defend “traditional 
marriage”.  
The Christian Coalition, Dobson, Michelle Bachman, Palin, and the rest concisely 
demonstrate why the pervasive perception of religion held by most Americans (religion is 
hypocritical, politically reactionary, uncritical, antihomosexual, antiscience, 
judgmental—see below) seems to mirror this politicized evangelical Christianity: not 
only because they make such neat representatives, but because these official evangelicals 
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successfully disseminate (and translate into public discourse and policy) their version of 
evangelicalism broadly through public channels—“secular” political systems, “secular” 
media, and (as I’ll demonstrate below) and the “secular” entertainment industry. As Asad 
has suggested, this historic inter-relation between religion and so many key public 
apparatuses should cause us to question entirely the notion of a truly “secular” public 
space that can be separated from the religious sphere. In fact, our American public sphere 
is deeply imbued with religion and particularly with evangelicalism. Below, I note 
several other intersections between religion and secular ideological apparatuses that only 
make that conclusion more compelling. 
 
Evangelicalism and Entertainment 
This power to raise up high-visibility evangelical representatives that shape 
American religion is not only present in political, theological, and academic circles, 
however: the connections between media and official evangelicalism extend into 
entertainment industries as well. To offer just one indication of the power of this 
mediatized evangelical network and the way it creates its own representatives, the album 
of Christian rapper LeCrae debuted at #3 on the Billboard 200 last month. While the 
music has received fairly positive critical reviews, LeCrae’s success might also be linked 
to his appearances at Christian youth conferences like Passion, an annual Christian 
teaching and worship conference aimed at 18-25 year olds, and the vocal support and 
media publicity lent him by the leaders of the white evangelical establishment. On this 
connection between a young black rapper and white evangelical leaders, we might point 
to evangelical pastor, editor, and blogger Tim Challies’ oft-cited “The Middle-Aged 
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White Guy’s Guide to Christian Rap.” Challies attempts to do as he indicates—introduce 
Christian rap to groups who have likely never listened to (or approved of) rap. He is 
clearly aware of the strangeness of this partnership at the levels of cultural history, race, 
and age: his guide is jokingly subtitled, “all about represent’n, front’n…and a bunch of 
other stuff you don’t understand.” By way of introduction Challies admits, “It has to be 
one of the most unexpected phenomena in the church today—that white middle-aged 
pastors are talking about rap music and, even more strangely, actually listening to it and 
recommending it.”  
Challies documents the connections between Christian rap and conservative 
evangelical leader John Piper, whose name, sermons and books are cited in rap titles, 
lyrics, and even sampled by Christian rappers (“John Piper’s Unexpected Career in Hip-
Hop”). The sixty-six year old Piper, importantly, prominently represents the official 
evangelical positions I’ve been describing above. He edited 1992’s Christianity Today 
book of the year, Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood: A Response to 
Evangelical Feminism. We might also find notable his published assertion that a tornado 
in Minneapolis was “a gentle but firm warning” from God to an association of 
Evangelical Lutheran churches who had gathered to consider a policy change allowing 
practicing homosexuals to pastor churches (“The Tornado”). Piper interviewed LeCrae at 
Passion 2011; in the interview, LeCrae describes himself as “an indigenous minister in an 
urban culture” providing “solid biblical truths” that “are Christ-centered and God-
centered” and articulating “the revealed will of God” (Piper, “Lecrae”). This is not an 
obscure interview: the link provided has, as of the date of this writing, 2835 comments. 
Its YouTube video companion currently has 117,317 views and 769 “likes” (compared to 
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only 10 “dislikes”). We can imagine that this has a reciprocal effect—producing a wider 
net for both Piper and LeCrae. While LeCrae’s citations of Piper certainly send publicity 
Piper’s way—he has a song entitled “Don’t Waste Your Life,” which is also the title of a 
popular Piper book—LeCrae almost certainly has gained visibility in certain circles 
through his networked connection to the pastor and author.  
But Billboard successes like LeCrae’s should also be understood as indicating a 
particular cultural network of evangelical celebrities, too—visible in the vocal support 
LeCrae has received from Christian celebrity-athletes including Tim Tebow, Jeremy Lin, 
and Bubba Watson. NBA player Lin’s own wave of popularity (dubbed Linsanity) was 
spurred not only by his Asian heritage and his (rare for a professional athlete) affiliation 
with Harvard, but also by his outspoken evangelical religious affiliation, detailed in a 
USA Today post by Cathy Grossman. Jim Lee, another evangelical blogger, makes this 
context for Lin’s popularity explicit: “Jeremy Lin intrigues me in more ways than 
one. First, he is a Christian.  Secondly, he is an Asian American of Chinese 
descent. Thirdly, his Christian faith spells out in real life by doing all things in excellence 
unto the Lord including in academics, evident by the fact that he is a Harvard Economics 
Graduate.” Lee’s blog post offers a single picture of Lin with one finger pointed as if to 
heaven, wearing a Harvard jersey—though by then Lin was actually playing for the 
NBA’s New York Knicks. The blogger provides links to an interview with Lin from the 
Evangelical Channel, and Lin himself has a “Faith” tab on his personal website that 
provides links to multiple Lin interviews on the subject. So while any thorough 
explanation of Lin’s popularity would have to account for his multiple subject positions 
and personal attributes, including his stunning initial success as a rookie NBA point 
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guard in the bright lights of New York City, and his underdog story (going undrafted, 
then sleeping on his brother’s couch while playing for the Knicks), the point I’m trying to 
make is that Lin’s evangelical identification, coupled with access to evangelical media 
networks, amplifies (again that word) Lin’s overall visibility.  
Lin also, as we’ve seen in other ways, reciprocally amplifies the visibility of 
official evangelicalism. Notably, one of those links on Lin’s “Faith” page takes readers to 
the website of InterVarsity, a Christian organization that works on college campuses. 
High profile evangelical representatives are often redundantly tied into evangelical 
institutions through overt connections like this. This is the case with Passion in LeCrae’s 
case, and Focus on the Family in Tebow’s. (Tebow, an outspoken evangelical and son of 
a missionary, appeared as a sort of celebrity endorser for Focus on the Family in a pro-
life commercial that aired during the Super Bowl in 2012.) The results of such 
arrangements are complex: Lin’s interview with InterVarsity may at one time have 
increased his public visibility; now the link from Lin’s website returns the favor by 
increasing traffic on InterVarsity’s website; institutional evangelicalism directly and 
indirectly gains by its connection with a high-profile celebrity representative; and the 
hegemonic account of “evangelicalism” gains a new contribution—a modest, intelligent, 
attractive young Chinese-American who credits God for orchestrating specific events in 
basketball games (Grossman). So even the entertainment industry continually creates new 
evangelical representatives for official evangelicalism that legitimate the authority of 
other evangelical representatives and organizations to speak as evangelicalism. Through 
such connections to specific organizations, official evangelicalism’s representational 
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network and cultural presence grows more expansive, or perhaps dense, and certainly 
harder to fully escape. 
While his study doesn’t focus on athletes, Tebow, Lin and LeCrae nevertheless 
corroborate D. Michael Lindsay’s basic finding in a sociological study of evangelical 
elites and their social networks: “the incorporation of powerful leaders into social and 
professional networks that overlap with evangelicals has been fundamental to achieving 
greater visibility for the movement” (78). Lindsay points for illustration to non-
evangelical George H. W. Bush’s participation in the National Prayer Breakfast. 
Similarly, even if Lin, Tebow, and LeCrae turn out to be outspoken Christians but not 
strictly evangelicals, their participation as celebrities in organizations that overlap with 
evangelicalism like InterVarsity, Passion, and Focus on the Family still will have resulted 
in greater evangelical visibility. Tebow, Lin, and LeCrae are official representatives of 
official evangelicalism because they are connected to both institutional evangelicalism 
and the hegemonic account of evangelicalism through organizational and mediatized ties, 
even if they are not themselves ideologically evangelical. Their visible support 
strengthens the hegemonic account of official evangelicalism and helps to disseminate its 
norms to a wider audience. Taken together, the effect of all of these ideological 
apparatuses suggests one partial answer to Asad’s question—how does power make 
religion?—through publicity. As Henry charged, official evangelicalism’s version of 
Christianity is being “lived out, among the regenerate, in every area of activity,” so that 




IV. Recognition: The Evangelicalism Under Our Skin 
Everything I’ve described might seem to describe a circle of elites affirming and 
recognizing one another in a sort of mediated echo chamber; how this prominent account 
of evangelicalism actually impacts “normal people,” including instructors and students, 
may remain somewhat unclear. Research and theory have together argued for decades 
that the effects of the media on individuals are neither totally determining nor linear. 
Why does Tim Tebow make my experience of evangelicalism any different? To answer 
this, we return to the concepts of recognition and misrecognition by which individuals 
respond to ideological apparatuses. Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus reminds us that our 
prolonged exposure to official evangelicalism’s norms and accounts of itself, 
disseminated through such a wide variety of “secular” apparatuses, probably means that 
evangelicalism will have become sedimented beneath our skin, so to speak, even if we 
don’t subscribe to an explicit evangelical ideology. We—whether religious ourselves or 
not—are likely shaped by and recognize evangelicalism.  
And in fact, there’s plenty of evidence suggesting that these official evangelical 
representatives have gotten under our skin and will be recognized. In chapter two I 
discuss Thomson’s findings about instructor perceptions of religious students—to present 
that text again briefly, Thomson finds writing instructors tend to see Christian students as 
“cling[ing] to the idea of universal truth” (74) and “unable or unwilling to think 
critically” (80). While instructors try to “make distinctions between Christian students 
whom they see as radical, evangelical, conservative, and judgmental and those who 
appear to blend more seamlessly into the academic environment” (68), the radical/ 
evangelical/ conservative/ judgmental Christian student seems to drive generalized 
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instructor perceptions of “Christians.” Such descriptions and perceptions of religion are 
not unique to writing instructors, nor localized to conservative Christians. Putnam and 
Campbell report widespread negative perceptions of Christianity; of religion more 
broadly; and of the Christian Right, Muslims, and atheists most specifically (American 
Grace 120-33; “Crashing the Tea Party”). They suggest in American Grace that a much-
discussed across-the-board decline in American religiosity may be a result of what I’ve 
called official evangelicalism: “religion itself and conservatism (theological, social, 
moral, and political) became increasingly symbiotic and identified, especially in the 
public eye, with the Religious Right” (120).  
To support this claim about American perceptions of religion, Putnam and 
Campbell cite studies from the Pew Forum, a number of academic studies including their 
own, and the work of Lyons and Kinnaman, whose research I discussed above. In their 
2006 book UnChristian, Kinnaman and Lyons report on an expansive study they 
conducted of young “outsiders” to Christianity, a group they define as “atheists and 
agnostics; those affiliated with a faith other than Christianity (such as Islam, Hinduism, 
Judaism, Mormonism, and so on), and other unchurched adults who are not born again 
Christians” (249). Among these “outsiders” aged 16-29, Kinnaman and Lyons find that 
91% describe present-day Christianity as antihomosexual; 87% describe it as judgmental; 
85% describe it as hypocritical; 75% describe it as too involved in politics; and 70% 
describe it as insensitive to others (34). Kinnaman qualifies that “too involved in politics” 
means outsiders think “Christians . . . promote and represent politically conservative 
interests and issues” (30).  
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So instructor perceptions seem to correspond closely to at least young Americans’ 
conceptions of “Christianity”—hyper-conservative, judgmental, hypocritical, and 
narrow-minded—and to the behaviors and representations forwarded by official 
evangelicalism through the cultural apparatuses described above. As Putnam and 
Campbell interpret this and their own similar findings among the general population, 
“this youthful generation seems unwilling or unable to distinguish the stance of the most 
visible, most political, and most conservative religious leaders from organized religion in 
general” (American Grace 131).  
But strangely, Kinnaman and Lyons find that younger Christians seem to agree. 
In the same study from 2006, Kinnaman and Lyons find that among young churchgoers, 
80% would describe present-day Christianity as antihomosexual; 52% would describe it 
as judgmental; 47% would describe it as hypocritical; and 50% would describe it as too 
involved in politics (34). And in a more recent study, Kinnaman identifies six issues 
raised by disaffected Christians aged 18-29. These disaffected, according to Kinnaman, 
make up approximately 60% of all young Americans with Christian backgrounds. They 
feel Christianity is, first, over-protective—“The church is . . . a creativity killer where 
risk taking and being involved in culture are anathema.” It’s also shallow—“Easy 
platitudes, proof texting, and formulaic slogans.” Third, it’s anti-science—“Many young 
Christians have come to the conclusion that faith and science are incompatible . . . What’s 
more, science seems accessible in a way that the church does not; science appears to 
welcome questions and skepticism, while matters of faith seem impenetrable.” Fourth, 
it’s repressive—“Religious rules—particularly sexual mores—feel stifling to the 
individualist mindset of young adults.” Fifth, it’s exclusive: “[Young Americans] have 
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been shaped by a culture that esteems open-mindedness, tolerance, and acceptance. Thus 
Christianity’s claims to exclusivity are a hard sell.” Finally, it’s doubtless—“Young 
Christians (and former Christians too) say the church is not a place that allows them to 
express doubts. . . . Many feel that the church’s response to doubt is trivial and fact 
focused, as if people can be talked out of doubting” (92-93). 
Kinnaman observes that young Christians’ complaints about Christianity are 
weirdly similar to one another—he writes, “It feels as if they are reading from a script” 
(9). This phenomenon is clearly occurring across American culture more generally, too: 
the same script is being employed in our rhetoric and composition descriptions, general 
societal descriptions, and descriptions from religious practitioners themselves. 
Altogether, these descriptions of Christianity, and of religion at large, do begin to feel 
“scripted”—and having observed how official evangelicalism promotes itself through our 
ideological apparatuses, this should be less than surprising.  
To begin to consider the consequences of that recognizability, we can look again 
to examples of religion in politics and entertainment. The success of evangelical parodies 
indicates the extent to which evangelicalism is generally recognizable. A recent episode 
of NBC’s Parks and Rec on abstinence education provides an example: in that episode, 
“Sex Education,” a married Christian couple crusades against teaching comprehensive 
sex education to senior citizens (there’s been an outbreak of Chlamydia in the nursing 
homes), saying that this will lead to “babies in thongs.” The kicker, of course, is that the 
wife is portrayed as sharp-faced and unhappy while the husband is flamboyantly gay—
but doesn’t know it. He refers to the “urges” he keeps down, and mentions that he and his 
wife waited till well after marriage to have sex. To be clear, the word evangelical never 
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gets used. But the specific references to God, sin, and abstinence do enough to connect 
the couple’s discourse directly to the official evangelical rhetoric on sex, homosexuality, 
and marriage I describe above.  
This sounds like a result that evangelicals would not want—people’s perceptions 
of evangelicals seem generally negative. But scholars of presidential rhetoric have 
pointed out how recent presidents—though particularly George W. Bush—have utilized 
this general recognizability of evangelicalism to their rhetorical advantage by pairing 
“God talk” with ideals of freedom, and with prophetic, hortatory modes of discourse that 
display the certainty characteristic of such religious discourses (Coe and Domke, Hart 
and Childers, Brown). As Kevin Coe and David Domke put this, “Reagan and Bush are 
distinct [from other presidents since Roosevelt] in at least three crucial ways: their greater 
amount of God talk, their greater propensity to claim that a divine being has a special 
connection with freedom and liberty, and their much greater likelihood to speak 
declaratively about God’s wishes for these principles” (323). Coe and Domke connect 
these rhetorical patterns with “the ascendancy of religious conservatives in the political 
sphere and the desire of presidents—particularly those in the Republican Party—to 
connect with this voting block” (320), noting Bush’s ascription to the belief that “political 
leaders should ‘signal early, signal often’ their religious views” (312), and pointing out 
that “in the 2000 election Bush received 79% of White evangelicals’ votes” (313). But 
plenty of non-evangelicals voted for Bush—the more interesting question might be to 
what extent the general incorporation of evangelical logics causes non-evangelicals to 
similarly recognize Bush’s evangelical discourse.  
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Wendy Brown is less circumspect. She argues that the blurring of religious and 
political discourse “facilitates the reception of the de-democratizing forces of 
neoconservatism and neoliberalism” (706) by utilizing religious discourses’ dependence 
on a “declarative modality of truth” combined with an “inner conviction or certainty” that 
makes “interrogation, deliberation, and facts” irrelevant (707). Brown believes that this 
religious discourse activates a sort of authoritarian mindset in which those possessing the 
requisite evangelical disposition will simply submit to leaders who perform evangelical 
discourse. But Althusser’s conception of ideology suggests that no such blindly coercive 
relation need be imagined—Bush’s discourse might be more successful with evangelicals 
precisely because it doesn’t require their submission (a coercive logic): it instead merits 
trust in those who recognize its evangelical logics. Because of this recognition, Brown is 
right to note that when evangelicalism’s logic “seeps from religious to political 
rationality” it “transforms the conditions of legitimacy for political power” so that 
“executive power obtains a prerogative and legitimacy not routinely available to liberal 
democratic states” (708). Put simply, Bush’s evangelical God talk may grant him 
legitimacy and authority with populations in whom such discourse positively resonates. 
They trust him, vote for him, and thus literally authorize him to press his religious logic 
forward into government policy. 
 In a less incendiary instantiation of the same basic argument, Ann Powers of NPR 
argues that the appeal of a number of immensely popular contemporary bands similarly 
derives from their resonances with Christian sensibilities. She describes  
a new generation of fans emerging not only for Mumford but for acoustic-
leaning American bands garnering ever-larger and more fervent audiences 
on the club and theater touring circuit. A lot of this stuff has unmistakably 
churchy overtones: The Head and the Heart shares a name with Garry 
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Wills' popular history of American Christianity; The Avett Brothers sing 
of carpenters and (indirectly) “Corinthians”; the rousing choruses of bands 
like The Lumineers musically connect to both old hymns and 
contemporary praise and worship music. It may not be cool on the secular 
scene to play up these Jesus people leanings, but they're a huge part of 
what attracts fans to these artists. Many pop fans are or have been 
churchgoers, and the comfortable feeling of singing along, nurtured in 
many during childhoods spent in the pews, allows for a form of release 
that's edifying without proving too scary.  
 
The most incisive distinction Powers makes here (though it can be easily over-looked for 
its seeming obviousness) is between the explicit and the implicit: music evocative of 
religious sensibilities attracts American listeners; music that is explicitly religious might 
repel them. 
Powers goes on in this vein, describing the levels at which the experience of these 
bands resonates with people’s religious sensibilities—reminding them of church without 
being specifically or directly religious: 
I know the feeling that radiates from a room full of Avetts or Mumford 
fans singing along with every overly sincere, earnest word; I've been there 
myself. At sixteen, I was a confused Catholic kid struggling to figure out 
how I could be my parents' daughter and still want to make out with boys, 
dye my hair funny colors and dance all night to ridiculously loud music. 
U2's music didn't present an alternative to the church life that had made 
me, in part, who I was then; it showed me how to struggle within that life, 
and get to the point where I could either walk on within it or walk away. 
I'm not a practicing Catholic now, but when I hear Mumford & Sons or the 
Avett Brothers, I recognize the same internal fights, the same desire to 
grapple with impossibly big terms like "sincerity" and "belief," that U2's 
music helped me through twenty years ago.  
 
Powers is not the only one who recognizes these feelings and fights: globally, Mumford 
& Sons’ 2010 Sigh No More sold over 2.5 million copies, while its new album Babel (a 
notably religious reference) had the biggest debut week of any album in 2012—moving 
600,000 copies—and won the Grammy for Best Album of 2012. That sales number, by 
the way, almost doubled the debut sales of the year’s next highest album, Justin Bieber’s 
 129 
Believe (G. Smith). The point I’m making through these examples is that Christian 
discourse (often, specifically evangelical discourse) pervades not only institutional 
apparatuses, but through these apparatuses also injects itself into the sensibilities and 
even the tastes of ordinary people. They, in turn, recognize and sediment that discourse 
through a number of consumer practices—buying albums, attending concerts, wearing 
band gear, sharing songs, quoting lyrics, creating Pandora streams, and many more—that 
ensure its continuation.10  
 
V. Misrecognition: The Evangelicalism in our Writing Classrooms 
But hegemonic enculturation leads not only to the recognition of evangelicalism, 
but also to the misrecognition of official evangelicalism. To reiterate, the chief 
hegemonic work of ideological apparatuses is to cause individuals to accept as natural 
the selective version of the world they are offered by those apparatuses: misrecognizing 
culturally contingent relations for natural ones; misrecognizing their own participatory 
role in the maintenance of those relations; and missing their potential for transforming 
those relations.11 Individuals’ incorporation of cultural norms as behaviors, expectations, 
                                                
10 All of these citational examples speak, of course, to evangelicalism’s discursive power, 
but not necessarily its effects or potential uses: given that the bands, satirists and 
politicians speaking in evangelical terms are not necessarily evangelicals or working 
from evangelical motives, we can see how the power of evangelical discourse can be 
harnessed for alternative purposes and articulated with non-evangelical perspectives. 
Rhetors often draw on religion’s power for non-religious purposes: to intensify listeners’ 
sympathetic experience of romantic sentiment, to elevate citizens’ sense of togetherness 
or human responsibility, or even to add the “recognition” necessary to much 
contemporary comedy while critiquing the behavior of the religious community being 
recognized.  
11 Within rhetoric and composition, this has been discussed thoroughly in Richard 
Miller’s “The Nervous System” (in Bourdieusian terms) and even more thoroughly in 
Rickert’s Acts of Enjoyment (in Lacanian terms). 
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and perceptions—the enculturation of the habitus—effects such misrecognitions. I deal 
with several more key forms of misrecognition, and the stories that produce them, in 
chapter five: religious boundaries as stable, religious communication as transparent, 
religious experience as spontaneous. But here in chapter three I want to briefly point out 
another key form of misrecognition: religious representatives as really representative. 
Writing classrooms offer an instructive example of this particular misrecognition, so I 
turn my focus there to identify the individual, often non-conscious levels at which this 
misrecognition of official evangelicalism occurs.  
We might say that instructors and students encounter (perceive, recognize, 
respond to) three levels of sponsors promoting official evangelicalism. First, as discussed 
above, there are the official spokespersons of a minority religious population—that is, 
fundamentalist adherents, many of whom participate in institutions loosely tied together 
by the term evangelicalism—who have come to dominance in both American religious 
representations and American religious norms by successfully “representing” far larger 
and more heterogeneous religious populations (including the broader population of 
“evangelicals”). By claiming to speak for “Christianity,” and by being perceived as doing 
so, this 13% of the American population claims authority to speak for almost 68% of the 
American population (to put the numbers roughly—see discussion in chapter four). The 
relative accuracy of this representation will vary from issue to issue—for example, 
Putnam and Campbell find that most religious adherents do remain against abortion, but 
that doesn’t mean they also favor the death penalty and oppose gay marriage (they don’t, 
in fact). The official spokespersons are perhaps the easiest to recognize because they may 
maintain official positions, or will self-identify as evangelical or born-again, or may be 
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associated explicitly with evangelical institutions. On this primary level, hegemony 
depends upon explicit representations.  
But second, there are the performative, temporary representatives: anyone who 
acts in the name of this representation, or even anyone whose behavior is perceived to 
align with this representation. When this happens, they at least temporarily slip into the 
role of representative—for the length of the encounter, they become the evangelical that 
secular instructors write about. This is the case with Powers’ chosen representatives for 
Christianity more generally, Mumford and Sons. The band’s lyrics are generally 
religiously thematic rather than religiously dogmatic, and yet for Powers, Mumford and 
Sons’ music remains recognizably Christian (“churchy”) and affects people through 
activating that recognition. So we must acknowledge these sponsors’ representational 
role while we continue to resist the temptation to believe every representation actually 
refers to a concrete reality—instead, the representation itself is a reality that activates 
further realities, connecting discrete behaviors and groups, motivating collective and 
individual actions, realizing itself even in spite of the intentions of the actors like Marcus 
Mumford. These temporary instantiations of evangelicalism are only a situated acting-
out, making-real, of the hegemonic account of evangelicalism. This is actually how I read 
our tendency to write about evangelical students, described at the beginning of chapter 
two—I believe that often students act as what I’m calling secondary sponsors of official 
evangelicalism.   
There is no reason to suggest that our disciplinary portrayal of religious students 
is an intentional misrepresentation of the religious population: none of our scholars seem 
to be attempting to portray “religion” as conservative, and so choosing conservative 
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students as representatives. And none of our writers suggest or even imply that all 
religious students are political, social, and theological conservatives. After all, in almost 
every case the writers are clear that they are talking about evangelicals (not all Christians 
or religious practitioners). There is no reason, even, to suggest that our representations 
are inaccurate—the individual students we describe as conservative religious adherents 
probably are just that. Frankly, conservative religious practitioners are likely the ones we 
write articles about for the right reason: because we’re struggling to find good ways to 
teach them. They seemingly choose themselves. They announce themselves to us, or we 
have difficulty teaching them, or they struggle in our class, and so we write about them in 
an effort to help. But through our reporting on these apparently discrete encounters, one 
set of representatives seemingly dominates our literature, and those representatives 
correspond to generalized perceptions of Christian practitioners that are prevalent among 
Christians and non-Christians alike. To me, the relative similarity of religious 
representatives in our articles, arising without conscious intention, as a result of a series 
of apparently discrete encounters between individual teachers and their religious students 
over a period of twenty years, and yet displaying significant coherence, should be 
interpreted as a symptom of the hegemonic power of official evangelicalism to shape 
what rises to our attention. So at this level, official evangelicalism is dependent upon 
markable behaviors and remarking perceptions of those behaviors.   
This act of recognition, then, implicates two parties—the recognized and the 
recognizer. So I want to suggest here that the third group of sponsors of official 
evangelicalism consists of everyone who perceives these temporary representatives, gives 
credence to the official representatives, and then cites evangelicalism to explain their 
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experience. That’s where academics often come in: we are tertiary sponsors of official 
evangelicalism, maintaining its norms and forwarding its account in spite of ourselves. 
Perpetuation of official evangelicalism occurs, I would argue, every time instructors 
really do have bad experiences with a hypocritical, judgmental, absolutist, repressive, or 
conservative religious adherent. When we quite naturally interpret and occasionally re-
present this adherent as an expression or actualization of the official “Christian” or 
“religious” representation, we make them a representative of official evangelicalism. The 
stereotype gains reality through its confirmation: as Williams puts it, hegemony “is a 
lived system of meanings and values—constitutive and constituting—which as they are 
experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming” (110). Every time we give 
credence to that evangelicalism’s apparent “expression” in our interactions with religious 
adherents, we strengthen the authority (and possibly power) of official evangelicalism 
(the account and its institutionally-powerful backers) while eliding the practical challenge 
posed to official evangelicalism by our interlocutor’s religious life or the challenge that 
might be presented by identifying different sorts of representatives.  
This reality effect, in which individuals internalize, activate, and thus realize and 
misrecognize the hegemonic account, can also be seen at work in Thomson’s student 
informants. Official evangelicalism shapes these students’ expectations, their perceptions, 
their emotions, and their behaviors in the writing classroom, specifically because they 
operate as both secondary and tertiary sponsors. First, we can see how official 
evangelicalism has shaped religious students’ expectations. Heather E. Thomson’s 
research indicates that Christian students expect to be negatively perceived by 
instructors—thus, there are instructors expecting to see official evangelicals, and there 
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are students expecting instructors to see official evangelicals—and the result is political 
paralysis. As Thomson notes, “nearly all interviewed students raised the issue of 
stereotyping without being prompted” (97); they believe that instructors stereotype 
Christians as politically conservative (94), judgmental (96), ignorant, backward (104), 
“naïve, ill-informed, biased, ignorant” (110). Consistently, the religious students 
Thomson interviews are frustrated by popular representations of Christians put forward 
by non-Christian individuals and groups on campus (not only instructors but student 
newspapers, student groups on Facebook, and the like). One complains of his campus’s 
student newspaper staff, “they think that we’re all like George Bush, like Nazis, like 
we’re all conservatives” (90); and another observes of instructors, “I think they 
understand the concepts of, you know, the religious right and religious left, but not that 
most people aren’t either” (95). We can see that the students’ expectations have been 
shaped by official evangelicalism: they expect to be perceived as that kind of Christian. 
Thomson describes the emotional and relational effects of this loss of control 
(that is, the effects of official evangelicalism’s overwhelming presence): “The lack of 
power they have (or feel they have) over people’s perceptions of them contributes to a 
feeling that being Christian at UM involves a certain amount of risk and requires a 
willingness to explain oneself” (97). Many students feel fearful and defensive in such 
settings. As a result, “All but two student interviewees mention fear as part of their 
experience as a Christian student”; particularly, Thomson suggests, fear at “the prospect 
of dredging up other people’s negative associations with Christianity” (104). Another 
student, Quinn, describes feeling embarrassed and angry after seeing the way a preacher 
represents Christianity on the quad. He wants to differentiate himself from “that guy”—
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but he’s not sure he can. Thomson writes that Quinn feels “he has little control over how 
others might forge connections between him and that which he rejects” (96). These 
pervasive negative representations leave students feeling “a lack of control over how the 
label ‘Christian’ (or even just ‘religious’) will be interpreted by their peers and 
instructors” (105).  
Not only are their feelings and expectations being shaped by official 
evangelicalism’s cultural presence; religious students also feel unable to represent 
religion differently, given the constraints under which they must attempt those 
representations, and so they write differently. As one student explains,  
I feel a lot of times that I’m not equipped enough . . . I just have a hard 
time getting out what I mean, so when I talk to people that’s one of my big 
concerns, that I’ll say something I don’t mean, that it comes off the wrong 
way, or that I’m presenting my faith in a poor way. I just get really 
insecure about that . . . I definitely do get scared, because I don’t think I’m 
the wisest person alive. (105) 
 
Or as another of Thomson’s informants writes, “As long as Christians stay, you know, as 
long as they don’t let their religion seep out and try to change other people, I think most 
people are fine with that” (106). As a result these Christian students report, “avoiding 
topics with which their instructors may disagree; choosing not to disclose their religious 
beliefs; striving to be ‘neutral’ in their work” (206). They silence themselves on the 
assumption “that to identify as Christian is to invite doubts or preconceived notions about 
their intellectual abilities, their political views, and their openness to people of other 
faiths and worldviews” (124). This mutual expectation (ours, theirs) and attendant 
feelings stifle (or at least slow) the ability of young religious moderates to actually 
practice, represent and publicize their alternative or emergent religious practices as 
legitimate religious practices.  
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These students, however, do not only feel this lack of agency in the academy: they 
feel silenced and out of control in church as well, and part of this can again be understood 
in terms of misrecognition. One student, Theresa, activates official evangelicalism in her 
own description of other religious adherents. She 
remembers feeling afraid at times to “voice [her] more liberal opinions” to 
the Christian student group because they are sometimes looked down 
upon. She also wonders if “maybe it’s easier if you agree with the 
stereotypical Christian [than] to voice your opinion in that sense because 
it’s not like you’re going outside the lines that have already been set for 
you.” (95-96)  
 
Remarking on this quote, Thomson ties Theresa to the population of religious students 
who have “endeavored to both differentiate their religious selves from stereotypical 
representations of evangelical Christianity and perform or behave in ways that 
consistently reflect that identity” (Bryant 2, qtd. in Thomson 96).  
But here I think we see another relation to official evangelicalism for religious 
students, too: Theresa is not only struggling against the stereotype in the classroom, 
where she fears being constructed as a secondary sponsor of official evangelicalism—
she’s now using and perpetuating official evangelicalism as a tertiary sponsor. Feeling 
fearful around other Christians and anticipating negative responses, whether in fact 
there’s any actual social risk, constructs the participatory hegemony Raymond Williams 
describes—that “whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our 
senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world” 
(110). Further, through telling her story to Thomson, Theresa is transforming the 
stereotype into a real conversant, or perhaps turning her peers into the stereotype. We 
might say that conservative members of the Christian student group are actively 
perceived and constructed by Theresa as embodying the stereotypical Christian; thus both 
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the liberal and the conservative members of the group together participate in perpetuating 
the dominant representation and reinforcing the authority of its norms. So instructors and 
students alike act as tertiary sponsors, or “recognizers.” When we activate the 
representation through a reference or partial reference, or when like Theresa and Quinn 
we read behaviors in terms of the stereotype, even those who oppose official 
evangelicalism become its spokespersons. The representation is, in other words, 
hegemonic; dislocated, distributed, partial, and participatory, not merely coming “down 




We can conclude from this that official evangelicalism has not only attained direct 
influence (power) within religion and within American culture through visible positions 
within official institutions, but its leaders have also gained indirect influence (authority) 
by sedimenting their status as religious representatives in the bodies and minds of 
Americans. They may have institutional power apart from the hegemonic account; but 
official evangelical spokespersons derive much of their authority from ideological 
apparatuses like education and the media that move official evangelicalism beneath our 
skin, and from the recognition students and we learn to give to its representatives. 
Official evangelical credibility and legitimacy is at the very least reinforced every time 
what primary and secondary sponsors say and do in the name of their religion aligns with 
people’s perception of Christianity and religion more generally. This means that for the 
majority of Americans, the more homophobic or anti-science or anti-abortion a religious 
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spokesperson is, the more authoritatively he or she represents religion. Simultaneously, a 
highly visible creationist confirms for those who perceive religion as anti-science that 
religion is, after all, anti-science. And conversely, a spokesperson for religion can quickly 
lose credibility as such if his arguments or actions are shown to fall outside the range of 
the hegemonic account. To the extent that writing scholars should attend to celebrity 
spokespersons like Dobson or Jim Wallis, it should be an attention to what makes them 
recognizable and credible to us as religious authorities, and in what ways we, as 
secondary and tertiary sponsors, take up, misrecognize, and thus realize their accounts of 
evangelicalism (and Christianity, and religion).  
I think this pattern of misrecognition is crucial to understanding the power 
relations within which religious students write on religion in the classroom. We’ve heard 
from Thomson’s informants the lack of agency religious students feel over their 
perception at college and at church, and the self-muzzling that can result. They don’t feel 
they have the authority to claim their own position in either case, because official 
evangelicalism’s pervasive presence in people’s expectations (including their own) is 
successfully constraining their political, social, and academic options. Recognizing this 
difficulty presented by official evangelicalism, we can also recognize that giving 
religious students the opportunity to bring in religiously-inflected perspectives, values, 
genres, experiences, and texts may not seem as good an opportunity for them as it seems 
to us. They may see it as a risk, or they may not feel they have the tools to represent their 










HETEROGENEITY AND CONTESTATION 
 
Given the deep resonances between the dominant representation and the visible 
“representatives” of the Christian Right, researchers may be tempted to believe in, or at 
least look for, a homogeneous religious population that corresponds to these 
representations and their representatives—a powerful, official evangelicalism that people 
practice. As the previous section demonstrates, this temptation to give credence to the 
dominant representation and authority to the official representative is just as strong for 
individuals who encounter it in their everyday life. Michel de Certeau calls this the 
ultimate power of citation, and Butler calls it a reality effect—we believe the ideal or 
norm because of its ostensible representational or citational qualities. We tend to assume 
that there must be something that it accurately refers to, or someone else would have 
contradicted it, and we’d have heard that contradiction—citation always refers to a reality 
(we think). Because of this much of our scholarly focus tends to turn on these highly 
visible representatives and representations of religion. For example, throughout her recent 
dissertation on contemporary American religious rhetoric—discussed above—King 
constructs a rhetorical and ideological struggle between two strains of evangelicalism, 
one conservative and one progressive. She focuses heavily on official representations and 
representatives from each strain—namely, Dobson and Wallis—to establish the existence 
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and growing prominence of these two evangelical formations and their rhetorical struggle 
for the evangelical soul.  
 
Practical v. Official 
But as Thomson’s student informants above indicate, it is always dangerous to 
believe that such official positions—even the ones we find sympathetic—represent, in a 
strict sense, the “real” positions held by the population. Butler points out that actual 
practices will always exceed or run counter to the constraining forms offered by the 
dominant representation. Speaking of gender, she explains,   
That disciplinary production of gender effects a false stabilization of 
gender in the interests of the heterosexual construction and regulation of 
sexuality within the reproductive domain. The construction of coherence 
conceals the gender discontinuities that run rampant within heterosexual, 
bisexual, and gay and lesbian contexts in which gender does not 
necessarily follow from sex, and desire, or sexuality generally, does not 
seem to follow from gender. (Gender Trouble 135-36) 
Like gender, the official account of religion covers over the discontinuities of religious 
practice rampant in actual congregations and on actual campuses in America. Just as 
“heterosexuality offers normative sexual positions that are intrinsically impossible to 
embody, and the persistent failure to identify fully and without incoherence with these 
positions reveals heterosexuality itself not only as a compulsory law, but as an inevitable 
comedy,” so too do dominant religious institutions offer normative religious positions 
that are intrinsically impossible to embody and inevitably produce tensions experienced 
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to varying extents by all religious adherents (Gender Trouble 122). This difference is 
described by Raymond Williams as the difference between the practical (here, religion as 
it is experienced in everyday life) and the official (ideal constructions of religion as it is 
disseminated) (109).  
Evidence of such discontinuities within evangelicalism and within American 
Christianity more broadly abounds in religious research. First, we can see differences 
between practical realities and official evangelicalism even by observing the disparities in 
institutional religious affiliation. The Pew Forum’s “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey” 
finds that 83% of young Americans between 18 and 29 are in some sense “religious”; 
22% of all young Americans report evangelical affiliation; 43% are affiliated with all 
Protestant Christian denominations; and 68% are affiliated with Christianity. Another 6% 
of all young Americans fall into the category of “Other Religions,” and 25% report no 
religious affiliation—though 9% of those who are unaffiliated still describe themselves as 
religious. Of the religious 83%, then, evangelical spokespersons only officially represent 
a little more than one fourth, and Catholic leadership officially represents the same share. 
Even if we restrict our comparisons to evangelicalism’s place among young Christians, 
only around one third of those call themselves evangelicals. This point is especially 
important because with the partial exception of Black Protestant churches (8% of young 
Americans), Putnam and Campbell’s as well as Pew Forum’s results suggest that other 
Christian populations are vastly and consistently more liberal religiously, socially, and 
politically than evangelical Christian populations. For example, the Pew Forum finds that 
mainline Protestants and Catholics are almost three times as likely as white evangelicals 
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to feel that homosexuality should be accepted in society (though even among 
evangelicals, they find that 19% report that attitude). 
Putnam and Campbell also indicate discontinuities between the clergy 
(institutional representatives) and their congregants. Whereas religious Americans’ 
beliefs and practices are heterogeneous, clergy members can prove far more 
homogeneous—98% of Missouri Synod Lutheran clergy, for instance, claim that 
salvation comes only through Jesus, while only 14% of their Lutheran congregants agree 
(540). This gap between the institutional representatives and lay membership holds true 
on other counts as well: for instance, Jeremy Uecker and Glenn Lucke note that 
politically lay Americans “are divided, [but] the divisions are close, with millions of 
average Americans in the middle, sharing some views from one side of the cleavage and 
some views from the other side” (693)—but both political and religious elites are 
increasingly polarized (693, 705). While congregations are largely politically moderate, 
in other words, the clergy are likely to be more strongly liberal or more strongly 
conservative. It is a significant mistake, such findings suggest, to conflate official 
representatives’ attitudes and norms with those of congregants (although this is not to 
deny that the clergy’s views are influential, as Uecker and Lucke also note). 
A closer look at American belief, attitude, and behavior confirms that these 
differences between practical religion and official evangelicalism are present throughout 
American culture. Sociological data suggests that most Americans are clearly practicing 
religion in ways that differ from the dominant religious representation and its norms. In 
terms of belief, attitude, and behavior, religious Americans demonstrate that their 
practical relation to the dominant representation and its representatives is diffracted at 
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best, and most likely conflictual. In terms of belief, for example, Putnam and Campbell 
find that only 13% of the entire American population consists of “true believers”—what 
we often call fundamentalists (542-3). (Looked at slightly differently, the Pew Forum 
finds this sentiment among a still small one quarter of religiously affiliated Americans.) 
Putnam and Campbell find only that small population believes that “One religion is true 
and others are not”; in comparison, when asked the same question a remarkable 80% of 
surveyed Americans respond, “There are basic truths in many religions” (American 
Grace 543).  
Putnam and Campbell find that even among evangelicals, whose members make 
up 52% of the true believing population in America (note that 48% of true believers come 
from other religious traditions), 75% are not true believers (547). And even within that 
true believing fraction of the American population, there is significant diversity in 
attitudes. For instance, in addition to the one third who would approve certain forms of 
abortion, only 60% of true believers oppose gay marriage and civil unions. That is, within 
the most religiously conservative 13% of our population, abortion and gay rights are 
viewed favorably by at least a third of those believers (American Grace 544). And 
Kinnaman and Lyons lament that in terms of moral behavior there is simply no 
significant difference between evangelicals and others, Christian or not (54). So whether 
the differences stem from institutional or practical sources, the data makes clear that the 
hegemonic evangelical account does not even “represent” evangelicals in any complete 




To be clear, while these statistics indicate considerable gaps in official 
evangelicalism’s power to reproduce itself and make religion over in its own image, they 
cannot deny its power altogether. Unable to erase the hegemonic account either from the 
ideological apparatuses or from their own minds and bodies, what we find is that 
religious practitioners act, as Butler predicts, to deflect and re-deploy both the hegemonic 
account and its apparatuses. In Bodies that Matter, Butler concisely summarizes the 
realities of subversive action from within the hegemonic:  
Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that which one 
opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce alternative 
modalities of power, to establish a kind of political contestation that is not 
a “pure” opposition, a “transcendence” of contemporary relations of 
power, but a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably 
impure . . . For one is, as it were, in power even as one opposes it, formed 
by it as one reworks it, and it is this simultaneity that is at once the 
condition of our partiality, the measure of our political unknowingness, 
and also the condition of action itself. (241) 
 
If I were to translate this notion of performativity into the language of my text, I would 
say that if official evangelicalism is truly as hegemonic as I suggest in the previous 
chapter, then the challenges and contradictions that people’s actual lives present to 
official evangelicalism should merely produce new subject relations to it, not its 
eradication—namely, alternative and emergent evangelical formations that continually 
appear to stand in various relations to the official. Representing these alternative and 
emergent formations within evangelicalism, and the modes of religious struggle, 
heterogeneity, and change that they evidence, is the focus of this chapter. 
First, however, I want to offer an extended example from outside of Christianity 
and American culture that brilliantly highlights these related notions of the practical and 
the performative within religious formations. Bahira Sherif’s research on middle and 
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upper class Muslim professional women in Egypt investigates the specific ways in which 
those women are never entirely within or outside of official ideology; instead, they are in 
power even as they oppose it, and formed by hegemony even as their own actions rework 
it. Sherif argues that within traditional ideologies being disseminated by fundamentalist 
Muslim leaders in Egypt, “The ideal woman is a wife and a mother . . . wears the veil, 
guards her modesty, obeys her husband, and expresses her views only through her 
husband” (9). But this official representation of the ideal Muslim woman belies economic 
and social realities: “there is no room for the economic constraints that force women to 
work outside the home, to interact with unrelated men, or to negotiate new distributions 
of duties within the home in order to deal with the pressures of marriage, work and 
children” (9). These economic constraints are really matters of class; societal 
expectations demand that middle and upper-class women should expect a certain level of 
material wealth in their marriage that have become generally impossible to achieve on a 
single income. So traditional ideas of class status, gender roles, and religion collide here 
with current economic realities. As Sherif notes,  
While the ideologies of the centre identify women with the household and 
children, and subsume this domain to that of men, many upper-middle 
class Egyptian women are in the process of creating mechanisms that 
enable them to accumulate wealth for their families by negotiating central 
and peripheral domains. They are thereby reworking the definitions of 
what it means to be either male or female. (13) 
 
Sherif finds, in other words, that the Egyptian women she studies negotiate these trans-
formational conflicts by balancing their religious observation across multiple formational 
levels.  
Sherif describes a number of practices taken up by Egyptian women in order to 
negotiate these conflicting commitments and expectations. Most interestingly, Sherif 
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points out that Egyptian women have taken to wearing the veil—a very traditional 
religious practice—as one of their negotiating tactics.  
The hijab, the wearing of a head veil and loose fitting clothing, has come 
to signify the sum total of traditional institutions governing women’s role 
in Islamic society . . . This accounts, in part, for the willingness of many 
professional women to adopt these new forms of Islamic dress, thereby 
literally cloaking themselves in orthodoxy and modernity. (12) 
 
When Sherif’s informants elect to wear the veil but go to work, they are practicing an 
alternative way of being Muslim that responds to a variety of societal pressures without 
mounting an open challenge to official ideologies of gender roles. They observe Islamic 
norms on the level of appearance so as to be allowed to press its boundaries on other 
levels; and they make these trade-offs so as to satisfactorily address class, family, and 
gender pressures that matter to them. Sherif concludes, “the gender ‘rules’ that are often 
invoked for Egyptian society only represent ‘reality’ as it exists within the limited 
framework of a particular ideological system: one that relegates women to a subordinate 
female sphere. Nonetheless, we find that ‘reality’ is changing as women negotiate with 
the tensions brought on through divergent dominant ideologies” (9). It should not be lost 
on us that women in Egypt take up these negotiations to safeguard their own economic, 
social, and even physical well-being. Nor should it be lost on us how this might apply 
outside of Egypt: perhaps the hijab or birka that we read as a mark of repression or even 
danger (as suggested by France’s laws) is also (not instead) a mark of subversion—
paradoxically, these women may have to choose to wear the hijab in order to more freely 
pursue their classed and gendered desires.  
While negotiations may occur at less dangerous or less obvious levels, religious 
practitioners elsewhere are similarly operating in relation to multiple, competing 
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formations. Performativity will help us understand below, for example, how and why 
alumni of evangelical flagship Wheaton College choose to maintain identities as 
Wheaton alumni even as they openly challenge Wheaton’s official evangelical stance on 
homosexuality—as a group strategically entitled OneWheaton. Those alumni are 
explicitly asserting a multiple and partial, variously contradictory identity as Christians, 
Wheaton grads, and homosexuals or allies; but they do so in the name of creating a 
single, ideal evangelical community that never entirely separates them from official 
evangelicalism. And these notions of practice and performativity, the condition of 
negotiating relations of power within a complex space, will help us understand how 
external discourses on women’s rights exerted enough pressure on evangelicalism to 
bring about the creation of feminist evangelical organizations in the 1970s, and then how 
those organizations drew counter-organizations like Piper’s Council for Biblical 
Manhood and Womanhood in the late 1980s (all discussed below). In each case, while 
practitioners enact their multiple commitments, I will demonstrate how they engage and 
redeploy the hegemonic account of official evangelicalism. This discursive engagement 
with official evangelicalism proves both a constraint and a vehicle for these groups’ 
agential actions and alternative representations.   
 
Alternative Evangelicalisms 
One example of the struggle for control over evangelicalism—not only its popular 
representation, but also its ideological and cultural manifestations—can be seen in the 
“Evangelical Manifesto.” The Manifesto was published and signed by prominent 
evangelicals (including numerous Christian university presidents, magazine editors, 
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C.E.O.s of international relief organizations, the publisher of Forbes Magazine, and even 
the C.E.O. of Dollar General). Generally, the original signatories who published this 
document could be described as having ideological or cultural influence, rather than 
coercive influence, within evangelicalism. Released to significant press attention in 2008, 
the Manifesto outlines exactly what its writers think evangelicalism really is. Evangelical 
Christianity is characterized in the Manifesto by seven beliefs and seven defining 
features, which these evangelicals claim are in keeping with true Christian tradition: 
“Evangelicals are therefore followers of Jesus Christ, plain ordinary Christians in the 
classic and historic sense over the last two thousand years” (5). Later in the document, 
they go so far as to aver, “In sum, to be Evangelical is earlier and more enduring than to 
be Protestant” (10).  
But though they make these positive statements, the writers of the Manifesto 
clearly recognize that such claims to Christian tradition and Evangelical definition are 
contested. In fact, the document’s stated purpose is not merely to define Evangelicalism, 
but to counter the dominant public perception of Evangelicalism. The writers of the 
Manifesto are explicitly representing their evangelicalism and outlining its norms against 
the hegemonic account. 
The two-fold purpose of this declaration is first to address the 
confusions and corruptions that attend the term Evangelical in the United 
States and much of the Western world today, and second to clarify where 
we stand on issues that have caused consternation over Evangelicals in 
public life.  
. . . we are troubled by the fact that the confusions and corruptions 
surrounding the term Evangelical have grown so deep that the character of 
what it means has been obscured and its importance lost. Many people 
outside the movement now doubt that Evangelical is ever positive, and 




The writers indicate that the Manifesto is working to define Evangelicalism against the 
hegemonic account of Evangelicalism, not just to clean up a vague misperception.  
Furthermore: their efforts are not just directed against a hegemonic account, but 
against the norms for evangelicalism propagated by official evangelicalism. The authors 
refuse to directly indicate the sources of this dominant perception in the document or in 
subsequent interviews, but it requires little effort to recognize official evangelicalism and 
its representatives in their descriptions. To connect the two strains of contention: the 
writers are writing the Manifesto in response to the related hegemonic forces of, first, 
official evangelicalism’s explicitly ideological account of itself as truly evangelical and 
truly Christian; and second, official evangelicalism’s forceful presence as habitus, which 
shapes American religious and cultural norms for belief, behavior, and practice.  
So to oppose these, the Manifesto’s authors set out to articulate and publicize a set 
of alternative evangelical norms (dispositions, behaviors, assumptions and beliefs) and an 
alternative account of evangelicalism. These norms are represented—and countered—as 
in some sense normative for all Christians. Groups compete to claim, We stand as 
representatives of the Christian tradition; Ours are the norms for being “plain ordinary 
Christians” (Manifesto 5). In other words, they’re saying, make us the stereotype, not 
them. In their account, partially reproduced below, we see these writers engaged in a 
struggle to assert an authoritative definition of evangelicalism (indicated not least by their 
capitalization of the E in Evangelicalism, below)—but they can’t seem to extricate 
themselves from the sedimented forms of popular perception and official evangelicalism 
long enough to do so in strictly positive terms. The phrasing of their own positive 
defining features of evangelicalism makes this struggle—at once a constraint and a 
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springboard for their progressive action—all the more clear. Note below the continual 
uses of phrases like “not,” “but,” “also,” “rather than,” “always more than,” “not 
only…but,” “as much in…as in,” “not limited to,” “not contained by,” “not reduced to,” 
“not confused with,” “should be distinguished from,” “distinctive for,” and others (7-10). 
Even for these evangelical elites—heads of universities, academics, popular authors, 
CEOs—positive definitions of evangelicalism cannot get fully outside of official 
evangelicalism, and in fact gain much of their specificity and motivation agonistically, if 
not antagonistically.  
I provide here the key phrases for each of the Manifesto’s seven “defining 
features” of Evangelicalism, plus any clarifying language the writers offer that better 
indicate their agonistic relation to both the hegemonic account and to official 
evangelicalism. It would be a mistake to take this Manifesto’s Evangelicalism, any more 
than any other, to be the real or true form of evangelicalism. That’s not why I present this 
alternative account of evangelicalism in depth here. Instead, what this hopefully does is 
indicate two related struggles for control. First, one within evangelicalism, over what will 
be the official evangelicalism. Second, one both within and outside of evangelicalism, 
over what will be the hegemonic account. All of the following text is directly from the 
Manifesto: 
First, to be Evangelical is to hold a belief that is also a devotion. 
Evangelicals adhere fully to the Christian faith expressed in the historic 
creeds of the great ecumenical councils of the church, and in the great 
affirmations of the Protestant Reformation, and seek to be loyal to this 
faith passed down from generation to generation. But at its core, being 
Evangelical is always more than a creedal statement, an institutional 
affiliation, or a matter of membership in a movement . . . whole-hearted 
devotion, trust, and obedience are our proper response. . . . 
Second, Evangelical belief and devotion is expressed as much in our 
worship and deeds as in our creeds. . . . What we are about is captured not 
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only in books or declarations, but in our care for the poor, the homeless, 
and the orphaned; our outreach to those in prison; our compassion for the 
hungry and the victims of disaster; and our fight for justice for those 
oppressed by such evils as slavery and human trafficking. . . . 
Third, Evangelicals are followers of Jesus in a way that is not limited 
to certain churches or contained by a definable movement. Evangelicalism 
has always been diverse, flexible, adaptable, non-hierarchical, and taken 
many forms. This is true today more than ever, as witnessed by the variety 
and vibrancy of Evangelicals around the world. For to be Evangelical is 
first and foremost a way of being devoted to Jesus Christ, seeking to live 
in different ages and different cultures as he calls his followers to live. . . . 
Fourth, as stressed above, Evangelicalism must be defined 
theologically and not politically; confessionally and not culturally. Above 
all else, it is a commitment and devotion to the person and work of Jesus 
Christ, his teaching and way of life, and an enduring dedication to his 
lordship above all other earthly powers, allegiances and loyalties. As such, 
it should not be limited to tribal or national boundaries, or be confused 
with, or reduced to political categories such as “conservative” and 
“liberal,” or to psychological categories such as “reactionary” or 
“progressive.” . . . 
Fifth, the Evangelical message, “good news” by definition, is 
overwhelmingly positive, and always positive before it is negative. . . . Just 
as Jesus did, Evangelicals sometimes have to make strong judgments 
about what is false, unjust, and evil. But first and foremost we 
Evangelicals are for Someone and for something rather than against 
anyone or anything. . . . 
Sixth, Evangelicalism should be distinguished from two opposite 
tendencies to which Protestantism has been prone: liberal revisionism and 
conservative fundamentalism. Called by Jesus to be “in the world, but not 
of it,” Christians, especially in modern society, have been pulled toward 
two extremes. . . . The liberal revisionist tendency was first seen in the 
eighteenth century and has become more pronounced today, reaching a 
climax in versions of the Christian faith that are characterized by such 
weaknesses as an exaggerated estimate of human capacities, a shallow 
view of evil, an inadequate view of truth, and a deficient view of God. In 
the end, they are sometimes no longer recognizably Christian. . . . As a 
reaction to the modern world, [fundamentalism] tends to romanticize the 
past, some now-lost moment in time, and to radicalize the present, with 
styles of reaction that are personally and publicly militant to the point 
where they are sub- Christian. . . . 
Seventh, Evangelicalism is distinctive for the way it looks equally to 
both the past and the future. . . . To be Evangelical is therefore not only to 
be deeply personal in faith, strongly committed to ethical holiness in life, 
and marked by robust voluntarism in action, but to live out a faith whose 
dynamism is shaped unashamedly by truth and history. . . . We therefore 
regard reason and faith as allies rather than enemies, and find no 
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contradiction between head and heart, between being fully faithful on the 
one hand, and fully intellectually critical and contemporary on the other. 
(7-10) 
 
Later, the Manifesto’s writers also complain against individualistic constructions of 
religion that they say have been confused with true Evangelicalism: “One error has been 
to privatize faith, interpreting and applying it to the personal and spiritual realm only. 
Such dualism falsely divorces the spiritual from the secular, and causes faith to lose its 
integrity and become “privately engaging and publicly irrelevant,” and another form of 
“hot tub spirituality” (15). 
We can see the definitional boundaries that the Manifesto’s writers have chosen in 
these “defining features” as they set themselves against official evangelical norms along 
seven basic areas. It would appear from this that the hegemonic account of 
evangelicalism emphasizes religious beliefs over religious feelings, commitments, 
behaviors; right ideas over right actions; defined boundaries, institutional stability, and 
eternal dicta over heterogeneity, diachronic change and context-dependent ways of being; 
political and cultural identifications and viewpoints over religious identifications and 
viewpoints (or directly articulates them); negatives over positives (exclusion over 
inclusion, sin over righteousness, evil over good); anti-intellectualism and “tradition” 
over intellectualism, critique, and openness to new knowledge and changing 
understandings of religion; and individualism over community. Naturally, the 
Manifesto’s writers would recommend a different emphasis in each case, though they do 
not often engage in actual binary logics that would reduce the choice to one or the other. 
But as descriptions, these statements resonate with the descriptions of Christians offered 
by writing scholars, instructors, students, and public survey respondents; they also echo 
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many of the publicized characteristics of official evangelicalism (presented at length in 
chapter three). In other words, the Evangelical Manifesto accurately and continually cites 
the hegemonic account of official evangelicalism in its attempt to authoritatively re-
define the term along more flexible lines.  
The same performative struggle for re-definition is evident in other sorts of 
alternative evangelicalisms—many researchers have noted, for example, Jim Wallis’ 
efforts to establish and publicize a progressive evangelicalism through Sojourners. But 
importantly, sometimes the alternative formations actually appear to be driven by 
religious practitioner’s relationships with other identities and discourses. The Evangelical 
and Ecumenical Women’s Caucus, to cite just one of these issue-specific alternative 
alignments, hosts an extensive website and publishes Christian Feminism Today. The 
EEWC-CFT is clear about its counter-cultural agenda and history:  
. . . in 1974 the women’s caucus was one of six task forces or caucuses 
formed by ESA [Evangelicals for Social Action] participants to study such 
concerns as racism, sexism, peace, and simpler lifestyles. Thus our group 
was born as the Evangelical Women’s Caucus (EWC). The EWC group 
presented proposals to Evangelicals for Social Action on a variety of 
topics including endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment, support for 
inclusive language in Bible translation and Christian publications, 
affirmation of the ordination of women, and criticism of discriminatory 
hiring policies in Christian institutions. (“About EEWC”) 
 
While support of the ERA was clearly an intervention into the “secular” sphere, the last 
three endorsements were in clear opposition to stances taken by the official evangelical 
establishment I’ve described—in fact, they remain in opposition to stances still taken by 
evangelical leaders and institutions like Albert Mohler and the Southern Baptist 
Seminary, which houses the Council for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood. The 
Council affirms the “equality” of men and women, but also affirms that God has 
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established roles as part of the “created order”—citing the Bible, they call husbands to 
“loving, humble headship” (not domination or passivity) and wives to “intelligent, 
willing submission (but not usurpation or servility). The same paradigm of equal-but-
distinct roles applies, they feel, to church settings where “some governing and teaching 
roles . . . are restricted to men” (“Core Beliefs”). 
In an attempt to combat this, the EEWC-CFT argues for an alternative—but 
importantly still evangelical—approach to gender. On their website, the EEWC-CFT 
indicates both explicitly (in name) and implicitly—through various ideological 
affirmations—that it is an evangelical organization. It emphasizes its institutional 
evangelical history and its advocacy of several of the ideological hallmarks of 
evangelicalism discussed earlier (briefly: “conversionism, the belief that lives need to be 
changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a particular regard for 
the Bible; and crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross” [Eskridge, 
“Defining the Term”]). So the EEWC-CFT affirms that sin separates people from God; 
“that the gospel is good news for all people”; that “the Word of God, inspired by the Holy 
Spirit, . . . is a central guide and authority for Christian faith and life”; and emphasizes 
the simultaneous humanity and divinity of Jesus, along with the importance of his death 
and resurrection. Having established these evangelical credentials, they then argue (in 
direct contradiction to the Council) that their alternative stance on women’s equality 
derives from their evangelical ideology, namely the Bible’s authority: “EEWC affirms 
that the Bible supports the equality of the sexes”; “We proclaim God’s redemptive word 
on mutuality and active discipleship.”  
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Other alternative articulations have arisen to challenge evangelical institutions 
from within on the question of sexuality—OneWheaton, for example, is a local 
organization of Wheaton College alumni who came out to vocally support gay Christian 
students in 2010. Illustrating again the importance of the media, the group released and 
publicized its letters of support through a media campaign that included offering press 
copy on their website and providing links to the articles in the New York Times, Houston 
Chronicle, Newsweek, Christianity Today, and other major media outlets that reported on 
their campaign. A central location in the evangelical institution actually contributes to 
OneWheaton’s success, too; Wheaton’s evangelical reputation, discussed above, 
contributes to the visibility of OneWheaton’s campaign, something like the way the 
defection of high ranking Syrian officers is currently gaining more media attention than 
the far more regular defection of its common soldiers.  
Again, OneWheaton finds itself responding to official evangelicalism: forced to 
frame its agenda, first and foremost, oppositionally; but again this proves not merely a 
constraint, but in fact enables evangelicalism’s strategic redeployment. The first open 
letter begins, “Dear Wheaton Students, The recent chapel message on Sexuality and 
Wholeness and surrounding conversations may have left some of you feeling alienated, 
ashamed, and afraid . . . as a group of LGBTQ Wheaton alumni and allies, we’ve seen the 
devastating effects these words have had on ourselves and our loved ones” (“Dear 
Wheaton Students”). Here OneWheaton frames its agenda in the context of the 
devastating effects of official evangelicalism, represented here by Wheaton’s chapel 
message. Going further, the writers assert their own evangelical credibility by referencing 
their personal histories at Wheaton College. But they are leveraging, or redeploying, that 
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credibility as they assert their simultaneous LGBTQ identities or at least their 
commitment to supporting LGBTQ students. Citing their own negotiated position as an 
example of its possibility for other students, they write, “In our post-Wheaton lives, we 
have traversed the contradictions we once thought irreconcilable. Our sexuality has 
become an integral part of our broader pursuit of justice, compassion and love.” From 
this authoritative, negotiated position, OneWheaton affirms in part, “You are not tragic. 
Your desire for companionship, intimacy and love is not shameful. It is to be affirmed 
and celebrated just as you are to be affirmed and celebrated” (emphasis original).  
Seen over and over again, such framing indicates the extent to which the 
conservative evangelical account and the conservative evangelical institution are truly 
hegemonic, but also the ways in which official evangelicalism is being redeployed by 
those who want to transform religion. Official evangelicalism exerts normative pressure 
on all Christians within its range, but clearly alternative accounts can exert counter-
pressures and work to lend legitimacy to individuals who wish to practice their 
Christianity differently. Religious norms and accounts must be treated by writing scholars 
not as given, but as sites of struggle and potential tools for transformational action within 
the broader American religious community (and perhaps for those outside of it, who 
nevertheless are defined in relation to its norms).  
 
Emergent Evangelicalisms 
In addition to alternative formations, which compete with the hegemonic official 
evangelicalism for control over evangelical institutions and the evangelical public image 
(the hegemonic account), we can identify emergent evangelical formations that do not 
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necessarily display the coherence, articulacy, and organization of the Manifesto. These 
emergent formations, Raymond Williams explains, tend to appear at the level of the 
practical, and may or may not in the future rise to the level of alternative or official 
formations (125-7). This seems to have been the level that writers were pointing at when 
they wished to talk of religious students’ individual experience. But emergent formations, 
even if they are not entirely articulable, are nevertheless social. Practical consciousness 
must not be reduced to the individual, Williams writes: “It is this seizure that has 
especially to be resisted. For there is always, though in varying degrees, practical 
consciousness in specific relationships, specific skills, specific perceptions, that is 
unquestionably social and that a specifically dominant social order neglects, excludes, 
represses, or simply fails to recognize” (125). Not only are those practical relationships, 
skills, and perceptions social, but as such they are likely shared. While practical 
consciousness does refer to the ways that people’s individual relations to the official are 
inflected by their lived realities and complex relations to multiple formations, looking at 
emergent formations can help us highlight the shared components of that process. 
Williams points to the arts as a means of highlighting such emergent formations. I focus 
here on sociological studies describing an emergent evangelical formation, constituted in 
part by generational discursive differences, that seems evident among those under 30 
(and in our rhetoric and composition students, as indicated throughout Thomson’s study). 
It is certainly lacking the cohesiveness of an alternative formation, but nevertheless 
indicates a new source of growing practical resistance to the hegemonic account of 
evangelicalism and to official evangelicalism. It is, definitionally, emergent. 
 158 
While their official affiliations are not all that different from older generations, by 
almost all practical measures—belief, attitude, behavior—research finds that young 
Americans are consistently different from (and usually more liberal than) their elders. 
The Pew Forum’s U.S. Religious Landscape Survey finds, for example, that compared to 
35% of people over 65, 63% of young Americans feel that “Homosexuality should be 
accepted by society.” They also report that 55% of young Americans think “Evolution is 
the best explanation for human life” compared to 48% of the rest of the population and 
67% “prefer bigger government, more services” compared to 46% of the population at 
large. On religious issues, 74% of young Americans believe there is “more than one true 
way to interpret the teachings of my religion”—a number that fairly steadily decreases 
across age groups, falling to 59% in those over 65.  
Evangelicalism, despite all its ostensible conservatism, is no exception to these 
trends, either. Again according to the Pew Forum, 64% of young evangelicals believe 
there is “more than one true way to interpret the teachings of my own religion,” 
compared to 51% of those over 30; 39% of young evangelicals feel “Homosexuality 
should be accepted in society” compared to 24% of evangelicals over 30; and 65% of 
young evangelicals “prefer bigger government, more services,” compared to 36% of 
evangelicals over 30. Young Americans of all religious traditions are not only in conflict 
with insider/outsider representations of religion, but most are also in conflict with 
religion’s entrenched representatives and norms—represented here by elders who are 
more likely than the young to be politically, socially, and theologically conservative, to 
possess institutional authority, and to be construed as religious spokespersons. Together, 
they suggest an emergent formation.  
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In You Lost Me, Kinnaman describes this emergent formation by focusing on 
those of Christian background. Kinnaman finds, as I noted earlier, that “more than four 
out of five Americans under the age of eighteen will spend at least a part of their 
childhood, tween, or teenage years attending a [Protestant or Catholic] Christian 
congregation or parish” (22). But by the time that population is between 18-29, 59% will 
have “dropped out of attending church, after going regularly” (23), for an average of 
three years. Even if they do not leave religion for good, most young religious adherents 
seem to find themselves at the edges of organized religion. A full 50% of all Americans 
aged 18-29 with a Christian background agree that they have “been significantly 
frustrated about [their] faith,” and 32% “went through a period when [they] felt like 
rejecting [their] parents’ faith” (24). Kinnaman says that almost half of all young 
Americans from a Christian background (again, four fifths of the total 18-29 population, 
and a group not limited to evangelicals) exemplify at least some characteristics of what 
he calls an “exilic posture” towards Christianity. Exiles “are skeptical of [Christian] 
institutions but are not wholly disengaged from them” (77). They “want to participate in 
ministry outside of conventional forms of Christian community” (78), and are “Rejecting 
‘cultural Christianity’ to seek deeper faith in Christ” (83). Exiles feel “stuck between the 
security of the Christian subculture and the realities of life in today’s society” (83). Exiles 
are “Struggling to see how their faith connects to their calling or professional interests” 
(83). They are “Seeing the best in culture and desiring to redeem and renew it—
sometimes experiencing the worst in the church” (83). Exiles feel “fellow Christians—
particularly older believers—frequently have a hard time relating to their choices and 
concerns. . . . In fact, many times these young exiles end up staying under the radar, as 
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both fellow Christians and nonbelievers often misunderstand their faith and their calling” 
(78). Exiles “feel tremendous tension between their work, usually in mainstream arenas 
of society (the arts, media, science, fashion, law, and so on), and their faith” (80). Given 
all of this, it is unsurprising Kinnaman finds 33% of young Christians agree that “God is 
more at work outside the church than inside, and I want to be a part of that” (79), and 
29% agree that “I want to help the church change its priorities to be what Jesus intended 
it to be.” (79). The exilic subject position, at least as Kinnaman discursively constructs it, 
offers evidence of incredible tensions between: young religious practitioners experience 
significant conflict between various aspects of their lives and official manifestations of 
Christianity. This between-ness, really this performativity, marks both an “individual” 
subject position and a shared emergent formation that stands in a liminal relation to 
official evangelicalism. It is oppositional but participatory, simultaneously engaged and 
disengaged. 
We can see some references to Christian ideology in Kinnaman’s phrasing—some 
“doubt God,” some feel tension between their work and their “faith”—but seemingly 
more references to Christian culture—the church’s priorities, the Christian subculture, 
cultural Christianity—and to institutional Christianity—distinctions between inside and 
outside the church, difficulties with older church members, and references to institutional 
Christianity. Kinnaman explains that exilic Christians are, in fact, more concerned with 
the latter two: they are “deeply at odds with expressions of modern-day Christianity, 
which many would categorize as distortions or abuses of Christ’s teachings. In other 
words, some young adults doubt God—but for others, ‘doubt’ might best be described as 
a deep, visceral sense that the church today is not what it could or ought to be” (190). 
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As a result of these tensions, these exiles from church “feel isolated and alienated from 
the Christian community—caught between the church as it is and what they believe it is 
called to be” (77). Such constructions of “church” make room for exceptions—even the 
most disaffected young Americans tend to cite a different Christianity evidenced by 
someone like their parents. But the negative behaviors, experiences, and representations 
can be gathered discursively and organized as expressions of that nebulous Christianity 
(official evangelicalism) that cannot be said to exist coherently, but nevertheless must be 
acknowledged to fluidly and authoritatively exist in the imaginations and experiences of 
Americans in the form of Christian institutions and culture.  
This struggle to articulate a position against official evangelicalism, which we 
also saw in Thomson’s informants in the first chapter, seems to be echoed in part by 
James Bielo’s ethnographic work on the Emergent evangelical movement. Official 
evangelicalism operates as a forceful presence in Emergent evangelicalism in several 
forms. First, Bielo notes the Emergent movement explicitly rejects institutionalization: 
“there is no interest in establishing a denominational heritage, or extinguishing all ties to 
existing denominational structures. There is an active resistance to official statements of 
faith. There is an explicit resistance to viewing Emerging as a ‘movement’” (“The 
Emerging Church” 220). Second, Emergent evangelicals actually tend to construct their 
religious identities negatively: whereas conservative evangelicals are often characterized 
as purveyors of conversion narratives,12 Emergent evangelicals characteristically offer 
“deconversion” narratives, according to Bielo. As Bielo explains,  
Emerging Christians have an abiding dissatisfaction with how Christianity 
is imagined, lived, and discussed in 21st-century America. The result is an 
                                                
12 As simultaneously described and enacted by Rand (354-6). 
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abundance of talk about what and who they are turning away from, what 
forms of thought and practice they reject, and what they would just as 
soon see disappear from American Christian culture. The what and who of 
this deconversionist bent is primarily the conservative Evangelical 
establishment. Emerging Christians seem intent on not being mistaken as 
the latest incarnation of Bill Hybels or Rick Warren, not to mention more 
militant figures like Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, or James Dobson. (227) 
 
As I have been arguing, Bielo points out these deconversion narratives indicate that even 
this most powerful form of Emergent evangelicalism “relies heavily on the existing 
discourses of Evangelicalism” for its self-definition (228).  
Even beyond the Emergent church’s internal reliance on hegemonic discourse for 
self-definition, outside pressures on Emergents to conform to official evangelicalism are 
everywhere. This pressure becomes visible at several points. Some ideologically and 
culturally conservative evangelical churches take on the outward forms of the emergent 
church while retaining their conservative evangelicalisms; other evangelical churches and 
leaders have excluded the emergent church by questioning the Christian bona fides of its 
leaders and their doctrines (229-30). And of course, the official evangelical dispositions, 
ideologies, and social networks inculcated from childhood incline even those within 
alternative and emergent evangelicalisms back towards the hegemonic formation. These 
hegemonic pressures might partially account for the liminality and inarticulacy of the 
emergent formation I described above, and even for their fear of taking on a truly 
institutional character—they don’t trust themselves to institutionalize without losing the 
exilic posture to official evangelicalism that drives them. This suggests that it is perhaps 
too difficult for Emergents to disentangle “church” and “religion” from official 
evangelicalism. But Bielo also rightly notes that official evangelicalism’s antagonistic 
response indicates a destabilizing power structure: the dialogue surrounding it “indexes 
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the fact that Evangelical and Christian identity, and the terms that religious dialogue 
function on, are up for grabs in America and any analysis must grapple with this” (230).  
Most young Americans are not associated with this Emergent movement. But the 
Emergent church Bielo describes nevertheless seems to resonate with the swelling exilic 
formation described by Kinnaman and other researchers, and suggested at times by 
Thomson’s student informants. We certainly must not assume that religious students 
align perfectly with official evangelicalism or any other authorized position (including 
the Emergent church) with which they might be identified. But we should assume that 
religious students, like the writers of the Manifesto and Bielo’s Emergent Christians, are 
always acting in practical relation with the official evangelicalism disseminated by the 
popular media, other religious adherents, and academics. Official evangelicalism infuses 
their lives and their religious practice, even if only negatively. We would do well to 
remember how Thomson’s evangelical informants shape their behavior towards it and 
against it, they anticipate interactions on its basis, they feel fear and shame because of it. 
We must anticipate that their practices will never perfectly align with the official any 
more than anyone else’s will, and that in fact alternative and emergent formations will 
continue to constantly arise to resist the official institutions and the hegemonic account of 
any religion. Between these students’ lived experience of religion—beliefs, sensibilities, 
assumptions, behaviors—and popular representations of those forms of religion, there is a 
crucial and variable gap, a felt tension. This is the representational gap in which 
instructors must begin to work with their religious students—not only with Christians, 
but with all religious students who may feel unrepresented by the representations and 




The above should demonstrate that, contrary to our representational tendencies, 
religious formations like evangelicalism are heterogeneous and instable; continually beset 
by power struggles. Evangelicalism is not monolithic, but consists of numerous 
dominant, alternative, and emergent formations that fracture it into various partial 
evangelicalisms. As Bielo writes, even the privileged discourses and identities of 
“Evangelicalism” and “Christianity” are “up for grabs” (230), and we and students 
participate in the various ongoing power grabs, even if we don’t always recognize that or 
know how to articulate our positions. There are several factors confounding our ability to 
see this fluidity and these power struggles (and so, confounding our ability to develop the 
truly politically transformative pedagogies for which Stenberg has called). First, the 
groups—dominant or otherwise—that successfully articulate their positions tend to do so 
by positing homogeneous, stable, and essential accounts of Christianity or evangelicalism 
that of necessity attempt to elide the contingency and situatedness of their accounts. 
Second, the sedimentation of official evangelicalism within secular and religious 
ideological apparatuses, and within the bodies of religious insiders and outsiders, causes 
the powerful accounts to seem natural and given. Third, alternative and emergent 
evangelicals perpetuate the authority of homogenizing and stable official accounts by 
citing them to articulate their own positions—in a sense, the success of alternative 
articulations ironically depends on the continued stability, recognizability, and 
“citability” of that which they oppose. In sum, official evangelicalism successfully 
operates within a number of unstable ideological apparatuses to sediment a “stable” 
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position for itself in American society. But none of that makes it immune to change—in 
fact, hegemony’s dependence upon continued social participation makes religious 
formations like evangelicalism wildly susceptible to change.  
Given the critical role of power relations and material conditions in constituting 
evangelicalism and other religions, anthropologists studying religion in recent years have 
worked to develop theoretical frameworks that can highlight the actual mechanisms of 
transmission and transformation at work in ideological apparatuses. So in chapter five, I 
forward several terms offered by anthropologists who study religion. Each describes a 
particular structuring force that simultaneously maintains and disrupts the hegemony of 
official religions, thus helping to produce the alternative and emergent religious 
formations I’ve described. The terms I’ve selected are definition, mediation, and 
sensation. These frames promise not only to be academically, but also politically useful: 
if we can identify the contingent processes by which religions are continually formed and 
transformed, then we can also see how such normative pressures and hegemonic accounts 
might be de-stabilized, and how actions might be taken to deliberately challenge both the 
account and those relations. I will discuss how students and instructors can effectively 









 MATERIAL TERMS FOR WRITING ON RELIGION 
 
I established in chapters three and four that the vast majority of American 
religious students experience—and recognize—significant dissonance between their lived 
religious practices and the hegemonic account of religion that is connected with 
evangelicalism. That hegemonic account constructs religious practitioners as religious 
reactionaries and contemporary foundationalists. In contrast, studies suggest that in terms 
of belief, attitude, and behavior, religious practitioners are vastly more tolerant and more 
moderate—socially, religiously, and politically—than official evangelicalism and the 
hegemonic account would suggest. These pervasive disaffections and struggles over 
representation offer writing instructors our major opportunity for political intervention in 
today’s religious climate. They indicate that many Christians are motivated to practice 
and represent Christianity differently—in fact, to practice Christianity in myriad ways 
that often partially align with our critical ideals—and are struggling to find ways to do so. 
If we desire to efficiently promote and practice tolerance among religious adherents, we 
must focus on helping this massive population that is struggling for the same goals (in 
addition to challenging the thirteen percent of our students who probably are fully 
opposed to them). A few things have held us back from accomplishing this.  
One obstacle holding us back has been the issue of respect—I discuss in chapter 
two how writing scholars have often worried about balancing change with respect 
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through our pedagogies for religious students (Carter; Perkins; DePalma; Vander Lei; 
Downs). But Soliday has rightly argued that we presume too much by assuming 
responsibility for students’ decisions over “hybridizing and assimilating” (518). An 
instructor’s responsibility is not to decide how students should relate to any of the 
dominant discourses in their lives—it is to give students the opportunity to examine these 
choices for themselves. Soliday recommends an approach that allows “those ‘others’ of 
the academic landscape hitherto largely represented by teachers speaking on their 
behalf—themselves to enter into and influence the contemporary debates surrounding 
multicultural education” (513). Students have a right to offer an account of, belong to, 
become transformed by, and in turn transform those other discourses to which they are 
engaged in conflicted and committed relations (522). So rather than making decisions for 
students, writing classes should help students “wrestle with the kind of relationship to 
dominant discourses a writer wants to imagine for herself” (520) as they themselves 
“[contend] with complicated affective and social issues of translation” (519). To my 
mind, finding ways of reading and responding to students’ acts of religious discourse that 
will help them to do this sort of wrestling offers one compelling answer to Howard 
Tinberg’s questions in the 2013 CCCC Call for Program Proposals: “In what sense is 
writing public work?” and “How might our research be put to public use?” 
Our tendency to treat religious and academic discourses “as discrete, stable, 
internally uniform and linked indelibly to what is held to be each writer’s likewise stable 
and uniform location and social identity” (Lu and Horner, “Translingual Literacy” 
forthcoming) has proven a second obstacle to effective pedagogy. We must better 
acknowledge that no one discourse holds monolithic sway over public spaces like the 
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writing classroom—or the church sanctuary. As Soliday explains, speaking of the 
classroom, “outsider” discourses always push back against “insider” academic ones. 
“[T]he outsider’s own language overlaps, conflicts with, shapes, and is shaped by 
insider’s language; movements between worlds take on a liminal rather than dichotomous 
character . . . students and teachers begin to see their languages as mutually shaping” 
(522). Recognizing these intersections between students and discourses in the classroom 
space, Soliday hopes students come to see themselves as “rooted in other cultures yet also 
belonging to, becoming transformed by, and in turn transforming school cultures” (522). 
Religious discourse is already in the classroom and shaping academic discourse—we 
don’t have to bring them together, and we can’t keep them separate.  
Correspondingly, no one discourse can be assumed to hold monolithic sway over 
students; Soliday points out that students are “writers with multiple and sometimes 
conflicting commitments, aspirations, and choices” (522). Allowing students to contend 
and wrestle for themselves with their relationships to dominant discourses becomes not 
only desirable, but necessary, when we acknowledge this complexity of relations between 
and within students, religious discourses, and academic discourses; it becomes even more 
necessary when we acknowledge the complexity introduced into the classroom space by 
the “outside” formations we, our students, and our texts carry into the classroom. We are 
always operating within the mutually interfering webs of Asad’s “complex space” 
(Formations 178-79). So a third obstacle, as I suggest throughout the dissertation, has 
been our failure to fully attend to the potential internal conflicts between students and 
religious discourses—many of which are created by student’s conflicted and multiple 
discursive identities.  
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Most Americans, I argue in the above chapters, today must operate in relation to 
official evangelicalism and its norms, lending it credence and perpetuating its authority 
by re-activating it in their perceptions, their conversations, and even in their own 
alternative or excluded social, political or ir/religious practices. Because of this 
hegemonic situation, even the majority of students and instructors who do or would 
practice religion differently tend to share many of the same negative conceptions and 
experiences of American religion described by those who do not practice religion. They 
are always, if not self-consciously, responding to their sense of the positions of the 
authoritative spokespersons as those positions have been circulated through mass media 
and other ideological institutions such as family, the local church, college classrooms, 
and the entertainment industry. Such representational difficulties are only compounded 
for students by our blindness to the pressures our own academic discourses bring to bear.  
If we are going to encourage students to bring their religiously inflected 
perspectives and experiences into the classroom, we need to recognize these constraints 
on students’ abilities to write about them. Neither preservationist nor assimilative logics 
of inclusion can fully address the complexities of actual relations within and between 
students, religious discourses, and academic discourses. A key challenge for instructors, 
as I see it, is locating new ways of reading and responding to acts of religious discourse, 
particularly ways of reading and responding that are neither 1) immediately and 
necessarily counter to students’ current positions nor 2) caught up in the hegemonic 
accounts and logics of religion forwarded by official evangelicalism (and at times by our 
own scholarship). I cite Soliday throughout the dissertation because in her discussions of 
autoethnography and translation, she seems to be forwarding a critical strategy for 
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accomplishing the approach for which I’m looking: creating strangeness. By reading and 
responding to even the most seemingly conventional religious discourses in the relatively 
strange or estranging terms I will suggest below, both students and instructors may have 
the opportunity to move into new and potentially transformative relations with religion, 
and to deliberate on how they want to proceed with these new possibilities. Rather than 
re-entering familiar scenes from familiar angles where the battle lines are already drawn, 
this gives students and instructors the opportunity to approach sites of religious and 
academic conflict, and religious texts and discourses more generally, from new 
productive angles. This strategy for working with religious students is not new: it has 
already been forwarded, to some degree, by Perkins, Carter, and Stenberg. But I see two 
ways in which my project differs from earlier attempts.  
First, I understand this chapter as an extension of their work that more fully 
addresses official evangelicalism’s hegemonic force in structuring students’ and 
instructors’ relations to religion. So I draw on contemporary scholarship in anthropology 
and sociology to offer several new strange terms—definition, mediation, and sensation—
that can help us read and respond to students’ religious discourse in ways that address, 
deflect, and transform official evangelicalism’s force. I take significant time throughout 
the chapter to demonstrate how this might work: after introducing each term, I outline the 
official evangelical ideological account of each term, discussing the misreadings these 
official accounts encourage and the power relations such misreadings maintain. I then 
spend the bulk of each section re-reading previously published texts from religious 
students in our composition classrooms to demonstrate how reading and responding to 
students’ texts with these new religious terms might open up spaces for deliberation and 
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transformation in those students’ texts and in their relations to official evangelicalism 
(whatever those relations might be).  
The second difference I see between my transformational approach and those 
forwarded by previous scholars is my application of translingualism to the topic. 
Translingual scholars pay close attention to the negotiations that occur between various 
competing and conflicting discourses and languages—what I would describe as trans-
formational events—and call student and instructor attention to both the risks and 
affordances of such transformational action—many of which inform my critique of 
extant disciplinary approaches to religion in chapter two. As Horner and Lu explain in 
“Translingual Literacy,” translingual approaches aim to use writing to not only respect 
and include students’ multiple personal discursive resources traditionally undervalued in 
the classroom, but to develop students’ capacities for actively shaping and reshaping the 
very languages, identities, and social relations playing a key role in their writing and 
learning. So instead of merely asking students to bring religiously-inflected resources into 
the writing classroom, translingual approaches to religion will challenge students to 
explore how and why they are interested in employing such resources, and to consider 
how they might best go about re-creating and transforming their religious experiences, 
identities, and communities in the process of writing about them. By bringing 
anthropological lenses together with translingual lenses as a way to re-examine our 
students’ texts and propose transformational strategies for responding to their acts of 
religious discourse, I hope to demonstrate how we might respond in ways that can prove 
truly “politically transformative” for our students. 
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One pragmatic note should be offered about these strategies and how I imagine 
their actual employment in the classroom. Without ever explicitly asking students to 
write a significant essay on religion, over the past decade I have received numerous 
essays from students that nevertheless either referenced religious discourse or offered a 
full-blown account of a particular religion. I have been explicitly witnessed to by students 
analyzing sources of major transformation in their lives; I have received traditional 
“argumentative” essays challenging and supporting abortion, birth control, and even 
homosexuality (just homosexuality, not gay marriage) largely on the basis of religious 
evidence; I have received research essays attempting to make a case for atheism or 
counter Islamophobia; and as mentioned in chapters one and two, I have received an 
autoethnographic piece exploring the role of religion in the lives of African-American 
women, while another recounted a student’s personal experience of religious violence in 
Pakistan.  
My working assumption, then, is that while my strategies could be useful to those 
who wish to design a religiously-themed course or assignment sequence—I provide a 
number of texts and substantive themes that could facilitate those projects—a greater 
number of instructors are likely to come across religious discourse in irregular and 
unpredictable ways, for which they are less likely to be prepared. Those instructors who 
encounter religion in their classroom unexpectedly need a variety of strategies for reading 
and responding to religious students and texts, and my discussions below are largely 
geared towards such situations. The previous two chapters should illustrate how and why 
many of our conventional ways of reading and responding to religion (described in 
chapter two) are actually disciplined by official evangelicalism, as are many of our 
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students’ conventional ways of representing religion. We need new ways of reading and 
responding because otherwise such encounters with religious discourse will draw out our 
habitual responses and habitual readings, reinforcing the polarizing situation described in 
my first chapter. So in each section of this chapter I present a new way of reading and 
responding to students’ acts of religious discourse, hoping such re-readings might in turn 
help students discover new ways of representing and enacting religious discourse.  
 
I. Translingualism and Transformationalism 
Translingualism, as it has been recently defined in writing scholarship, represents 
a re-conceptualization of language similar to Asad’s formational re-conceptualization of 
religion. Asad points out that recognizing religion’s inessentiality causes us to ask how 
historical conditions make religion, thus exposing the power relations structuring religion 
that would otherwise remain hidden beneath a veneer of a-historical permanence. The 
same principle is at work in translingualism: languages are viewed as “always emergent, 
in process (a state of becoming), and their relations as mutually constitutive” (Lu and 
Horner, “Translingual”). This recognition of the inherent instability of social things like 
languages or cultures depends, as we’ve already seen in the cases of religion and gender, 
upon performative definitions of those things.13 As Lu and Horner explain, a 
                                                
13 This correspondence between Asad’s treatment of religion and translingualism is not 
merely analogous: in fact, discursive differences such as those between academic and 
religious discourses can represent the sorts of differences within a “single language” that 
Pennycook and other proponents of translingualism have marked for attention under the 
term “semiodiversity” (as opposed to “glossodiversity,” which refers to differences 
between languages) (Pennycook 97). Thus, we might imagine that the principles of 
translingual writing pedagogy are not only relevant, but in fact directly applicable, to 
issues of religious difference (although that is not to say that they won’t require some 
degree of translation).  
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“translingual approach shifts attention to matters of agency—the ways in which 
individual language users fashion and re-fashion standardized conventions, subjectivity, 
the world, and their relations to others and the world” (“Translingual”). 
Pennycook explains these central aspects of translingualism cogently in Language 
as Local Practice, drawing a parallel between Butler’s notion of performative identity 
and gender and his own conception of language (46-8). Butler articulates this 
performative logic, also discussed in chapters one and four, most clearly in the following 
quotation.  
Because there is neither an “essence” that gender expresses or externalizes 
nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a 
fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those 
acts, there would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that 
regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform, 
produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is 
obscured by the credibility of those productions—and the punishments 
that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction that 
“compels” our belief in its necessity and naturalness. (Gender Trouble 
140)  
 
Like Butler’s conception of gender and Asad’s conception of religion, translingualism 
sees languages and discourses as only existing through their repeated performance—that 
is, they depend upon new iterations, or uses, for their continuing existence. Language is 
practiced and social: performed over and over and passed from individual to individual 
in a process of “sedimentation” (Gender Trouble 163). From this perspective, to briefly 
rehearse an argument I’ve already made, ideal and stable constructions of a language or 
discourse—“English,” “evangelicalism”—paradoxically depend upon human action for 
their stability. This is the active, social process Pennycook calls “practice” by which 
actions become habituated, repeated in a variety of settings by a variety of users, and can 
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come to be both recognized (and therefore socially valuable) but also misrecognized as 
natural, stable, essential (46-8).  
On this view of language, there is no ideal or essential core—the real English—
existing somewhere, but only ever a set of practical realizations that “real-ize” English. 
Pennycook argues that even more progressive notions of overlapping languages or 
changing languages, by maintaining somewhere the concept of discrete languages, 
participate in hegemonic logics by falsely positing cores and peripheries as well as norms 
and variations that do not in fact exist (49-50, 132; see also Lu and Horner, 
“Translingual”). Languages themselves must be understood as linguistic constructs 
dependent upon their own repetition for credibility and authority. That words have fixed 
meanings is a naturalizing perception produced by the constant connection of a word with 
a meaning; that languages have discrete boundaries is a naturalizing perception produced 
by ATMs that offer discrete language choices and academic courses of work in 
“Mandarin” and “Spanish.”  
Attempts to remedy this through ever-greater specificity, like isolating Standard 
Edited American English or Engrish, will not find a fixed or homogeneous language there 
either, because these varieties are not any more stable than their broader counterparts. 
More accurately, researchers may find a fixed language variety, but only because they 
themselves have produced it in their research by highlighting the partial homogeneities 
and partial fixities that they found. Thus, there are not “languages,” which would suggest 
a count-noun and thus a countable, finite set of individual languages—instead, there is 
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only “language,” something more like “water”, which is not a count-noun,14 or better we 
could say there is only “languaging,” the act of using language that is constitutive of the 
language process and its sedimentation. There are always and only the ways that people 
practice language—writing it down, exchanging it vocally, thinking with it. This renders 
language entirely dependent upon users for its continued stability and thus subject to 
change through errors, copies, break-downs, alienation, lying, fiction, invention for new 
purposes, etc. 
Such performative conceptions of language assign users two forms of agency. 
First, there is a practical, if not conscious, agency in that language users here are active 
agents who create, change, and perpetuate the languages they use with every use. This is 
best expressed in the concept of iteration—the perpetual rupturing of language 
introduced by its repeated performance over time in an always-new context. Every 
performance of language (across space and time) necessarily introduces its forms into a 
new set of relations: perhaps into conflicting discourses which use that language form 
differently; into alternative “genres” which may authorize, revise, or reject a particular 
use; into social categories involving race, gender, class, or even religion where its 
meaning may become split or diffuse for different users; into new activities where it may 
take on an entirely new relevance or use. Even if I say the same words to the same 
interlocutor in the same location twice, still, time has introduced change—neither I, nor 
my interlocutor, nor our location, is exactly the same (not to mention that the previous 
iteration, remembered, will also impact the words’ meanings in subsequent iterations). 
All of these mean that the everyday practice of language inherently re-contextualizes and 
                                                
14 That analogy could be taken further, but doing so brings added and unnecessary 
complications. 
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transforms language as new meanings and uses accrete and old meanings and uses 
change or drop out, quite outside of any specific intention to create such change. 
Languages change, in other words, because they are practical and always in process—
lived out within the flow of everyday practices that are never ideal. As Pennycook notes 
and Lu and Horner re-iterate, one cannot step into the same river twice, and you can’t say 
the same thing twice (50; “Translingual”). Within such flows of time and space, 
constancy and stability are impossible.  
Second, performative representations of discourse raise the possibility that 
language users can strategically participate in changing their languages. This possibility 
that individuals could want to change the discourse arises through the conflicts and 
instabilities described above—from the differences between discourses, the dissonance 
created by our multiple commitments and multiply-constituted identities, the differences 
between lived experiences using a discourse and the official norms of a discourse 
endorsed by those in power, between experiences, between experiences and desires, 
desires and discourses. Such conflicts present the impetus for language’s negotiation and 
re-negotiation in each interaction, and language’s dependence on practice makes those re-
negotiations possible. We can see this chain of logic in “Language Difference in Writing: 
Toward a Translingual Approach” where Horner, Lu, Royster and Trimbur write,  
learning language is necessarily continuous precisely because language is 
subject to variation and change. Further, we recognize that language 
learners are also language users and creators. Thus, mastery must be 
redefined to include the ability of users to revise the language that they 
must also continuously be learning—to work with and on, not just within, 
what seems its conventions and confines. (307) 
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Representing social entities as unstable because dependent upon practice for existence, 
then, doubly makes room for agency and change in our understanding of language.15 
But this recognition of change and agency does not negate the operations of 
power detailed at length in chapters three and four: while instability is central to 
translingual approaches because it enables a re-conceptualization of possibilities for 
agency, power still flows through this practical sedimentation process, constraining those 
possibilities. First, this occurs through the situated repetitions by which some forms and 
uses come to be repeated, valued, and normalized. Norms and conventions are 
continually and actively produced, disseminated, and reproduced by those who act in 
relation to that language or discourse, whether from the inside or outside. The privileged 
forms and practices move through the ideological apparatuses I describe in chapter 
three—through popular media, education, and politics, but also through quotidian social 
relations in ways that transform individuals into agents of the hegemonic (regardless of 
intention).16  
And again, there’s the probability of misrecognition: as the ubiquity of those 
particular practices increases, their specific historical and authoritative roots come to be 
obscured by generalized practice and the new rationales assigned to them by those who 
take up the practice. I illustrate in chapter three that this misrecognition is often effected 
through hegemonic accounts that explicitly naturalize, homogenize, and idealize certain 
                                                
15 The same is true when a practical account of religion or culture is used, as we learned 
through Sherif’s account at the beginning of chapter four. The Muslim women Sherif 
studies creatively respond to economic- and class-related pressures by re-negotiating 
gender roles—even finding ways to do so within the bounds of their religious 
formation—and thus work with, on, and within the confines and conventions of their 
specific context to achieve their desires. 
16 Sometimes, even as individuals or communities explicitly look to work against the 
hegemonic. 
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privileged practices—this is how Pennycook views the notion of “languages,” as I 
explain above. Together, hegemonic practices and accounts lead to misrecognizing a 
temporary social structure as permanent and transcendent—and thus slow down actual 
change. So translingual pedagogies attempt to recognize again what the hegemonic 
account covers up—the heterogeneity, conflict, and change necessitated by practical 
processes of cultural reproduction; those processes of reproduction; and the accounts that 
naturalize those processes.  
 
Translingual Strategies 
To be clear, the translingual approach to writing not only looks to acknowledge 
linguistic instability, but also focuses on making political use of that instability. For 
translingual scholars, “the ideal user of English is . . . attentive to the capacities, rights 
and necessity of change in all living things: people, their life, society, culture, the world, 
and the language itself” (Lu and Horner, “Resisting” 151). But the ideal user is not only 
attentive to instability, but active in creating and using it: the ideal translingual writer will 
“map and order, remap and reorder conditions and relations surrounding their practices, 
as they address the potential discrepancies between the official and practical” (Lu and 
Horner, “Translingual”). We can see two examples of this de-stabilizing approach in 
familiar critical works from outside of translingualism.  
Raymond Williams speaks of de-stabilizing “tradition,” which he calls “the most 
evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures and limits” (115). To 
Williams, tradition is always “selective tradition: an intentionally selective version of a 
shaping past and a pre-shaped present, which is then powerfully operative in the process 
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of social and cultural definition and identification” (115). Getting a particular form of 
language, gender construction, or religious tradition passed off as the “ideal,” or “’the 
tradition’, ‘the significant past’” is one of hegemony’s “decisive processes,” Williams 
says, by which a contemporary order gains “historical and cultural ratification” (115-16). 
So Williams suggests historical research on alternative traditions—“the recovery of 
discarded areas, or the redress of selective and reductive interpretations” (116). This 
strategy will come up again below.  
Butler, alternatively, suggests tactically subversive performance and the strategic 
highlighting of such de-stabilizing performances:  
The abiding gendered self will then be shown to be structured by repeated 
acts that seek to approximate the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, 
but which, in their occasional discontinuity, reveal the temporal and 
contingent groundlessness of this “ground.” The possibilities of gender 
transformation are to be found precisely in the arbitrary relation between 
such acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic 
repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a 
politically tenuous construction. (Gender Trouble 164) 
 
In both cases the key to effecting strategic change is believed to lie in de-stabilizing and 
de-naturalizing official representations of social givens that must be shown to be 
“historical, variable, and negotiable” (Horner, Lu, Royster, and Trimbur 311).  
As I note above, to accomplish this destabilization in matters of language 
difference translingual scholars like Lu and Horner suggest helping students learn to map 
existing conditions, recognize their practical instability, and take advantage of the 
instability to re-order those conditions—often by focusing on processes of translation. 
For instance, as I explain in chapter two, when students are asked to translate from one 
language or discourse into another, they are confronted with the opacity of words and the 
constraints of any one discourse’s representation of “reality” and “experience.” As 
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students translate, they are forced to select new words from among a set of partially 
adequate choices, leaving some meanings and subtle nuances out of the new translation 
while drawing in new ones. Further, these translations are made in the context of the 
unequal power relations between discourses that are particular to that setting: these 
selections are made because someone has asked for the translation; because some 
privilege or reward or punishment will be attached to its performance or failure; because 
peers will respond (or are expected to respond) in particular ways to certain discourses, 
languages, or experiences. And while a pragmatist or accommodationist approach might 
emphasize the utility and benefits of producing the finished translation, a truly 
translingual approach will ask students to contemplate the remainders, we might say—the 
losses, inefficiencies, and injustices also produced by the process. Ideally, by focusing 
student attention on the process and its by-products (and not only the document that 
results) students see how each of these discourses or languages bring limitations and new 
meaning potentials not available in the other, but also how power works through such 
processes. They will see, we might say, the tensions between the official account of 
academic writing as a clear, rational, beneficial, and appropriate choice; and the practical, 
lived realities of academic writing as a forced, contradictory, obscuring behavior. 
In “The Place of World Englishes in Composition,” Canagarajah describes a 
second sort of translingual strategy, code-meshing, in which students work to incorporate 
multiple languages into a single document rather than “translating” one into another 
(598). As I see it, the value here lies in the way students negotiate that incorporation with 
readers who also must bring some labor to the negotiation (609-10). The way such 
incorporations are invested in relations of power, and the responsibilities of readers and 
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writers in such negotiations, becomes apparent when writers and readers discuss whether 
or not a foreign word must be defined for readers, for instance. Ideally, at least, 
responsibility for the labor and success of a translinguistic encounter lies with all the 
participants—not just the “foreigner.” Students should be asked to deliberate upon the 
process itself, to discuss its challenges and interrogate (that is, map and re-map) their own 
socially-specific assumptions about etiquettes, or responsibilities, or what makes a 
linguistic transaction successful, for instance. If this happens, then asking students to 
perform “translingually” in these ways helps them to not only see, but also to enter into 
negotiating, the work and power of language use.  
A third type of translation returns us to autoethnographic pedagogies, discussed in 
chapter one. These strategically incorporate (translate) personal experience into academic 
conversations in order to challenge hegemonic accounts and discourses. Throughout 
“Translating Self and Difference,” Soliday argues that writing on experience can help 
students act within their lived conditions by highlighting, deliberating on, and intervening 
in the contingent and culturally-situated forces that shape those experiences. Similarly, 
Lu and Horner set two goals for classroom uses of students’ experience in “The 
Problematic of Experience”: first, “to make productive use of, rather than dismiss, the 
challenges students’ lived experience poses for the teachers’ discursive understanding of 
that experience” but also “to involve the student as well as the teacher in politicizing the 
students’ experience” (267). We use experience autoethnographically, in other words, for 
the dual purposes of identifying and transforming hegemonic accounts of discourses, and 
for identifying and transforming our lived relations to those discourses. This sort of use 
of personal experience extends beyond the constructing or expressing of the self to 
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participate in cultural definition and cultural representation through the de-naturalization 
of experiences and in turn cultural forces. 
This, of course, requires reading and writing strategies for de-naturalizing 
(making strange) experience. That is, for locating the contingent and culturally specific 
aspects of experiences. Soliday explains what this achieves: “By foregrounding their 
acquisition and use of language as a strange and not natural process, authors of literacy 
narratives have the opportunity to explore the profound cultural force language exerts in 
their everyday lives” (511). She uses, for example, a story of an Irish man’s violent 
acquisition of literacy to point out how “his story achieves maximum tellability in 
rendering strange one of the most seemingly mundane events of our lives” (514). This 
happens, first, when “like an ethnographer, the narrator assumes that something as 
seemingly natural as learning to write in school is not a neutral event but is itself a 
meaningful social drama” (514). Another means of doing so Soliday suggests is through 
shifts in time: “If writers construct their interpretation of past events from the vantage 
point of a particular present, then the life story becomes a dialogical account of one’s 
experience rather than a chronological report of verifiable events” (514). Soliday explains 
that deliberation on the discursive shaping of experience is another key to this 
politicization of experience: “successful narrators acknowledge that their life stories can 
be composed or deliberately constructed renderings of experience” (514)—in other 
words, the choices involved in telling about experience create the meaning and offer 
opportunities for experience to be politicized in the telling (514)—to reinterpret 
ostensibly neutral experience “from the vantage point of a critical present” (515). The 
introduction of these deliberations on experience can lead to the de-naturalization of 
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supposed cultural givens like experience’s expressive relation to representation and 
autonomous relation to culture.  
Summarizing the principles of the translingual approach enacted in all of these 
particular strategies, Lu and Horner offer three generalizable pedagogical tacks for 
accomplishing translingual work:  
1) foregrounding the sedimented nature of social and discursive practices; 
2) examining the processes of recontextualization involved in iterations of 
conventional ways of doing language; 3) considering the possible short 
and long term consequences, often unintended and not always 
immediately observable, that individual instances of recontextualization 
might bring to conventions iterated, the contexts of iteration, and the 
subjectivity and the life of the person using them. (“Translingual”) 
 
While I don’t articulate a comprehensive pedagogy below, the reading strategies I 
forward attempt to follow these basic principles of translingual pedagogy. I begin from 
the acknowledgement that all student uses of religiously inflected values, experiences, 
commitments, texts, or genres in the classroom are trans-formational acts whereby 
multiple formations and power relations collide, and change and creativity result. I also 
assume it is our responsibility to help students deliberate on the forces, processes, and 
consequences of those acts of transformation in which we ask them to engage. Put into 
the transformational terms of this dissertation, those reading strategies might be rendered 
in this way: 
1. Map: Ask students to locate and deliberate on cultural forces that shape their 
religious experience, and to map out how they participate in those;  
2. De-stabilize: Challenge students to locate the conflict, change, and heterogeneity 
within religion and religious experience by drawing students’ practical experience 
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of enacting their religion into comparison with official accounts of that religion 
for the purposes of interrogating both; 
3. Re-map: Emphasize sites for student choice, intervention, and creativity in their 
religious and academic contexts (specifically, through acts of representation), and 
encourage deliberation on the process and consequences of those choices. 
 
Transformational Strategies for Reading and Responding to Religious Discourse 
In the rest of this chapter, I propose three new terms instructors can employ in 
reading and responding to acts of religious discourse. I believe each term—whether 
brought to bear individually or in concert—offers instructors and students alternative 
means of mapping, destabilizing, and re-mapping religious formations through writing 
and reading. Drawn and conceptualized largely in terms of anthropological and 
sociological research, my terms are purposely chosen for their ability to counter specific 
aspects of our hegemonic accounts of religion—largely connected to official 
evangelicalism—that make religion’s practical instability difficult for scholars, 
instructors, and students to see. For example, official evangelicalism and its account of 
religion often focus attention on consciousness: beliefs, language, and the behaviors that 
properly express these beliefs. So my terms are intended to help students and instructors 
attend to how religious discourses work to shape and adhere to individuals on other 
levels: informing not just conscious belief but also sensibilities, attitudes, assumptions, 
and behaviors. And because official evangelicalism centers its attention on the Bible as 
God’s word, the terms I’ve selected help students and instructors identify how religious 
formations depend on material forms other than language—including bodies and 
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objects—to produce, maintain, and transmit religious practice over time. This avoids a 
direct confrontation over a valued belief while shifting attention to aspects of religious 
practice that are immanent and more obviously subject to constant change. By focusing 
on “inessential” religious practices rather than “essential” ideas, students and instructors 
may be able to more comfortably identify and analyze variations and changes in religious 
formations—how individuals change, how discourses change—thus countering reifying 
tendencies towards static, unchanging depictions.  
These potential shifts in instructors’ readings and students’ representations of 
religion, however, are not important simply because they might de-stabilize received 
Western notions of religion by talking about bodies, objects, and processes. They are 
important because they can help instructors highlight specific avenues of student action 
and creativity. The responses I imagine here encourage students to create representations 
of religious discourses as entirely dependent upon ongoing relationships between 
individuals, things, and language that will perpetuate, challenge, conform to, re-
appropriate, and ultimately alter the religious discourses themselves. Moreover, the 
responses I suggest encourage students to contemplate specific, concrete changes they 
might introduce into their religious practices and religious communities. Attending to and 
highlighting students’ religious agency should be a crucial concern for us, given the 
perceived lack of agency expressed by the religious students I described in chapters one, 
three, and four; it should be even more of a concern as we read the representations of 
religious experience and communities offered by religious students later in this chapter. 
Students need multiple new ways into expressing and altering their own religious 
discourse; instructors need multiple new ways to respectfully address and even challenge 
 187 
aspects of students’ religiously inflected perspectives, experiences, and communities 
about which they may be skeptical.  
 
II. The Transformational Work of Definition in Representational Formations  
If privileged religious terms like Christianity, Islam and evangelicalism are taken 
to refer to historical formations whose stable boundaries and essential cores are actually 
constantly contested, then one of the first channels by which power operates in these 
formations is boundary work—that is, acts of definition. While boundary work occurs on 
all levels—as evidenced by Sherif’s informants donning of the hijab, which is useful for 
the women precisely because wearing the hijab is seen as a definitively Muslim 
behavior—language must be considered as a formational component of religion because 
implicit and explicit definitions do not merely describe religious formations but actually 
participate in shaping them. As foregoing chapters should demonstrate, even ostensibly 
meta-discursive definitions (like religion as a historical formation) form religious 
formations. Often, an “essence” of a religion is declared in order to determine the 
exclusionary boundaries of the social group, whether in ideological or coercive senses (as 
seen above in Southern Baptist Seminary’s employment requirements).  
Such acts of definition take place in legal arenas, too: those definitions can 
actually disable certain practices of religion while enabling others. In chapter one I 
mentioned one example of this from Greece, where individuals were not allowed to keep 
their religious affiliation on “identity” cards despite their protests—thus enforcing a 
definition of religion and of identity as individual. In order to declare that keeping 
religious affiliation on an identity card would amount to the violation of those desirous 
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individuals’ civil rights, but removing it would not, the government declared religion 
(and identity) an individual, private matter, that therefore cannot be violated by lack of 
access to particular forms of separation, including communal identity. So an official and 
“secular” definition of religion, motivated by a question of legal practice, decided 
through a structure of legal channels, and made significant through state apparatuses that 
enabled its coercive enforcement—all of this recorded and disseminated through the 
medium of language—shaped the individual and collective practice of religion in Greece 
(Asad, Formations 139-40).  
Anthropologist Webb Keane uses the notion of representational economy to 
describe these transformational connections between practices, ideas, and language. It is 
not only the definition of religion that causes changes in religious practice: accepted 
definitions of any aspect of the religious formation can change related practices. He 
writes, “ideas and the practices they involve have not only logical but also causal effects 
on one another across a potentially wide range of apparently distinct social fields. They 
are parts of what we would call a representational economy” (Christian Moderns 18).  
In “God is Nothing but Talk,” Joel Robbins depicts one such representational 
economy by exploring the prayer practices of the Urapmin (905-7). Prior to mass 
conversions to Christianity, the Urapmin generally believed others’ thoughts were 
entirely undiscoverable. Language by definition could not represent thought (906). But 
the introduction of a form of Christianity reminiscent of evangelicalism that puts a 
premium on sincerity in language provoked the Urapmin to alter their practices to 
accommodate this new value (905). They negotiated a solution in which God was an 
invisible auditor to Christian prayer, and could assure the sincerity of the person praying. 
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Thus, in a situation where two Urapmin men were feuding, a public prayer of apology, 
performed in church, was accepted as sincere and ended the feud: an apology offered in 
any other discursive mode would have been considered suspect (907-8). New attitudes 
towards sincerity introduced by representatives of a different formation shifted the 
representational economy of the Urapmin’s religious formation and necessitated new 
practices of reconciliation; new assumptions about and practical relations with God 
enabled this new conciliatory strategy to be successful, even as the Urapmin’s conception 
of the relationship between language and thought transformed the Western religious 
practices they took up.  
To offer just one more example, Saba Mahmood’s argument in “Religious Reason 
and Secular Affect” uses the Danish cartoon controversy of a few years ago to point out 
how definitional assumptions about signs can enter trans-formational interactions in ways 
that can limit agency and delegitimize religious experience. Mahmood convincingly 
argues that Westerners’ bafflement at Muslim pain and anger over cartoon 
representations of Muhammed “presuppose a semiotic ideology in which signifiers are 
arbitrarily linked to concepts, their meaning open to people’s reading in accord with a 
particular code they share between them” (841). It is only because they detach material 
causality from semiotic forms, Mahmood argues, that modern Western semiotic 
ideologies can suggest “Muslims agitated by the cartoons exhibit an improper reading 
practice” (844). That Western response and its assumptions are most obviously at 
evidence in the arguments “it’s just a damn cartoon,” and its more recent instantiation 
“it’s just a movie,” spoken in response to the fatal backlash against the “Innocence of 
Muslims” video. Mahmood points out that this “impoverished understanding of images, 
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icons, and signs . . . fails to attend to the affective and embodied practices through which 
a subject comes to relate to a particular sign—a relation founded not only on 
representation but also on what I will call attachment and cohabitation” (841-42).  
She describes the relationship of attachment or cohabitation between devout 
Muslims and Muhammed as “predicated not so much upon a communicative or 
representational model as an assimilative one” (847) in which practitioners attempt to 
embody Muhammed’s dispositions and practices. The sense of violation in the cartoon, 
then, “emanates not from the judgment that the law has been transgressed but that one’s 
being, grounded as it is in a relationship of dependency with the Prophet, has been 
shaken” (848-849). Western semiotic ideologies, with their assumed definitions of signs, 
religion, existences, and possible relationships, are incapable of recognizing that sense of 
violation and thus dismiss the experience as “irrational.” Obviously, we can see the 
power of definition here—if semiotic forms are limited to words and interpretation, then 
religion becomes a matter of language, and religious agency becomes choice—a social 
and cognitive phenomenon subject to the rules of rationality. Muslims’ agitated response 
to the cartoon is prohibited, out-of-bounds, irrational, because their semiotic ideology 
does not fit within the Western representational economy.   
 
Definition Misrecognized: The Hegemonic Work of Official Religious Definitions  
One chief goal of all hegemonic ideological accounts is to essentialize their own 
definitions and ideas: this allows them to stabilize religious boundaries while covering 
over the situated source of those definitions and the particular relations of power those 
definitions promote. Mohler demonstrates well how official definitions can actively work 
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to promote this misrecognition of religious formations. In a blog entry arguing that 
Christians should not practice yoga, Mohler writes,  
Yoga begins and ends with an understanding of the body that is, to say 
the very least, at odds with the Christian understanding. Christians are not 
called to empty the mind or to see the human body as a means of 
connecting to and coming to know the divine. Believers are called to 
meditate upon the Word of God — an external Word that comes to us by 
divine revelation — not to meditate by means of incomprehensible 
syllables. . . . 
When Christians practice yoga, they must either deny the reality of 
what yoga represents or fail to see the contradictions between their 
Christian commitments and their embrace of yoga. The contradictions are 
not few, nor are they peripheral. The bare fact is that yoga is a spiritual 
discipline by which the adherent is trained to use the body as a vehicle for 
achieving consciousness of the divine. Christians are called to look to 
Christ for all that we need and to obey Christ through obeying his Word. 
We are not called to escape the consciousness of this world by achieving 
an elevated state of consciousness, but to follow Christ in the way of 
faithfulness. (“The Subtle Body”) 
 
This short text illustrates two key components of hegemonic definitions.  
First, a-historical, essential definitions of religion play a critical role in drawing 
boundaries and establishing relations of power. Mohler’s whole argument depends for its 
effect upon a number of definitional arguments that erase the fluidity of religious 
practice—Christianity is by definition a conscious and pure practice of knowing the 
divine; yoga is by definition an embodied and sexualized practice for knowing the divine; 
therefore, Christians should not practice yoga. In fact, Mohler actually defines yoga in 
universal and essential ways that deny the importance of lived practices. He does so by 
ascribing assumptions and understandings of yoga to contemporary practitioners that 
Mohler actually acknowledges they may not hold—and yet the “bare fact” is, what “Yoga 
begins and ends with,” “the reality of what yoga represents,” is that it is “heathen” 
(Mohler’s word). It is heathen because of its supposed point of origination: “yoga cannot 
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be fully extricated from its spiritual roots in Hinduism and Buddhism.” In the same way, 
Mohler confidently asserts essential definitions of Christianity that do not depend upon 
the recognition of practitioners: he writes that “Christians are called,” “believers are 
called,” and “Christians are called,” whether they know it or not, to practice religion in 
the ways Mohler asserts.  
Second, hegemonic acts of self-definition often depend upon constructing an 
excluded other (which must also be defined on essential terms). Ironically, Mohler makes 
these ahistorical, essentializing assertions about yoga despite drawing his information 
from a source, Stefanie Syman, who appears to place careful emphasis upon historicity 
and cultural construction. She writes of contemporary yoga,  
We had turned a technique for God realization that had, at various points 
in time, enjoined its adherents to reduce their diet to rice, milk, and a few 
vegetables, fix their minds on a set of, to us, incomprehensible syllables, 
and self-administer daily enemas (without the benefit of equipment), to 
name just a few of its prerequisites, into an activity suitable for children. 
Though yoga has no coherent tradition in India, being preserved instead by 
thousands of gurus and hundreds of lineages, each of which makes a 
unique claim to authenticity, we had managed to turn it into a singular 
thing: a way to stay healthy and relaxed. (Syman, qtd. in Mohler) 
 
In this quotation at least, Syman represents yoga as precisely the sort of constructed, 
inessential formation that I’ve attempted to argue official evangelicalism also represents. 
Moreover, she ironically notes the American cultural construction of yoga by which an 
incoherent set of practices and “traditions” becomes “a singular thing: a way to stay 
healthy and relaxed.” And yet, using Syman’s very quotation as evidence, Mohler 
brazenly does what Syman mocks: he establishes that there is something “authentic” and 
“coherent” about yoga’s tradition that can be identified and used to define and exclude 
yoga from Christianity’s boundaries.  
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We can see two more components of hegemonic definitions in prominent 
evangelicals’ response to the “Evangelical Manifesto” discussed in chapter two. We see 
that hegemonic definitions are selective. Many prominent conservative Evangelicals like 
(again) Mohler, Dobson, and Tony Perkins of the Family Research Council predictably 
and publicly refused to sign the Evangelical Manifesto, often on the explicit grounds that 
the document’s definitional criteria were too inclusive or too exclusive. Their rebuttals to 
the Manifesto represent the dominant norms of evangelicalism they wish to defend, and 
clarify how well they understand the power of definitions to shape entire formations. 
Mohler actually admits that the document’s description of evangelicalism might be 
accurate, but argues that the account nevertheless remains inadequately selective:  
Another complication on this score comes from the fact that Evangelicals 
are identified as “one of the great traditions that have developed within the 
Christian Church over the centuries.”  There is a sense in which this is 
true, of course, but relegating the Evangelical understanding of the Gospel 
to just one among many Christian traditions undercuts our witness and 
sows seeds of confusion. (“An Evangelical Response”) 
 
In that complaint, we see that Mohler finds the Manifesto’s construction of the Christian 
tradition not sufficiently selective. Even as he admits that the Manifesto’s rendering of 
tradition might be historically accurate, he worries that it will not be satisfactorily 
persuasive. Accuracy, Mohler is saying, is not as important as effect.  
Finally, hegemonic definitions are exclusive. Mohler complains, for instance, that 
the Evangelical Manifesto’s definition of salvation “leaves out the question of the 
exclusivity of salvation to those who have come to Christ by faith. The use of the phrase 
‘for us’ in strategic sentences,” Mohler writes, “makes one wonder if room is left for 
some manner of inclusivism or universalism? The door is certainly not sufficiently 
closed.” In a fitting last complaint, Mohler then worries that he himself has been 
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excluded from the Manifesto’s definition of evangelicalism. The document, as we saw in 
chapter four, criticizes official evangelicals for its anti-intellectualism and its low view of 
science. He asks regarding these criticisms, “Who are these believers who represent 
‘caricatures of the false hostility between science and faith’? The context would seem to 
implicate those who believe in a young earth cosmology.  This represents millions of 
Evangelicals — perhaps by many surveys the vast majority.  Are they (we) to be written 
out of Evangelicalism?” (“An Evangelical Response”). “Written out of Evangelicalism” 
is the right phrase—Mohler is rightly underlining the most important hegemonic function 
of definition: a linguistic exclusion can effect a social exclusion. And if that linguistic 
construct can be rendered neutral and natural (the function of ideology), then that social 
exclusion will also seem neutral and natural.  
 
Recognizing Definition in Student Accounts of Religion 
To provide the simplest of illustrations of how employing a transformational 
perspective in student writing might combat such hegemonic definitions—and accounts 
of those definitions—we can consider the best definition of evangelicalism heretofore 
offered by a student in our scholarship. Here’s how a graduate student named Mona 
explains evangelicalism in Carter’s article:  
A myriad of beliefs and, subsequently, subgroups abound within the 
vaguely defined borders of Evangelical Christianity, however the expected 
beliefs are those espoused by the largest protestant denomination in 
America. These views are touted by Christian programs, held as mainstays 
by the political activist Christian groups, and echoed by grassroots 
Christians in the workplace. It is these views to which you must hold or at 
least not contradict if you are to be considered a “literate” member of the 
mainstream Evangelical movement.” (586)  
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As I discussed above, the chief idea in translingual approaches is to help students 
recognize that language is always practical—working—rather than transcendent, 
transparent, or stable. Mona’s definition suggests that she is very cognizant of some of 
this work. First, we note her references to practical heterogeneity: “a myriad of beliefs,” 
“subgroups,” and “vaguely defined borders.” Further, she is successfully identifying 
several formational forces at work in the “mainstream Evangelical movement”—“touted 
by Christian programs,” “held…by political activist Christian groups,” “echoed by 
grassroots Christians.” Finally, she recognizes the definitional and exclusionary power 
exercised by particular institutions by using phrases like “borders,” “expected beliefs,” 
and “must hold or at least not contradict if you are to be considered a literate member.”  
Mona apparently offered this information directly to Carter, rather than for an 
assignment: but Carter’s response, as she applies it to her undergraduate writing 
classrooms, is a concern to help students recognize their various communities’ 
orthodoxies “so that they don’t commit heretical acts” within them (586). As noted in 
chapter one, Carter wants to help students see the differences between academic and 
religious communities of practice so they can more effectively and safely shift back and 
forth between them, rather than having to abandon a valued community. She calls this 
giving students “some control over [their] environment” (586), but it sounds to me more 
like helping students fit into environments they cannot control. Our challenge, however, 
is to respond in a way that might also help Mona locate and activate the sources of 
transformation in evangelicalism.  
I say this because even though Mona’s account seems to acknowledge the social 
power defining evangelicalism and sources of variation, there is no sign here that Mona 
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recognizes how and why evangelicalism has changed, is changing, and will change. Her 
definition right now presents us with a stable account of official evangelicalism and its 
definitions that does not fully acknowledge the processes of formation behind it. As such, 
in the end she offers up a static picture of evangelicalism that can be immediately 
appropriated and reified by Carter for politically accommodationist purposes. Mona’s 
definition acknowledges heterogeneity, but not transformation—which, given the 
generalized dissatisfaction and sense of impotence felt by young Americans towards 
contemporary religion, is unsurprising. As I argue in chapters one and four, this apparent 
misrecognition indicates a pedagogical opportunity for writing instructors to help 
students like Mona wrestle with the dominant religious discourses in their lives.  
A first option for de-stabilizing a hegemonic account of religion like this is to 
encourage students to compare multiple official definitions of a religion and highlight 
both the content and the social purposes of such accounts—focusing, then, on the 
intraformational conflict produced by definitions. A student like Mona might be 
encouraged, for example, to examine official definitions of evangelicalism like those 
offered by Mohler and compare those with the Evangelical Manifesto and definitions 
offered by Bielo’s emergent evangelical informants. Or she might be encouraged to 
reflect on how various alternative definitions are offered by insider groups that form 
around competing discourses—for example, how evangelical feminist groups have 
selectively appropriated parts of evangelicalism’s discourse in constructing their 
alternative accounts of evangelicalism, and the reasons for those choices. Students like 
Mona would then have the opportunity to note the competing claims on “true” and 
“essential” Christianity, deliberate on conflicts within religious formations, contemplate 
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the roles played by multiply-constituted identities and external cultural discourses in 
those conflicts, and situate themselves positively in relation to the account that they 
preferred.  
Instructors can also approach official definitions as Raymond Williams suggests, 
by asking students to historicize those definitions and doctrines. Historicizing specific 
beliefs should be appealing to many instructors, given our own tendency to privilege 
doctrines and beliefs in definitions of conservative religion (discussed in earlier chapters), 
and even more so given the conservative religious establishment’s heavily doctrine-
centered self-representations. The hegemonic works—through us—by naturalizing and 
essentializing these definitions, so historicizing these definitions could acknowledge this 
habitual emphasis on doctrine while essentially using its momentum against itself. This 
would require noting how religious formations have developed through history as not 
only a set of ideas but as shifting sets of beliefs, behaviors, and consequences containing 
or attached to those shifting ideas. Moreover, it would require examining why those shifts 
occurred—that is, the transformative pressures exerted on religious formations.  
How, for example, did the presence of Muslims shift how European Christianity 
defined religion, or how did the introduction of the printing press and concurrent shifts in 
cultural notions of textuality participate in changing definitions of the Bible? Students 
could examine how definitions have been used to include and exclude populations—to 
examine who would have counted as a Christian in Reformation England, who would 
today, and the sometimes-lethal consequences of being included or excluded. Balmer’s 
accounts of American Christianity work to describe such historical shifts: in Thy 
Kingdom Come, for example, he describes how dominant religious positions on 
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evolution, education, political activism and even abortion underwent major shifts during 
the twentieth century in response to events including the Scopes trial and Ronald 
Reagan’s presidential campaign. In Balmer’s account, the ideas, beliefs and behaviors of 
American Christianities are represented as formational practices: produced to do specific 
work for the religious formation, in response to particular contextual forces. Such shifts 
were not simply in response to events like the Scopes trial or Ronald Reagan, Balmer 
argues throughout the book, but in response to shifts in public discourse—on science and 
education in one case, and in response to shifts in public policy regarding the taxing of 
religious institutions in the other, and so on. Our accounts should look to activate the 
same historical perspective on definitions if instructors and scholars intend to continue to 
focus on religious doctrines in published representations and classroom interactions.  
Some idea of giving greater attention to students’ personal definitions of religion 
has already been suggested by DePalma’s recommendation that Thomas work out his 
“key words” through narrating personal experiences (237-8). To be more specific about 
what that means, however, from a transformational perspective I would want to do three 
things when I encountered students’ key words or definitions. We can take the definition 
offered by Alex in Carter’s article as an example: Alex writes, “I understand that 
academics look at facts and evidence. However, religion is mostly about feeling. If God 
wanted to, He could easily give us evidence that He exists. If He did, though, believing in 
him and trusting Him wouldn’t be the same” (577, emphasis in original). I would want to 
help Alex connect this definition both to her experience and to a specific cultural 
context—to draw out the personal-social contexts connected to this definition. 
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So first, I would ask Alex to examine the past transformations that produced that 
definition for her. I might ask her, for example, how she arrived at this definition—
Where has she seen that definition before? Was there a time when she believed that 
religion was a matter of facts and evidence? What changed her mind? Second, I could ask 
her about the work the definition presently does: What benefit does she derive from this 
definition? Does she know people who would disagree with her? Are they Christians or 
non-Christians? If she agreed with those others that religion was a matter of facts and 
evidence, or was not a matter of feeling, would she still be able to be a practicing 
Christian? Third, a transformational approach would ask Alex about the potential work 
she could do on the definition. Moving from a retrospective account of definitional 
transformations to a forward-looking transformational account, I might also ask Alex to 
pursue one alternative definition of religion and imagine its short-term or long-term 
consequences on her life (past, present or future), then to reflect afterwards upon her 
reasons for accepting or rejecting that new definition in light of its transformative 
potential.   
Another transformational response would be to encourage a student like Alex to 
examine how academic and religious formations define shared cultural terms, exploring 
how the formations work on one another through these definitions. Mahmood’s 
discussion of the Mohammed cartoon controversy (above) might help us to initiate this 
sort of investigation. If she were encouraged to read Mahmood’s explanation of the 
religious conflicts created by differing definitions of seemingly non-religious terms like 
representation, instructors could then ask Alex, to deliberate on the definitions of other 
key terms in her above description: facts, evidence, feeling, believing, trusting. These 
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words clearly do not have stable, singular meanings, and the words are continually 
transported from context to context. Alex’s definition indicates some of those cross-
formational movements between religion and academia that we could deliberate on. For 
example, some might argue that the evidence for God is the feeling that Alex describes. 
Pointing this out highlights the way Alex’s definition of evidence and facts depends upon 
modernist scientific epistemologies, and highlights the way that modernist epistemology 
causes her to place religious knowledge in a different category from academic knowledge 
(for good or for ill). Instructors might also discuss how Alex’s definitions of Christian 
believing and trusting as actions taken in the absence of facts and evidence—definitions 
glossed by Carter as “faith” (578)—contribute to precisely the dismissal of faith as “anti-
intellectual” that Carter complains about (578). If Alex were to re-define facts and 
evidence in less Cartesian ways, or if she and Carter were to re-define faith as an action 
taken in the presence of evidence (emphasizing faith as the relational concept of “trust” 
over the more cognitive concept of “belief”), how would this change the relationship 
between the academy and religion Alex has conceptualized? What risk would this present 
to Alex or her religious commitments, or what challenges might this present to the 
intellectual divide that ghetto-izes religion, in Carter’s mind? Carter herself sets about 
doing this work, attempting to re-present the relationship between academic and religious 
knowing to instructors. She does not assist Alex in re-considering her definition. But 
doesn’t Alex, a Christian graduate student, need this opportunity to re-present the 




III. The Transformational Work of Mediation in Religious Formations 
Another key term for thinking through the forces producing religious 
transformation is mediation. Keane points out that even if religion is just language and 
ideas as some Western conceptions might suggest, those ideas still must take material 
form in order to be shared between people: “like everything else, [they only] circulate 
insofar as they have some medium” (Christian Moderns 42). In the “Evidence of the 
Senses,” Keane argues that even religious beliefs rely on material practices for their 
transmission—as he writes, “With the possible exception of divine revelation unmediated 
by any prior practices, institutions, or discourses (but even then, it must take a semiotic 
form if it is to go further), belief ontogenically follows on practice” (S116-17). Mediation 
actually enables religion’s transmission and reproduction across space and time, entailing 
both the potential conservation and transformation of the religious discourse—“even the 
most spiritualized of scriptural religions teach doctrines through concrete activities, such 
as catechisms, sermons, scripture-reading, exegesis” (S117). New assumptions do not 
simply appear in the consciousness of the Urapmin Robbins studies—they arrive in 
material form and are taken up, practiced, and circulated in and by other material forms. 
In keeping with this assertion, Birgit Meyer and the other sociologists in her 
edited collection Aesthetic Formations have demonstrated across a wide range of 
religious groups—including groups practicing Bahian Candomble, Brazilian 
Pentecostalism, Islam in Bangladesh, Tamil mythology (mixtures of Hinduism), Canção 
Nova (Catholicism), Ghanaian Pentecostalism, the Raelian movement (UFO religion), 
and Venezuelan Pentecostalism—the ways that religious formations depend upon, re-
appropriate, and are shaped by material objects. Meyer and her contributors emphasize, 
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for example, the role of traditionally understood “media” as sensational forms that 
mediate religious experience—they describe how sermon cassettes, videos, cards, 
worship music, and the like are all used by religious adherents to relate to the 
supernatural as well as to strengthen the bonds within their religious community. In his 
book-length ethnography, Emerging Evangelicals, Bielo has made similar observations 
about American evangelicals (74-75).  
Taking the term media more broadly, I propose here that a mediated lens for 
understanding a religious discourse such as evangelicalism could help us focus on the 
literally material aspects of religion: 1) bodies and bodily practices 2) other material 
objects, such as buildings, clothing, relics, and photographs 3) traditional “media” 
including podcasts, books, songs, YouTube videos, and blogs. Focusing on these 
circulating material forms (bodies, objects, media) as mediators can help writers 
represent the transmission, provocation, regularization, and disruption of shared religious 
sensibilities and practices that shape historical formations. In order to successfully 
recognize and represent religious mediators in this way, there are a few transformational 
keys: first, recognizing their necessity for the religious formation; second, recognizing 
how their very materiality renders mediators instable, unpredictable transmitters of 
religion (introducing change and variation into the religious formation); third, 
recognizing how various religious formations relate to mediators in different ways 
through their practices, which introduces a further source of instability and difference; 
fourth, recognizing how various religious formations manage mediators’ instability in 
different ways, again introducing a further source of instability and difference into 
religious formations; and fifth, recognizing how all of these unstable aspects of religious 
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mediators render religious practitioners and formations always susceptible to creativity 
and change. We can see these five keys by analyzing a pair of anecdotes from 
anthropologists studying religion.   
Matthew Engelke’s A Problem of Presence is an anthropological study of 
religious mediation in an African Christian movement, the Friday Church Masowe, in 
Zimbabwe. The Friday Church Masowe explicitly reject the use of the Bible in their 
religious practice because they strive for a direct and unmediated relationship with God 
(2-3). The Masowe, as radical immaterialists, try to shun material objects that they 
perceive to inflect their relationship to God: those which cannot be trusted, which may 
produce unpredictable results and by doing so produce evidence that their channel is not 
entirely clear for the pure transmission of God’s presence, are rejected for use in religious 
practice (3). In this way, the Masowe actually take to its logical conclusion Western 
definitions of signs and religion I discussed above. But the Masowe cannot eschew the 
use of all material vehicles, no matter how hard they try. As Engelke rightly demonstrates 
throughout the text, “The repudiation of the material is a selective process” (224). So 
throughout his text Engelke investigates the material vehicles that the Masowe will 
incorporate into their services—the spoken word, songs, healings, rituals, holy water, 
pebbles, holy honey, white robes, and prophets, along with their mumiriri wemweya—
and the ways that these material vehicles exert their own force on the religious 
practitioners, in spite of all attempts at relegating them to neutral intermediaries.   
The Masowe are in a difficult position because within their struggles to locate 
objects that simply transmit (without bending, integrating, or inflecting) religion, they 
keep running against the materiality and sociality of those objects. For example, the 
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Masowe perform healings using jars of holy honey, supposed to draw all of their 
medically healing properties from the church’s ritualistic infusion of the Holy Spirit’s 
power in prayer (226-8). The honey, in and of itself, is a neutral vessel, an intermediary 
through which the Holy Spirit does all the healing. But then one day a church member 
asks Engelke to loan him some holy honey blessed specifically to treat Engelke’s illness. 
But the church member is only looking to get through a long day at work (227). Even 
church members know the honey really is not an intermediary, despite all the official 
discourse—members know practically that the honey can have effects apart from the 
Spirit’s power, and no amount of official discourse to the contrary can regulate the 
practical use of honey. The Spirit may act upon honey eaters, but so does the honey. It is 
a mediator, which by its variable action and variable relations with practitioners 
constantly troubles the official account that would obscure the practical work that the 
honey does in declaring it a transparent intermediary.  
Bielo provides an excellent discussion highlighting how American evangelicals 
deal variably with the problem of mediation. In Emerging Evangelicals, he describes how 
particular groups of American evangelicals use bodies, objects, and texts differently—
detailing, for instance, how and why emergent evangelicals make heavy and deliberate 
use of quotidian found objects and multi-sensory experiences in their worship (see 
especially pp. 70-97). He describes uses of “lint brushes, globes, sand, bricks, bags, 
sugar, stones, and sponges . . . Lint brushes roll off sin, prayers are placed onto their 
destinations, bricks are lifted and removed, and sponges soak while stones sink” (95). 
Despite their positive and deliberate incorporation of mediators into their worship, Bielo 
finds his evangelical informants are aware—and wary—of this risky relationship. So they 
 205 
attempt to change out the found objects they utilize in worship regularly so as to not 
sediment too much power in those objects or risk changing the relationship people have 
with them (96). The informants know—though Bielo seems to pass over this—that they 
are not simply using the objects to relate to God (the primary goal [96]) but entering into 
relationship with the objects themselves in ways that are not entirely predictable. So as a 
protection against losing control of that relationship—in order to maintain the items in a 
place where “they are not dismissed, they are not special”—“none are retained for very 
long or treated with any reverence” (96). Given that religious informants (from the 
Masowe who distrust media to the emerging evangelicals who privilege them) are clearly 
concerned with what objects will do to people and their faith, we must not fail to take 
objects equally seriously in our studies of how religion changes. 
 
Mediation Misrecognized: Obscuring Mediation in Official Accounts of Religion 
Naturally, another effect of hegemonic ideology is rendering a formation’s 
transmission processes—that is, its mediators—transparent. In Western religions like 
Christianity and particularly in official evangelical strains, this often occurs through the 
de-emphasis of religion’s materiality. In his thoughtful account of Christianity’s arrival in 
Papua-New Guinea, Keane traces the historical development of a broadly Western view 
of religion “which identified it ‘as a set of propositions to which believers gave assent’ . . 
. a matter not of material disciplines or of ritual practices, for example, but of subjective 
beliefs” (Christian Moderns 67). Keane argues that this construction of religion also 
defines language in certain ways: in such religious formations, he writes, “language 
functions primarily (and properly) to refer to or denote objects in a world that lies apart 
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from it, in order to communicate ideas that lie within one person to another listener or 
reader” (67). And from within this hegemonic account of religion, religious beliefs too 
are understood primarily in referential terms—they affirm something about the world 
(“Reflections” 245). Explaining what this account of religion achieves, Keane writes that 
Christian leaders since John Calvin have been trying to “play down the materiality of 
semiotic form in order to arrive at a disembodied spirit, a pure idea, or an unsullied faith” 
(79).  
This attempted purification, as Asad constructs it, is an attempt at obscuring the 
social contingencies that threaten hegemonic religious authority. Such accounts erase the 
historicity and transformativity of religion in order to arrive at something essential, 
universal, and unchanging. To be clear, focusing on belief is not all bad—the problem is 
failing to recognize that beliefs (and orthodox beliefs) are dependent upon social 
conditions for their constitution and thus intrinsically changing. The reality, Asad argues, 
is that social conditions continually transform religion, religious beliefs, and even the 
definitions of belief that religions operate with: 
Changes in the object of belief change that belief, and as the world 
changes so do the objects of belief, and the specific forms of bafflement 
and moral paradox, which are a part of the world. What the Christian 
believes today about God, life after death, the universe, is not what he 
believed 800 years ago—nor is the way he responds to ignorance, pain, 
and injustice the same now as it was then. (“Reflections” 247)  
 
He explains, then, that the proper focus for a religious scholar is on material conditions 
and social processes, because social “disciplines are preconditions for specific forms of 
thought and action, but they must be taught and learnt, and are therefore themselves 
dependent on a range of social institutions and material conditions” (251, emphasis 
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mine). Power relations and social conditions cannot be separated from beliefs—and thus 
any definition that asserts otherwise serves hegemonic ends by concealing those relations. 
On hegemonic belief-centered accounts, religion transcends human action and 
historical change; the religion has an enduring essence referenced by ideas that can 
correspond perfectly to an eternal reality; humans’ perceived ability to change the 
religion is constrained (only the humans can change, because God and his perfect earthly 
representation needn’t); the possibility of a true and accurate knowledge arises as an 
ideal, and is echoed in the possibility of a single, common-sense meaning for all Biblical 
language; arguments over definition, belief, and correctness become possible and then 
central to the religious formation. This account of religion and language lends force to 
whatever is the official doctrine at a given moment, which can claim to transcend its 
historical formation and instead declare itself true in reference to an eternal ideal. Those 
in power can then demand belief from adherents. This belief can only be signified by 
verbal assent, so that words must now do two things faithfully in order for those in 
authority to feel assured of their control: words must faithfully express interiority, and 
words must faithfully refer to reality.  
We can see how this conjunction between pure beliefs and pure language 
produces hegemonic effects by returning to official evangelicalism and Mohler’s 
argument against yoga. Mohler’s privileged form of religion, “Christianity,” is defined as 
conscious and linguistically centered while in contrast yoga is embodied and privileges 
other forms of knowing. As he writes, setting up the boundary between Christianity and 
yoga, “Christians are not called to empty the mind or to see the human body as a means 
of connecting to and coming to know the divine. Believers are called to meditate upon the 
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Word of God — an external Word that comes to us by divine revelation” (“The Subtle 
Body”). Mohler explains this transparent process elsewhere in the short pamphlet entitled 
“The Pastor as Theologian,” which I reference in chapter three. For Mohler, the 
transparent transportation of meaning through language is guaranteed by the work of the 
Holy Spirit. He writes,  
Through the preaching of the Word of God, the congregation is fed 
substantial theological doctrine directly from the biblical text. . . . The 
divine agent of this transfer is the Holy Spirit, who opens hearts, eyes and 
ears to hear, understand and receive the Word of God. The preacher’s 
responsibility is to be clear, specific, systematic and comprehensive in 
setting out the biblical convictions that are drawn from God’s Word . . . 
(“The Pastor as Theologian” 9-10, emphasis mine) 
 
In his book on emergent evangelicals, Bielo cites another prominent conservative 
evangelical theologian, pastor, seminary president, and popularizing author—John 
MacArthur—who also articulates this view of biblical language. In a radio interview, 
MacArthur says,  
. . . we’re talking about how do you interpret the meaning of the Bible? 
It’s really not that hard. It’s not brain surgery. You use the normal sense of 
the language. You just see what the language says like you do, how do you 
interpret a conversation? Or, how do you interpret an old document? 
We’re talking simply about how we discern what it means by what it says. 
(Emerging Evangelicals 58) 
 
To the extent that religious language transparently refers to a religion that is 
perceived to exist separately from the language but can be represented accurately in “that 
normal sense of the language,” this account enables several of the hegemonic practices 
evident in official evangelical discourse. The direct (pure) transfer of religious 
knowledge by way of clear (pure) language, enabled by the Holy Spirit, allows for the 
progressive purification of religion as beliefs are corrected and as heretics are excluded. 
And it does so while making human religious authority transparent (pure): if Mohler and 
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MacArthur are successful in arguing that their interpretation is natural and common-
sense, then in declaring Biblical truth and establishing Biblical mandates they are purely 
speaking for God, not from crass material motives or a desire for power. Moreover, 
alternative understandings must be corruptions, not of God, and can be rejected out of 
hand. Hegemony thus draws power from obscuring mediation and positing stability: both 
the physical materiality of communication, the material conditions shaping those 
communications, and the agendas of the communicators must be removed from 
consideration if official evangelical leaders like MacArthur and Mohler are to continue 
speaking for God and authoritatively excluding and including beliefs, people and 
practices from religion.  
While arguments directly challenging this privileged status of language (and in 
turn, destabilizing particular beliefs) can be appealing and by 2012 have become 
increasingly easy for writing instructors to make,17 I’m not convinced they represent our 
best option when we encounter religious discourse that enacts this logic. Pointing out 
interpretive variability without first combating the idealist removal of religion from 
materiality mostly seems to produce a logic of corruption or variation (as seen in Rand’s 
argument in chapter one), not genuine instability. It leaves the hegemonic logic of 
religion as an immaterial idea largely intact—and it’s that logic, not just an approach to 
language per se, that maintains power relations by masking religion’s transformational 
capacities. Appeals to divine revelation, further, produce a loophole for those in power 
that arguments over hermeneutics simply can’t overcome. Making matters worse, given 
the direct accounts of language-as-common-sense offered by official evangelical leaders 
                                                
17 See Perkins  
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and formative documents, adopting a strategy that emphasizes language’s instability is 
likely to be seen as a direct attack on religion. This is why in the rest of this chapter I 
want to focus instead on how instructors might attend to the elements of religious literacy 
acquisition that dominant representatives like Mohler wish to leave out—the body, 
things, and other people, for instance—and on highlighting how they are involved in the 
process of acquiring the right religious knowledges, feelings, and experiences (literacy). I 
believe these approaches provide students and instructors with alternative, somewhat 
indirect means of challenging the hegemonic status of pure religious language and 
knowledge within evangelicalism. They also provide students and instructors with new, 
positive terms for representing religious practices, getting them outside of largely 
oppositional and unending arguments over doctrine and hermeneutics.  
 
Recognizing Mediation in Student Accounts of Religion—Objects  
If instructors want to help students challenge or at least de-naturalize hegemonic 
accounts that divorce religion from change and power relations by making its social 
transmission appear transparent, our responses to them need to highlight the unstable 
material (physical and social) processes involved in religious literacy and learning. One 
potentially useful strategy for doing this is to ask religious students who incorporate 
religious texts to deliberate on their own relations with those texts, as objects, in light of 
Latour’s distinction between mediators and intermediaries (Reassembling 39). Making 
any sort of strong distinction between the two—stating, for instance, that the Bible is an 
intermediary rather than a mediator, as some evangelicals might, requires a significant 
amount of definitional work—establishing criteria, compiling evidence, etcetera. Instead 
 211 
of asking students to make a fast distinction, or arguing with students about which their 
sacred text is, I think it might be more useful to ask students to define both terms and 
then attempt to find ways in which it might enact both roles. For example, Alex tells 
Carter how she and her cousins carried their Bibles to school every day in high school in 
hopes that “when the time came, we could use it to help others become saved” (576). 
Alex also tells of quoting the Bible throughout an academic paper and failing, then 
removing those quotes and succeeding—“I did nothing but remove the quotes and my 
paper received an A” (577). While not everything falls neatly into the category of 
intermediary and mediator or remains within either category—in fact, Latour argues that 
things move back and forth in accordance with the relationship actors have with them—
using those theoretical categories might help Alex to deliberate on her experience so as to 
highlight how the Bible’s effects change as it relates to individuals in various contexts.  
In the high school anecdote, Alex constructs the Bible as simply a tool for use 
“when the time came.” In that sense, Alex constructs the Bible as an intermediary she 
could deploy for specific purposes at moments she chose. But we could ask if the Bible 
doing other work during the school day, apart from Alex’s intentions? Was it acting as a 
mediator? Were other students, for example, attributing a religious identity to Alex 
because of that Bible? Was it creating a community for her? Or was the Bible actually 
acting as a mediator that helped irreligious high school students know to avoid being 
evangelized by Alex, who kept waiting for a time to come that the Bible itself kept from 
occurring? She might be encouraged to consider alternative actions and effects the Bible 
was having while she carried it as a tool—as if the shovel she was carrying to dig a hole 
might have knocked over a few passers-by on the way. And did she carry the same Bible 
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all those years? What relationship did she have to that particular Bible? I remember 
when a pocket Gideon Bible I owned in high school (I carried mine everywhere too) went 
through the wash. I was so distraught over the destruction of a free book that I cooked it 
in the oven to try and dry it out. The Bible in this case took on properties beyond an 
intermediary for delivering informational content—my relationship was also with the 
object itself.  
In responding to Alex’s experience of removing biblical quotations from her 
college paper, we could also examine the transformational relations between academic 
and religious discourses the account indicates. Alex’s purported attempt to use the Bible 
as an intermediary (simply useful as evidence for her arguments) was foiled because the 
instructor’s relationship with the Bible was beyond her control. The Bible again worked 
differently than Alex had hoped—making it a mediator—or perhaps not. Perhaps, as 
Goodburn and others are suggesting, Alex was aware of the likely effect of the Bible on 
her professor and was challenging or even testing her professor. So instructors could 
challenge Alex to consider how the Bible, as a cultural object with variable meaning, 
mediated the relations between Alex and her professor. But then, Alex might also be 
encouraged to consider what it means that she was able to make her argument 
successfully for an academic audience without doing anything, she said, but removing the 
Bible quotations. For the professor, removing the Bible positively transformed Alex’s 
argument. And given that Alex changed nothing else in the essay, it would appear that the 
essay was ostensibly coherent and persuasive without her Biblical quotations. Alex’s 
argument after the citations were removed became simultaneously biblical (no arguments 
were scrubbed out when the quotations were erased) and academic (it’s academic logic 
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received an A). This forces a reconsideration of the relationship between academic and 
religious discourses—perhaps in this one case at least it was the Bible, not the logic, that 
created conflict. But it also allows Alex to go back and look at the document—what, 
specifically, was lost to the document, or to Alex, when the Bible was erased from the 
text. Why is she still angry about it?  
Instructors might also ask Alex about the transformational agency (specifically, 
salvific agency) she attributed to the Bible. Alex says she and her cousins carried the 
Bible “so we could use it to help others become saved.” This is a fascinating syntactical 
construction that establishes four sets of unstable relations Alex could probe by thinking 
through a specific witnessing experience she might have had. In that experience, what 
were the relations she imagined between herself and the Bible—how specifically did she 
use it, and why in those ways? What were the relations between Alex and the other 
person—how specifically did she help that person become saved? What were the 
relations between the Bible and the other person—how specifically did it help? And 
finally, what were the salvific relations between Alex, the Bible, God, and the other 
person?—after all, she does not say they save themselves, nor does she say that they get 
saved, but she uses the Bible to help them become saved, a curious distribution of agency.  
Having thought through these assignations of agency, instructors might ask Alex 
to examine the transformational properties of this encounter in the past, present, future 
mode I described earlier. First, what was the cultural or experiential source of these 
understandings and the evangelistic practices that stemmed from them? Who taught those 
attitudes to her, and if no one did, where did she acquire them? Second, instructors could 
ask her to consider the consequences of those attitudes and practices towards the Bible in 
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concrete encounters. Third, since Alex is reporting on a past behavior towards the Bible 
as object, instructors could ask her to construct a narrative of her relationship with the 
Bible, or to simply compare that high school relationship to other relationships from other 
points in her life (including using it as a source of evidence in a college paper). She could 
borrow from a variety of genres and sources to craft these representations, but the 
question would remain generally the same: in what ways, and for what reasons, have her 
relations with the Bible changed—and how have those related to other changes in her 
life? 
 
Recognizing Mediation in Student Accounts of Religion—Sponsors  
In attempting to highlight the mediated nature of religious literacy acquisition, 
instructors’ responses can also focus students’ attentions on the social disciplinary 
relationships their writings describe. Though the language is different, the mediators that 
Engelke, Keane, Meyer and Bielo depict aren’t too far from Deborah Brandt’s conception 
of sponsors—at least not as regards the role that they play in transforming religious 
formations and religious individuals. For her project on literacy, Brandt defines sponsors 
as “any agents, local or distant, concrete or abstract, who enable, support, teach, and 
model, as well as recruit, regulate, suppress, or withhold, literacy—and gain an advantage 
by it” (17). As she explains, “Sponsors are delivery systems for the economies of literacy, 
the means by which these forces present themselves to—and through—individual 
learners” (17). It will prove helpful below to also think of mediation in terms of 
sponsorship to help us draw out the power relations imbricated in the transmission and 
distribution of religious practices from sponsors to individual practitioners.  
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Here’s James, another student from Carter’s class, explaining the discipline he 
underwent at church:  
Before I was [just] a child that went to church. I believed the Bible was 
something you read if you weren’t sure that you were going to heaven [. . 
.] so I never read it. But one day I started to mature from a child that went 
to church to a churchly child. I started to understand the older Christians 
and the purpose of being a Christian and the role that the Bible played in a 
Christian’s life. All because one day . . . I felt it was my job to be the 
clown. . . . When my mother . . . saw me acting like a fool she came 
slapped me in the back of the head in front of all my friends and maid me 
go to the front of the church to sit with the senior saints. . . . I couldn’t 
even fall asleep because the old ladies wouldn’t let me because they would 
either pinch to wake me or be making to much noise praising the Lord so I 
had to listen to the message. . . . I mean don’t get me wrong I always heard 
the Message but I actually listened that time. . . . That’s how the front pue 
saved my life. (575, all ellipses original) 
 
James explains further in an interview in Carter’s office: “It’s like this. A child who just 
goes to church is an illiterate Christian because he can’t feel it. He may feel something 
somewhere else, like in school with his friends or at work, but that feeling ain’t the Lord 
because he’s not in his House. A churchly child, though, he [is] literate because he can 
feel it. Like I felt it” (576). 
James’s literacy narrative, ostensibly an essay describing the Bible, was written 
for an assignment “to describe an object that best represented literacy for [him]” (575). 
But instead of talking about his relation to the Bible as a representation or even a sponsor 
of literacy, James’s story is really consumed with other mediators, and with tactile, 
affective, and aural discipline. He describes being hit on the back of the head, being 
embarrassed, being placed in the front pew, being pinched by old women, and being kept 
awake by their noise. All of these acts of discipline—physical, emotional, spatial, aural—
are acts of sponsorship (really, authoritative discipline) that enable James to acquire 
religious knowing and religious ways of being. The experience, knowledge, and 
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relationship with God that James acquires—together, his personal transformation into a 
religious literate—are not directly transported into his mind through the intermediary 
Bible, the mediational Holy Spirit, or even the clear instruction of the pastor: instead, a 
broad set of indirect mediators enables James’ religious literacy. Recognizing this 
directly challenges the exclusionary power claimed by those who would render religious 
literacy immediate and self-evident.  
What’s more, these mediations are performed mostly by the women of James’s 
community, and thus women’s leadership is strongly indicated as a cause for James’s 
achievement of religious “feeling” and religious literacy. As he says, those sponsors 
caused him to “really listen,” rather than goofing off or falling asleep (which he calls 
merely hearing the Message), and thereby “the front pue saved my life” (575). Further, 
James spends a lot of time elaborating on the importance of place—the feeling must 
occur in the Lord’s House, or it’s not the feeling. In this way, even the church building 
(and even specifically the front pew) becomes a mediator necessary for James’s 
acquisition of religious discourse. Emphasizing all these mediators might encourage 
James to challenge official accounts of Christianity through his representation of 
religious transformations. In a revision he might, for example, be encouraged to represent 
his experience in a way that highlights the practical role of women and material forms in 
the church; deliberate on how these sponsorships do or don’t align with official religious 
discourse on gender relations, say, or the practical importance of a Christian’s material 
surroundings through locating primary documents distributed by religious institutions; 
and even potentially draw in traditional academic research on the changing historical 
relationships between African-Americans, women, and Christian churches. Tracing 
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mediators, then, might help students represent a different set of practical relationships and 
hierarchies within a church than the official discourse offers.  
Another revision suggestion might focus on alternative routes to religious literacy, 
which could help James develop the contingency and choice that are implicated in 
acquiring religious discourse in these mediated ways. For instance, he could be 
encouraged to construct alternative narratives exploring what would have happened if the 
pews had been more comfortable, or if there had been children’s services at church, or if 
he had been at a church where demonstrative forms of worship were not acceptable. We 
could challenge him to do either first or second-hand ethnographic research on how other 
sorts of Christians acquire religious literacy absent those factors, and deliberate by 
comparing his experience to theirs on the differences between not only the processes, but 
the products. In what ways are the properly religious dispositions of a member of a 
largely white, Midwestern Reformed congregation different from those in James’ 
community? To what mediating factors does James assign responsibility for these 
differences? Do they matter?  
A third avenue of response could challenge James to think about the power 
relationships and advantages gained through his religious sponsorship. What motivation 
does he think the senior section had for pinching him and helping him to acquire religious 
discourse? What does the church gain from his membership? What does he gain through 
membership—perhaps, I would specify, what besides salvation? Finally, any writer 
hoping to represent James’s acquisition of religious discourse as transformative must 
identify not only his wide variety of sponsors, but also the specific work that he did in 
these interactions with sponsors to help him acquire the religious discourse. One could 
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ask James, for instance, how he altered his practices from that day forward in order to 
maintain the feeling he describes and the ways of seeing that determine his relation to the 
Bible. This might entail asking him to construct a new narrative that focuses not on a 
single transformative event, but on religious transformation as a continual process—
describing how his attitudes, practices, feelings and beliefs have changed over the years 
since that day that he became a churchly child. To be properly transformational, James 
would need to identify not only how they’ve changed, but why—what new discourses, 
events, and sponsors does he think caused those changes? Who’s done the work? And 
finally, looking forward to the work he can do on his religious experience and discourse, 
one could ask James to consider how this new understanding of religious sponsorship 
does or should affect the way he sponsors other people—in what ways might he use this 
knowledge to become a better religious sponsor for others, or in what ways has this new 
knowledge changed or damaged his relations with his religious community? And in what 
ways does this new, academic construction of religious literacy acquisition fail to hold up 
when interrogated in light of his religious experience?  
 
IV. Recognizing the Transformational Work of Sensation in Religious Formations 
A third type of media that I mention above, but do not discuss in detail, is the 
body: so here in this final section I focus on the role of the body and bodily practices in 
religious formations. I believe instructors must focus on how religious formations help 
adherents to acquire the “right” feelings, or sensations (that is, making strange the 
processes by which religious practitioners themselves must be transformed). Looking 
back at James’s account, we can see how his experience challenges writing scholars and 
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instructors to focus more closely on this issue. Carter notes that James’s representation of 
Christian literacy hinges on a “feeling that only other literate Christians can experience or 
understand” (576), which points to the crucial articulation of feeling with information in 
religious literacy. Again, we can begin from the work of Meyer. In her work on 
mediation, she explicitly focuses on the sensational level of formation, and usefully 
focuses on Evangelical Christians, a group that we might not normally associate with a 
religion of the senses (regarding sensation, see also Mauss; Bourdieu; Jackson; 
Luhrmann). In fact, as Mohler demonstrates, official evangelical discourse works to 
dissociate Christianity from sensational practices: “Christians are not called to empty the 
mind or to see the human body as a means of connecting to and coming to know the 
divine” (“The Subtle Body”). Meyer demonstrates convincingly, however, that sensation 
is not only included, but is actually at the center of many evangelicals’ religious practice. 
Moreover, she notes that for many evangelical Christians, the ability to experience certain 
sensations arises through “authorized and socially shared practices and techniques” rather 
than immediately. In “Aesthetics of Persuasion” Meyer describes these practices,  
through which born again Christians are enabled to sense the presence of 
the Holy Spirit with and in their bodies wherever they are and to act upon 
this sensation . . . sensations of the divine do not happen out of the blue 
but require the existence of a particular shared religious aesthetic through 
which the Holy Spirit becomes accessible and ‘sense-able’. 
(“Indispensability”)  
 
These acquired sensibilities enable participants to physically experience—that is, sense—
new aspects of reality with their bodies.  
One of the closest studies of these Evangelical sensibilities and their acquisition 
comes from Luhrmann, who studied an Evangelical Christian congregation in California. 
Luhrmann argues that while we in the academy have largely focused our attention on the 
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beliefs of Christians (particularly about the truth status of the Bible), “it is at least as 
important that the new U.S. religious practices put intense spiritual experience—above 
all, trance—at the heart of the relationship with God” (“Metakinesis” 518). She also 
notes, “The most interesting anthropological phenomenon in U.S. evangelical 
Christianity is precisely that it is not words alone that convert: Instead, congregants—
even in ordinary middle-class suburbs—learn to have out-of-the-ordinary experiences 
and to use them to develop a remarkably, intimate, personal God” (518).  
So in contrast to official evangelicalism’s heavy emphasis upon doctrine, for 
many Evangelical adherents “relationship,” not doctrine, seems to be the focus of their 
practical religious discourse. And it’s this relational construction of religious practice that 
explains for Luhrmann why sensational practices are so important to the Evangelical 
Christians she studies: “the goal of worship is to develop a relationship with God. 
Developing that relationship is explicitly presented as the process of getting to know a 
person who is distinct, external, and opaque, and whom you need to get to know in the 
ordinary way” (525). Luhrmann compares falling in love with Jesus to “the intense love 
of early adolescence” (523). Religious adherents in Luhrmann’s study consistently 
described the process as “falling in love with Jesus,” and achieving “peace,” both of 
which Luhrmann specifically identifies as bodily dispositions (523, 524). This emphasis 
on learning to have experiences, crucially, denaturalizes religious experiences and the 
relationships with God that depend upon them—creating space for the inherent change 
and participatory agency we want to inject into representations. 
These dispositions emerge through and perpetuate practitioners’ ongoing love 
relationship with God, but don’t emerge spontaneously. Writing with Nusbaum and 
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Thisted, Luhrmann argues they actually depend upon a set of social disciplines and 
individual labor within those disciplines.  
it takes effort to accept that a particular interpretation of the supernatural is 
correct, and it takes effort to live in accordance with that interpretation—
to live as if they really do believe that their understanding is accurate. It 
requires learning, and the learning can be a slow process, like learning to 
speak a foreign language in an unfamiliar country, with new and different 
social cues. That learning is often stumbling and gradual for those who 
convert, take on new roles, or go through an initiation process. People 
must come to see differently, to think differently, and above all to feel 
differently, because to believe in a particular form of the supernatural as if 
the supernatural is truly present is, for most believers, to experience the 
world differently than if that form of the supernatural were not real. 
(Luhrmann, Nusbaum, Thisted 67) 
 
Maintaining this relationship through seeing, thinking, and feeling differently is difficult, 
and must be acquired and worked at by religious practitioners. The relationship and the 
sensations are thus the products of a continual learning process. Luhrmann’s findings 
suggest there are three different types of learning involved in contemporary U.S. 
evangelical Christian practice: cognitive/linguistic, metakinetic, and relational. 
“Together, they enable new believers to do something quite remarkable—to construct, 
out of everyday psychological experience, the profound sense that they have a really real 
relationship with a being that cannot be seen, heard, or touched” (“Metakinesis” 519). 
In terms of language, Luhrmann discusses lexical, syntactic, and narrative 
knowledges that religious adherents utilize to represent, construct, and disseminate their 
personal relationship with God. She notes two lexical elements particularly: one, “walk 
with God,” describes the ongoing relationship Christians have with God; the other, 
“Word of God,” “refers overtly to the written Bible, but it connotes the loving, personal, 
and unique relationship congregants believe God has with each individual Christian.” 
One man, for instance, describes the Bible as “a love story [. . .] written to me” (521). 
 222 
The man turns a generally available text into a personal communication of sorts—and 
importantly, does so through particular interpretive texts. Luhrmann also notes that 
evangelical Christian congregants train to acquire and maintain these relational practices 
in part through official forms of discourse. Luhrmann’s “syntax” is closer to logic, or 
themes. These broad themes include, for instance, the assumption that being a Christian, 
praying, and the like are difficult: “These Christians expect that prayer does not come 
easily and naturally. It is a skill that must be learned, as a relationship to God must also 
be learned” (522). Finally, there are the narratives, and again Luhrmann cites one chief 
narrative: “I was lost, so deeply lost, so lost that no one could love me—and then God 
did, and I was found” (522).  
Language also participates in transmitting metakinetic, or sensational, practices. 
Descriptions are used, she finds, to transmit and codify sensational practices and 
experiences, which are often “identified, labeled, and discussed” in books, seminars, 
small groups, and sermons. At least within this congregation, the practical is articulated 
(identified, labeled, discussed) so that it can be shared—whether it ever reaches the level 
of official discourse or not. Although Luhrmann notes that individuals seem to develop 
their own heterogeneous versions of the authorized practices, codifying articulation can 
inform and disseminate these sensational experiences that “mark God’s spiritual reality in 
their lives” (525). Luhrmann calls the bodily awareness that results from these practices 
“metakinetic.” Reversing direction, metakinetic skills are also dynamically involved in 
making linguistic practices relationally significant. For example, Luhrmann’s research 
into sensation points out the ways the Bible is also a love story written by that man 
referenced above—that is, she attributes his and other practitioners’ ability to have this 
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experience and understanding of the Bible to their embodied skills. If the Bible is to be a 
personal love story, practitioners must first acquire the “ability to identify their own 
bodily reactions as indicating God’s responsiveness as they read the Bible, and as they 
pray” (525). This use of sensation to develop a relationship with God, through language, 
was widespread in the large congregation that Luhrmann studied: she notes, “all 
congregants spontaneously associated the process of ‘getting to know Jesus’—which one 
does through prayer and reading the Bible—with occasional experiences that involved 
heightened emotions and unusual sensory and perceptual experiences and that they 
identified, labeled, and discussed” (523).  
In learning metakinetic skills, adherents “seem to be engaging in a variety of 
bodily processes that are integrated in new ways and synthesized into a new 
understanding of their bodies and the world”—processes that can alter attentional focus, 
sensory perceptions, and changes in mood (522). The most prevalent metakinetic skill, 
according to Luhrmann, is learning to “build a personal relationship to God through 
prayer” (522). This prayer is “the conduit of anomalous psychological experiences” (523) 
achieved through attendance and trance. Luhrmann writes that adherents “attend to the 
stream of their own consciousness like eager fishermen, scanning for the bubbles and 
whorls that suggest a lurking catch” (523). Adherents “become intensely absorbed in 
inner sensory stimuli and lose some peripheral awareness” (523). In addition, Luhrmann 
discusses the experience of sensory hallucinations—hearing voices, feeling pushes, and 
the like. Nearly half of Luhrmann’s interviewees cited such experiences (524). In 
whatever form, metakinetic learning allows congregants “to learn to pay attention to the 
fragmentary chaos of conscious awareness in a new way” and “learn to identify and 
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highlight these moments of discontinuity and . . . come to understand these moments as 
signs of God’s presence in their lives” (524). As Luhrmann notes, these emotional and 
bodily experiences “mark God’s spiritual reality in their lives” (525). She explains, 
Metakinetic states—when God gives you peace, speaks to you outside 
your head, when you feel that He carries you down to the altar—give a 
kind of real reality to God because they create the experience of social 
exchange between opaque individuals, between individuals who cannot 
read each other’s minds and must exchange goods or words in order to 
become real to each other, in order to know each other’s intentions. (525) 
 
In this way, through the media of their own socially-disciplined bodies, even run-of-the-
mill American evangelical Christians achieve new religious sensations, modes of 
consciousness, and dispositions that help them “create a personal relationship that feels to 
them authentic, intimate, and mutually reciprocal with an intentional being who does not 
exhibit any of the normal signs of existence” (520).  
 
Sensation Misrecognized: Mysticizing Sensation in Official Accounts of Religion 
But, as I discussed with regards to DePalma in chapter one, hegemonic accounts 
of religion and experience in America tend to misrecognize these embodied experiences 
and feelings as natural and spontaneous. While the connection may not at first be 
obvious, I’d like to connect this misrecognition to Alex’s distinction, discussed earlier, 
between “my faith-based religious views” and “my fact-based academic view of the 
world” (Carter 576). Although Alex understands herself as practicing both stances, she 
nevertheless posits a divide between the two formations, in that “academics look at facts 
and evidence” while “religion is mostly about feeling”—it literally can’t be a matter of 
knowledge because God’s material presence would change the nature of belief and trust 
(576). Writing studies has focused much attention on this division, and to the concept of 
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religious feeling in general, but I don’t think we’ve yet adequately theorized religious 
feeling, or figured out how to deploy it fruitfully. In fact, I use our own writings as an 
example of the hegemonic account, because we remain wrapped up in a logic of religious 
experience and feeling that renders it spontaneous, or individual, or in-articulable, and 
almost always non-agential.  
The logic first appeared in Anderson’s “Description of an Embarrassment.” Citing 
negative theologian Karl Barth, Anderson argues, “Faith is a matter of intuiting the 
inexplicable and of making a leap that cannot be justified to anyone who hasn’t made that 
leap” (22). Since Anderson, this negative theological definition of religion has developed 
into a common trope in our writings: Bronwyn Williams, citing Anderson, defines 
religion as “belief in what cannot be proved or seen or explained in words” and a 
“relationship to the unspeakable, undefinable, and unprovable” (107), while Smart 
approvingly cites Anderson, affirming that “Faith embarrasses our attempts to articulate it 
because it is otherworldly and thus other-word-ly: Faith asks us to explain the 
unexplainable” (14). Carter’s gloss on Alex’s statement is interesting for the way it draws 
in Anderson, Williams and Smart: “as so many of my students have said, true faith is a 
‘feeling’ that cannot be explained, so articulating the reasoning behind one’s faith in 
terms the secular world can understand may seem impossible” (574). I think it’s worth 
rehearsing the set of terms attached to faith in these quotations: Faith is feeling (not facts 
and evidence); intuiting; inexplicable; a leap; unjustifiable; belief in what cannot be 
proved, seen, explained in words; a relationship to the unspeakable, undefinable, 
unprovable; inarticulable; otherworldly; other-word-ly; asking us to explain the 
unexplainable.  
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As I read these terms that instructors attach to “faith,” I find these descriptors 
compelling. Really, they would appear to correspond to the position I’m taking here—
they acknowledge the forms of practical knowing and being that are undoubtedly 
involved in religious formations and really all formations, as Raymond Williams makes 
clear. Experience cannot be exhaustively represented in language. Moreover, they point 
out the internalization of behaviors, beliefs, assumptions, and sensibilities within 
formations that I describe in chapter three. I want to further this line of inquiry, but I first 
want to point out the hegemonic misrecognition process at work here. It might be best 
expressed by Asad’s complaint regarding Geertz: He says, quite simply, “Geertz never 
examines whether, and if so to what extent and in what ways, religious ‘experience’ 
relates to something in the social world believers live in” (249).  
To understand what’s going on here, I believe the connections between this 
construction of religion and negative theology must be elaborated. Put very roughly, a 
strong negative theology asserts that by definition, nothing said by humans about God 
can be true. This draws a firm and total line between a God of the Outside, and human 
language (see Hagglund; Tillich). This epistemic agnosticism is academically and 
philosophically useful, because it appears to insulate religious belief from many basic 
rational arguments against it while simultaneously posing a challenge to the certain 
knowledge claimed by religious adherents. In a very weak form, negative theology is 
prevalent among evangelicals. According to the surveys done by Smith, Putnam and 
Campbell, and Kinnaman, as well as ethnographies of evangelicals written by Susan 
Harding and Bielo (to name only a few), many evangelicals do seem to acknowledge that 
there’s much that they cannot know in a cognitive sense about an infinite being beyond 
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their comprehension. This is so even in light of claims for the clear and immediate 
knowledge of Biblical truths. This would seem to justify activating negative theology 
when discussing students’ faiths.  
So as the writing scholars above rightly indicate, many evangelicals instead report 
conducting lives infused with religious affect, religious ways of thinking, and even 
supernatural experiences. In other words, they report on religious ways of being and like 
us often pose those religious ways of being (feeling) against knowledge or fact as a 
seeming defense against logical critiques of religion. This is where Alex’s quote comes 
in: “I understand that academics look at facts and evidence. However, religion is mostly 
about feeling. If God wanted to, He could easily give us evidence that He exists. If He 
did, though, believing in him and trusting Him wouldn’t be the same” (Carter 577, 
emphasis in original). Here, we see that Alex replaces facts and knowledge with feeling, 
though she denies that these feelings represent a form of knowing or evidence. Given 
academe’s increasing interest in embodiment and alternative forms of knowing, writing 
scholars seem naturally drawn to these descriptions of religious faith (on the relations 
between embodiment and rhetoric and composition pedagogy, for instance, see Cooper; 
Fleckenstein; Hawhee; Hawk; Johnson; Miller; Rickert). Our pedagogical response, as I 
demonstrate in chapter one, is to help religious students find ways to express those 
aspects of their faith in ways that will be congenial to an academic audience, rather than 
attempting to defend what is “rationally” in-defensible. Negative theology, then, seems a 
generous and intelligent way of getting around the difficulty of defending religious 
beliefs that we may see as logically indefensible (Latour outlines and dismisses this 
approach in the final chapter of Factish Gods).  
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But I see two problems here. First, we don’t seem to acknowledge that pervasive 
evangelical claims about relational knowing mean that a strong negative theology is 
decidedly not how most evangelicals seem to understand their relationship to God. Even 
beyond claims that the Bible consists of God’s actual words, the evangelical God 
participates in the world—was even incarnated and lived a historical life as a man. He is 
not fully Outside; in fact, as Luhrmann makes so clear, many evangelicals report 
conducting an ongoing, deeply intimate relationship with a very personal God. If 
evangelicals can talk about their lover or their friend, they can talk about their God—
strongly evidenced, too, by the enormous market for Christian music. The lyrics of those 
songs are, as many have noted, often strangely reminiscent of popular love songs. God 
may be mysterious, inarticulable, and somehow Other, but evangelicals’ relationships 
with God are decidedly not. They are conducted, talked about, written about, improved 
and fall apart, worked on and deliberately managed. Thus, while it needn’t be rejected out 
of hand, we might need to reconsider our attempts to use negative theology as an 
explanans for our students’ struggles to articulate their religious experiences and as a 
rationale for helping students better express their faith. Their experience of a relationship 
with God is not as mysterious and inarticulable for them as we would have it. As 
DePalma, Rand, and Carter seem to suggest, perhaps the trouble is not knowledge or 
general inarticulacy, but a question of genre or a matter of the sorts of knowledge we 
count as legitimate.  
Second, and even more crucially, we need to recognize that the difficulty of 
adequately articulating religious feelings has little impact on whether or not the mediated 
acquisition and maintenance of those feelings can be articulated and deliberated upon—
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and that seems to be a more important political project than determining ways to express 
them. I can’t always articulate a feeling of love to my own satisfaction in any one form, 
but I can nevertheless use any number of lenses or generic forms to explore and articulate 
parts of that love, as well as particular sources contributing to that love’s acquisition. I 
can manage it, recognize it, represent it, re-conceive it, make plans to get rid of it, help 
others act so as to achieve it. Asserting there is a role for dispositions and emotions in 
religious formations, then naming them (simply valuing and incorporating sensation in 
descriptions of religious practice), is not enough. If instructors and scholars point to 
religion’s practical qualities but fail to expose the deliberate processes of construction 
underlying them, we allow ourselves and our religious students to treat these intuitions, 
feelings, relationships, and beliefs as spontaneous or static rather than acquired and 
changing. We again fall victim to “misrecognition”—forgetting the processes by which a 
feeling or belief was acquired, and acting instead as if it is natural, a given. Doing so 
maintains power relations by covering over sponsorships and hiding responsibility behind 
spontaneity and “mystery.” This assumption, as Asad would point out, disables certain 
options for religious students—they may more readily accept the idea that they can’t 
express their religious commitment, but worse, they may also more readily accept the 
idea that they can’t change the way that they feel.  
 
Recognizing Sensation in Student Accounts of Religion 
Acknowledging the importance of “feeling” and “experience” in religious practice 
is the easy part—students claim them, instructors constantly highlight them—drawing out 
the multiple mediators and individual acts of participation that form these experiences 
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and feelings is seemingly more difficult. But it is worth the trouble: emphasizing 
“sensation” simultaneously removes religious feelings, experiences, and faith from the 
passive mystical, and moves them a little further into the politically and rhetorically 
useful realm of choice, change, and individual agency. It is critical, therefore, that 
instructor responses to, and student representations of, religious formations not only 
gesture at these components of religious commitment and aid in their expression, but also 
help students deliberate on and articulate the social processes by which such intuitions, 
feelings, relationships, and beliefs are achieved. If students like Alex and James had 
access to a strategy for representing the construction of religion’s internalized and 
practical qualities, they might gain some agency in both expressing and intervening in the 
supposedly inarticulable or spontaneous (passive) aspects of religious experience. Those 
practices and events become explicable, describable, transmissible, and even alterable. 
That doesn’t make religious commitment “logical,” and it doesn’t resolve it down to 
assumptions, facts, or value statements; but it does make religious commitment 
accessible to more forms of expression and more forms of intervention.18  
                                                
18 The same might be said of our persistent definition of religion as identity. While 
emphasizing the relations between religious discourse and students’ sense of self has 
done powerful political work in legitimizing religions’ inclusion in the writing classroom, 
it also risks reifying particular relations. Within all of our repeated attestations to 
religion’s role in identity, very little has been said about the way that identity was 
achieved and the way that it is likely to change in the future. The problem with this is 
very similar to what Horner and Lu argued in “The Problematic of Experience” about 
desire. In that article, Horner and Lu argue that students may want certain things when 
they enter our classroom, and those desires should be taken into account. But the desires 
students have at nineteen often change: over-privileging the desires of a certain moment 
in their life, as some instructors have suggested we do, risks ignoring that these desires 
have been shaped into this particular form and will continue to re-form in the future. It 
would be irresponsible to reify the desires of the student at one moment and only work to 
meet those desires, ignoring all of the other forms that student and her desires may take. 
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This, I believe, is an implicit concern in DePalma’s article. He focuses significant 
attention on the dynamic relationship between religious beliefs and experience. Religious 
belief, DePalma argues, is a “working out of experience,” and so he encourages students 
to reflect back on faith-defining events (223-4; 232). I’ve described DePalma’s strategy 
in depth in chapter one: working specifically with an apparently evangelical student 
named Thomas, DePalma responds to Thomas’s accounts of encounters with the Holy 
Spirit by suggesting ways that Thomas might better communicate and construct these 
religious experiences. DePalma indicates that Thomas could better describe the sensory 
experiences (235-6), wants him to complicate and explicate phrases like “the presence of 
the Holy Spirit,” “God’s will” and “surrender to Him” as well as terms like “calling,” 
“grace,” and “ministry” (232), and thinks Thomas should more carefully mine some of 
his key terms by explaining the personal meaning they’ve acquired through his religious 
experiences (terms like identity, will, and surrender) (237). These are certainly promising 
avenues of approach that are likely to achieve DePalma’s goals: they should encourage 
Thomas to reflect in academic ways on both his religious experience and his religious 
discourse, and could realistically improve Thomas’s ability to communicate those 
experiences and that discourse to academic outsiders. Additionally focusing on religious 
sensation as social, acquired, and relational, however, would provide Thomas and 
DePalma with a transformative way to re-construct this spiritual experience; one which 
could help Thomas to see further opportunities for actively participating and even 
intervening in his religious experiences and relationship with God.  
                                                
When we reify a momentary identity or quarantine a religious feeling, we risk doing the 
same thing. Our options for creating change become extremely limited. 
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While at times Thomas reports upon successfully achieving religious sensations 
and relationships, oftentimes Thomas is reporting on difficulties he has with his feelings 
and the strained relationship with God that those struggles index. He seems to feel very 
little agency with regards to those religious sensations and that relationship with God, and 
this lack of agency is a source of significant angst in the narrative. Thomas speaks at one 
point as if God and his feelings towards God have together deserted him, for instance. He 
writes,  
Ever since I broke up with Jen, I feel like God is nowhere to be found. Just 
when I needed him most, he has up and left. I read my bible every day, but 
I just don’t feel drawn the way I used to. What’s happening with me? Why 
can’t I get a hold of myself? God, I am trying to fix this, but I just don’t 
know how. I just have never felt so alone, and I don’t think anyone gets it. 
(230) 
 
Here Thomas is clearly flustered by his inability to master his feelings, but also by a 
sense of loneliness stemming from a double social loss—not only is his relationship with 
God seemingly gone (“he has up and left”), but Thomas also feels that others can’t 
understand his situation. Thomas also admits the difficulty of communicating other 
religious feelings, implying a pattern: “For a long time, I felt a calling to ministry. It’s 
hard to describe, but I just had a feeling inside of me that it was right for me” (231). As I 
noted at the beginning of this section, other students in our literature have similarly 
confessed to difficulties articulating religious feelings, a complaint that instructors have 
frequently highlighted.  
So instead of trying to better express his frustration or the sense of absence he 
feels when his relationship with God is on the fritz, Thomas might be better served if 
encouraged to deliberate on the mediators and processes involved in producing that 
relationship and those sensations at that moment. Clearly, attempting to describe feelings 
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is difficult for anyone—and poetic genres for expressing them will not always meet 
students’ needs (especially not if they’re trying to gain more control or understanding of 
them). Focusing on religious sensation as acquired and social could, however, by helping 
them to write about the mediative role they and others have played in both enabling and 
disabling their feelings and experiences. In Thomas’s case this type of focus could afford 
a position of greater agency to Thomas but also to others like his girlfriend Jen, while 
also giving him specific language for representing and interrogating the forces and causes 
of his feelings. 
Reading his account with the social and sensational aspects of religious 
experience in mind, I see Thomas’s relationship with God as heavily shaped by his social 
conditions. First, there are the commonalities between Thomas’s account and other 
evangelical accounts: like Luhrmann’s informants, Thomas uses the word “peace” twice 
in one short entry describing a positive religious interaction with the Holy Spirit (231), 
suggesting that his sensation (or at least its representational aspect) circulate. Second, in 
keeping with Luhrmann’s informant-accounts Thomas depicts a strong connection 
between his cognitive relationship to the Bible and his emotional relationship to the Bible 
and to God—perhaps just as interestingly, he depicts how that connection is also affected 
by his emotional relationship with Jen, his ex-girlfriend. For example, when Jen quotes 
Scripture to him shortly after their break-up—“Wait for the Lord. Be strong and take 
heart, and wait for the Lord”—Thomas’s journaled retort is, “You know what, no thank 
you. I hate that verse. What does it even mean?” (230). Thomas is “unable” to 
comprehend the transparent meaning of the Word because his relationship with Jen, and 
God, have become troubled. Here, sensation again points to the social and mediated 
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nature of religious literacy. This could be the germ of a revision suggestion in which 
Thomas would be asked to highlight the mutually transformative social relations he 
experienced between he and Jen, and he and God. If I pushed out our boundaries to 
consider the cultural forces at work here, I might ask Thomas to consider what discourses 
on love, sex, and relationships (religious or not) were speaking into his relationship with 
Jen, and so through that relationship into his relationship with God and the Bible.  
Many other mediators, too, played significant roles in helping Thomas recover his 
ability to hear God speaking. Here, for example, is Thomas’s report of the moment when 
he does finally sense God’s presence again:  
August 26, 2008: Dear Diary . . . Morning prayer started off sitting in a 
small, slightly crowded room joined together in body and spirit with 20 
other people. The profound feeling of the presence of the Holy Spirit is a 
weight and a heat that surrounds you and fills your lungs with every 
breath, as if the air were somehow thicker. Yet it is comforting, like the 
warm embrace of a parent; it removes all distractions, and I am at peace . . 
. Then, after worship, we transitioned into the retreat of silence. Two and a 
half hours by myself in total silence. At first, I was very intimidated by 
this, two hours alone with my thoughts with all the confusion in my life at 
this point. But as I picked a comfortable spot under a tree and looked out 
over the lake, peace crept back in. During the silence, I spent a long time 
reflecting on my life and praying for God to reveal whatever he has been 
trying to show me. This time I was willing to wait, willing to take heart, 
and eagerly I anticipated an answer. In the quiet, God slowly revealed to 
me a lot more than I bargained for. (231, ellipses original) 
 
I think we see here the real advantage of DePalma’s emphasis upon thick description—
thick description draws out the mediators in an account. Moving towards revision or 
further assignments, a transformational perspective will ask Thomas to think about the 
work being done in this scene by a variety of things, people, and regulated practices.  
There are the four hours or so of religious programming—the morning group 
prayer, transitioning into group “worship” (likely music), transitioning into contemplative 
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silence. There is the programmed experiential progression from individual to corporate 
body, then back again into individual isolation. There is the small size of the room, 
important, as studies have found that being crowded increases excitement and suasion. 
There is the relational orientation of the programming: the direct invocation and address 
of God through prayer, and the proclamations of relationship that generally infuse 
Christian worship music—which Thomas suggests successfully provoke the presence of 
the Holy Spirit—followed by the long period of silence and prayer in which Thomas 
specifically supplicated God for his personal communication. This period of silence, of 
course, is enhanced by the cultural symbolism that attaches contemplative ambience to 
the lake scene. Further, I think there are indications that Thomas may be practicing the 
metakinetic forms of attention described by Luhrmann’s informants—he is willing to 
wait, willing to take heart, eagerly anticipating an answer—and so, after an hour or so of 
preparatory practices that moved Thomas into a heightened emotional and spiritual state 
and then two hours of prayer and internal attendance, he gets it. God speaks to him. 
That’s a lot of work, a lot of mediation, a lot of agency. These not only offer 
opportunities for reporting, but for deliberation; Thomas could be asked to examine the 
cultural sources that shape, disseminate, and thus enable these practices as effective 
religious practices.  
If we encouraged him to look backward in his life, Thomas might examine how 
he learned to utilize such sensational practices—and to expect and interpret such 
sensational experiences—in the first place. In terms of practical experience, instructors 
could ask Thomas, When do you remember first having such sensations of God’s 
presence, revealing something to you? What were the circumstances that time, and which 
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of those circumstances were also present in this occasion? Are there specific types of 
prayers that you pray, or ways that you’ve learned to attain the “quiet” and “waiting” that 
you describe? Who taught you to do that, or what other experiences helped you locate 
those skills? Are there books on this, or other publicly-disseminated models of religious 
behavior that resemble your practice? In terms of recognizing those sensations as 
specifically religious, instructors might ask Thomas to elaborate again on its sources: 
How have you acquired the ability to recognize the Spirit’s presence? What other 
individuals taught you how to recognize this? What did that training entail? Where have 
you ever read, viewed, or otherwise heard about these experiences and sensations? How 
might these past second-hand experiences have informed your experience?  
Then, as I suggested with James, instructors could produce a sense of cultural 
specificity by asking Thomas to compare reports of religious experience offered by 
practitioners of other religions or other churches to his own report. How do they differ, 
and why does he think that is? What might Thomas consider including from those 
practices into his own—and if he’s unwilling to include any of these alternative means of 
relating to God, he might go back to the definitions of religion he’s operating with. 
Instuctors’ comments could, too, turn attention to the future by asking Thomas to 
consider what he can do with this new conception of religious sensation as acquired. How 
can he intervene in his own religious practices or those of others with this new 
knowledge? What work could be accomplished by representing religious experience in 
this way? Conversely, Thomas could discuss any losses or contradictions this new, fairly 
academic representation creates for him. Does thinking of religious sensation through this 
academic lens change Thomas’s relationship with God, or the way he now remembers 
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that experience on retreat? Does the excitement of experiencing God’s presence go away 
if it seems orchestrated or manufactured? Does it create a sense of contradiction for him 




In a well-known Bible story King Solomon is confronted by two mothers and one 
baby. Each woman claims that the infant is her child. Those of Judeo-Christian heritage 
know, of course, the punch line—Solomon demonstrates his divine wisdom by drawing 
the truth out of the women themselves. He orders the baby cut in half. It was not his 
intent, of course, but by today’s light there is something scientific and analytical in 
Solomon’s recommendation: let us cut the baby open, releasing the child from its 
infantile muteness, and let the body itself tell us the truth. One woman—the ESV calls her 
“the woman whose son was alive”— exclaims, basically, “In that case, she can keep the 
child. Don’t kill it.” The other, stone-faced, urges the king to get on with it. Solomon 
declares the first woman the boy’s mother on the basis of those reactions, saying, “Give 
the child to the first woman, and by no means put him to death; she is his mother” (I 
Kings 3:16-27). Solomon, you sly devil, we say. Tricking the women into telling you the 
truth.  
But lately I am more compelled by an alternate reading. As a modern reader it has 
always troubled me that the women in the story are not named, and as such the 
distinctions between the two women are never better than hazy. They are described as 
“two prostitutes,” “the one,” “the other,” “the first woman,” etc. The reader is never told 
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whether the plaintiff or the defendant is speaking after the opening explanation of the 
circumstances, so that the reader is never granted the “truth” we often demand from such 
a story. We don’t know which woman was stone-faced, and which was loving—only that 
the loving woman received the child. It’s like ending a detective novel with the 
murderer’s execution, but never showing readers the face under the hood. Here, we only 
know that the story is adequately resolved in the sense that the mother has her child. That 
should be enough, right?  
But this raises, for me, a critical implication: if we do not need to know who was 
telling the truth—plaintiff or defendant—perhaps it’s because Solomon didn’t need to 
know either. The real story for me isn’t about the honesty of the women or the facts of 
the child’s birth—the narrative (and by turn Solomon) proves to be concerned with the 
baby and with its mother. A relationship. Solomon’s real wisdom may have been in 
eschewing information (facts, knowledge of the past) for present effects. So is it possible, 
I’d like to ask, that the birth mother did not end up with the baby, but the mother did? 
Why not? What if the reason we aren’t given any way to differentiate between the 
women’s histories (their characters, their “selves”) is because they don’t matter? Then, 
Solomon’s wisdom is not in “knowing the truth,” nor in “revealing the truth,” nor in 
otherwise pretending to find what is inaccessible but instead in recognizing, in making, a 
mother. Motherhood is “yearning,” being “moved,” effects that the ESV says Solomon’s 
word triggered in one woman and not the other (3:26). From there on, motherhood 
becomes really a matter of legal positioning—Solomon’s performative utterance declares 
“She is his mother” in the same breath as it gives the child to her, so that this particular 
type of motherhood is born in discourse. 
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Solomon’s story points out, certainly, other approaches to an investigation. We 
can proceed assuming that cutting open the baby will reveal a factual mother. We can 
proceed assuming that careful questioning may eventually coax or cajole a hidden truth 
or partial truth from the women (that’s how the story is generally read). We can give up 
on both and declare that whatever we decide it won’t ever get to the truth; we may 
believe what we determine, but we can forget about ever being certain of it. In this case, 
which sounds (but is not) close to my reading, the true mother may not end up with the 
child. But that’s not what I’m saying: I’m saying the mother inevitably ends up with her 
child in this story because Solomon is re-defining a mother as something one can become 
or cease to be, rather than something one simply is. One woman became a mother 
through her responses and through Solomon’s actions—the other woman became the 
mother of the other, dead child through her responses and through Solomon’s actions.   
This reading of Solomon’s story compels the dissertation I’ve written. My 
founding assumption is that religions, like mothers, are being made continually. The 
important questions have never been what religion, or Christianity, or evangelicalism, 
really are: the important questions have always been what forces have shaped those 
formations into their current form, what relationships and practices maintain that current 
form, and in what ways can our actions intervene and alter future formations of religion, 
and Christianity, and evangelicalism? And, specific to our discipline, what habitual ways 
of thinking, seeing, reading, and writing about religion operate in our relations to 
religious discourses and religious students? If instead of answering these questions we 
wish to continue arguing over what religion is, or what evangelicalism or Islam or 
Judaism truly are, the result for ourselves and our auditors will be something like 
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Solomon’s response to the two women’s endless debate: “‘The one says, ‘This is my son 
that is alive, and your son is dead’; and the other says, ‘No; but your son is dead, and my 
son is the living one’.’ And the king said, ‘Bring me a sword’” (3:23-24). There is no end 
to such an argument, but there will assuredly always be two polarized sides, a weak 
middle, and a scramble for a sword.  
The binary logic on religion is pervasive, and politically consequential. Mohler 
said weeks before our recent presidential election, speaking from just such a binary 
perspective on the difference between Democrats and Republicans, “We are not looking 
at minor matters of political difference. We are staring into the abyss of comprehensive 
moral conflict. Christian voters,” he continued, cannot escape “the fact that our most 
basic convictions will be revealed in the voting booth come November” (“The Great 
American Worldview Test”). Barack Obama and the Democratic Party were applauded in 
some corners for eventually taking an equally antagonistic rhetorical stance, dramatically 
apparent to me as I watched the Democratic National Convention. In the end, such 
irresolvable arguments must resolve down to force: who yells loudest, who steals the 
baby last, who gets the most votes, who grabs the government’s sword.  
Thinking back to Thomson’s student-informants and the ways they struggle to 
represent themselves within the hegemonic influence of official evangelical discourses 
like Mohler’s, and thinking back to instructors’ and scholars’ corresponding difficulties 
with reading and representing religious students and religious texts, it is clear that we all 
need strategies for re-mapping the polarized, two party, heaven and hell religio-political 
world of Mohler and official evangelicalism. As I have argued in this fifth chapter, this 
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re-mapping is a matter of recognizing (that is, not only reading but legitimating and 
realizing) both difference, and change.  
To better recognize difference, students and instructors need new ways of 
recognizing and locating official evangelicalism’s representations, representatives, and 
accounts on a different, less polarized, more pluralized map, even if it’s just a map of 
evangelicalism itself. If we can produce that map, it will offer us a richer variety of ways 
to position ourselves and relate to one another on religious and political questions. This 
might allow students to more creatively align their position in relation with their 
experience of religion, or their desires for religion, or the political reality that they desire, 
or to the various and competing commitments shaping their political and religious lives. 
To better recognize change, students need help focusing on religious processes rather 
than contents or products, so that they will have a better chance at seeing religion, the 
academy, and the contexts in which it plays out as sets of moving parts involving 
relations of agency and power. If they do, then they may also understand themselves as 
one of those moving parts, part of the answer to how and why; they may see themselves 
having the capacity to intentionally and non-intentionally change, as well as be changed 
by, their religious experiences and discourses and the contexts in which such experiences 
and discourses take place.  
Accordingly, the reading strategies I’ve recommended to instructors throughout 
this dissertation are intended to help students explore new ways of representing, locating, 
and creating religion. At the very least, I hope they help instructors practice forms of 
reading and writing that acknowledge, and help students address, the challenges of 
representation—the need for and possibility of responding to official discourse using 
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one's own practical experience in religions and academic cultures. But in addition, these 
reading strategies should help students see how they can exercise their agency in 
transforming cultures and identities through reading and writing. If these strategies are 
successful, we may be able to simultaneously practice and promote tolerance by helping 
religious students “engage the fluidity of [religion] in pursuit of new knowledge, new 
ways of knowing, and more peaceful relations” (Lu, Horner, Royster, and Trimbur 307). 
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